THE RECORD OF JCP-CPC TALKS

How Mao Zedong Scrapped the Joint Communiqué

Edited by Masaru KOJIMA

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

THE RECORD OF THE TALKS BETWEEN THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

—How Mao Zedong Scrapped the Joint Communiqué—

Edited by Masaru KOJIMA,
Member of the Presidium, CC JCP

Central Committee, Japanese Communist Party

Published by
the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party
1980
Sendagaya 4-26-7, Shibuya-ku Tokyo 151 JAPAN
Tel. Tokyo (403)6111

英文「日中両党会談始末記」

発行所　日本共産党中央委員会
発売元　日本共産党中央委員会出版局
東京都渋谷区千駄ヶ谷4-26-7　電話(403)6111
振替東京2-21096

1980年10月31日　発行　¥2,500

CONTENTS

* Introduction 1
* Visit to Three Countries: The call for an anti-imperialist international united front .. 4
* The International Communist Movement at That Time and the Japanese Communist Party 14
* Shanghai-Hanoi-Beijing 44
* JCP-CPC Talks Open in Beijing 63
* Second Session: "Anti-U.S." or "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet" 85
* Third Session: Key point thrown into relief 110
* JCP-CPC Talks End--Serious disagreements remain 137
* Welcome Mass Rally and JCP-CPC Joint Communiqué 169
* The Meeting with Mao Zedong 197
* Mao Faction Intensifies Attacks on Japanese Communist Party 244
* JCP Representatives Suffer Brutal Violence--Beijing under "Great Cultural Revolution" 260
* The JCP Resolute Counter-Offensive 276
* The Nixon Visit to China and Reversal of China's Foreign Policy 291

* Foresightedness of the JCP Shown in the Development of Affairs 313

* General Trend of Communist Movement Rejects Hegemonism 322

* In Conclusion--Lesson of history 325

- \- \-

APPENDIX I Joint Communiqué of the Delegation of the Japanese Communist Party and the Delegation of the Vietnam Workers' Party on the Former's Visit to Vietnam, February 27, 1966 331

APPENDIX II Joint Statement of the Delegations of the Japanese Communist Party and the Workers' Party of Korea, March 21, 1966 337

APPENDIX III Speech by General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto at the Grand Welcome Rally in Beijing, March 26, 1966 352

APPENDIX IV Speech by Political Bureau Member Peng Zhen at the Grand Rally in Beijing, March 26, 1966 364

- \- \-

INTRODUCTION

The fourteen-year rupture in the relations between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China has originated from the talks with Mao Zedong, when a delegation of the JCP visited China in the spring of 1966, for the purpose of holding bilateral talks between the two Parties.

On the points of disagreement that arose, Mao Zedong himself said "We will discuss them again at some time". But after the talks, the CPC leadership attacked and intervened in the affairs of the JCP. It was at this time that the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was launched full swing, which proved actually to be a power struggle waged by Mao Zedong using every possible means. The attacks and interventions against the JCP were escalated in parallel with the expansion of the "Great Cultural Revolution".

The "Great Cultural Revolution" has now been exposed as bankrupt. Diplomatic relations were restored between Japan and China, and a joint communiqué issued in September 1972. Then in October 1978, a Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed, but relations between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China have remained in state of rupture since 1966.

The main purpose of the JCP delegation's visit to China in 1966 was to frankly set out the Party's view that a broad international united front should be formed of all anti-imperialist forces in the world, to struggle against the U.S. aggression in Vietnam. At that time the Japanese Communist Party's relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were in disarray, with open polemics going on between them. An evaluation of the leadership of the CPSU was one of the major issues taken up in the JCP-CPC talks. The attitude toward the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam was truly a historic test of those days, and the major point at issue in the discussions with the CPC was which way to choose: an "anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. united front", or an "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front".

The issues involved in the anti-imperialist struggle discussed in the talks were later to be subjected to the judgment of history, i.e., the defeat of U.S. imperialism in Vietnam. But by then the CPC leadership had changed its position, moving from an "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" to an "anti-Soviet united front", making "the Soviet Union the chief enemy". China has now gone to the extreme of supporting the Japan-U.S. military alliance, and is strengthening its relationship with its "allies", the United States, Japan and West European countries.

Both past and future relations between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China are a matter of serious concern within the JCP as well as in our country, for which reason it is now very important that the truth of the JCP-CPC talks of 14 years ago be made public. Some of the significant points in these talks have already been made known by Presidium Chairman Kenji Miyamoto in an article entitled "Our Last Discussions with Mao Zedong", which appeared in the weekly magazine "Shukan Asahi", on June 24, 1977, which focuses on the 1966 talks. But the full report of the talks, including the sequence of events that preceded the discussions with Mao have never been published.

During these 14 years, the historic verdict was given on the crime of the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam, and persons directly concerned including Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, are no longer living. There is now no basic reason why the discussions at that time should not be made public. In addition, taking account of both the changes that have taken place in the international communist movement and the existing relations between Japan and China, it will be very meaningful to bring to light the whole of the discussions that led to the break in the relations between the JCP and the CPC. This will not only reveal the facts of the past events and make it possible to gain a better understanding of present affairs but also offer a better perspective of the future.

As one of the members who accompanied the delegation on that historic tour, I have put together this report with the approval of the Party Center, in order to make known the story of the "three-country visit", to Vietnam, China and Korea, and more especially the whole proceedings of the JCP-CPC talks.

This detailed record of the talks, now made public for the first time after 14 years, is a history of bitter struggle in the international communist movement relating to the war of aggression against Vietnam, undoubtedly one of the major political events of the post-World War II period. It is also a historic record that involves points at issue in the international communist movement itself. The serious split in the international communist movement has yet to be overcome, and this important document makes clear one of the root causes of that split. It is a record in which the vitality displayed by the JCP Program and its independent and self-reliant line in facing the serious obstacles and historic trials, is vividly seen, as an expression of the outcome of the Party's independent scientific studies carried on since 1958.

I have done my best to faithfully describe historical facts, but needless to say the responsibility for the wording lies with me as the editor.

In preparing this report, I have used many documents which already had been made public in order to present the background to the 1966 JCP-CPC talks, and have added some records and information gained later, assisted by the comrades concerned, who gave me facts that have not previously been made public.

VISIT TO THREE COUNTRIES: THE CALL FOR AN ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL UNITED FRONT

The Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party announced on February 4, 1966 that it would send a large delegation led by Kenji Miyamoto, at that time General Secretary and now Presidium Chairman, to three Asian socialist countries: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in order to hold discussions with the Communist and Workers' Parties of these countries. The following comrades comprised the delegation: delegation leader Kenji Miyamoto; deputy delegation leader Masayoshi Oka, Standing Presidium member and Director of the Akahata Editorial Board (now Presidium member emeritus); Korehito Kurahara, Presidium member and Chief of the Cultural Department (now Presidium member emeritus); Itaru Yonehara, Presidium member and Editor-in-Chief of "Zen'ei" (Vanguard) (now Presidium member emeritus); and Central Committee members Tetsuzo Fuwa (now Chief of the Secretariat), Koichiro Ueda (now Presidium Vice-Chairman), and Akira Kudo (now Presidium member). The delegation was assisted by Hiroshi Tachiki and Masaru Kojima (now Presidium members). Ichiro Sunama, Presidium alternate member and member of the Secretariat (now Presidium member emeritus), at that time in Beijing as permanent representative of the Japanese Communist Party, also joined the delegation.

The main purpose of what is called the "three-country visit" was to exchange views frankly with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the three countries, as part of the Party's effort to

establish an international united front against the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam.

Needless to say, the focus of world attention at that time was the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, and the struggle of the Vietnamese people to defend their country. After the signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1954, U.S. imperialism took over from French neocolonialism, and gradually increased its intervention in South Vietnam, which by the 1960s had developed into a blatant attack on the South Vietnamese people, aggression that later was expanded to North Vietnam.

In August 1964, the "Tonkin Gulf Incident" was staged by U.S. imperialism, and air attacks began on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, described as "retaliation". By February 1965, the Johnson Administration had begun constant air strikes against the North, and then came up with a phony "peace plan", temporarily suspending the bombing. After a 37-day pause, on January 31, 1966, the U.S. air attacks on the DRV were resumed.

(note)

Tonkin Gulf Incident--On August 4, 1964, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered U.S. forces to attack DRV warships and support facilities, on the pretext of retaliation for alleged attacks by Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S. naval craft. This whole episode was later exposed as false by the U.S. Congress.

With the escalation of the war in South Vietnam, U.S. imperialist air strikes against the DRV were intensified, bringing the struggle of the Vietnamese people to a most serious stage.

It was in this situation that the Japanese Communist Party made repeated appeals for formation of an anti-imperialist international united front to support the Vietnamese people. This was seen as the most urgent and serious task of the anti-imperialist and democratic forces of the world to defeat the U.S. imperialist aggression. The Party appealed widely for the socialist camp and the international communist movement to build unity, whatever differences existed between them, as the bulwark of an international united front to stand against the U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

The direct incentive that led to the "three-country visit" was in the views put forward by the Communist Party of China leadership, set out on November 11, 1965 in a joint article of the Editorial Departments of "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily) and "Hongqi" (Red Flag), entitled "Refutation of the New Leadership of the CPSU on 'United Action'". This article was a clear exposition of the policy adopted by the CPC leadership, which had been organizing "left" parties in country after country, based on the idea that a split in the international communist movement was inevitable. It openly began to advocate "reorganization and differentiation" in the international communist movement, saying, "The feature of the present world situation is that under the conditions of the daily deepening international struggle, now great change, great differentiation and great reorganization are in progress". The Communist Party of China in this article made clear its fundamental move from its traditional line of an anti-U.S. united front to an "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet international united front". This meant the organizational exclusion of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The reason for this change was stated as: the CPSU is taking joint action with U.S. imperialism on the Vietnam issue, and the call by the CPSU for "joint action" is a means to promote a split; no joint action is possible with those who reverse relations between enemy and friend.

The aggression against Vietnam waged by U.S. imperialism, under which the thirty-million Vietnamese people were fighting for survival, was central to U.S. imperialist global strategy, into which it poured dollars, weapons and troops, setting at nought its own national "prestige". The national income (nominal) of the DRV stood at only one two-hundred and fiftieth part of that of the United States. There was no comparison between the industrial power and technological levels of the two countries. While admittedly the human factor is decisive in war, the superiority or inferiority of weapons is also an important factor. In these circumstances, the DRV had no choice but to rely on aid mainly from the socialist countries, as far as supplies of aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, missiles and other modern weapons were concerned.

At that time, open polemics between the Japanese Communist Party and Communist Party of the Soviet Union were going on, and the CPSU leadership was being severely criticized for its big-power chauvinist interference in the Japanese revolutionary and democratic movements, and because it had taken a line of subservience to the U.S. But around this time, the JCP took note of the dismissal of N.S. Khrushchev as Party First Secretary and Premier in October 1964, and the new CPSU leadership called for joint action in opposition to the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam (March 1965). Aid to Vietnam was increased, after being very passive during the Khrushchev era. This changed attitude of the Soviet Union led the JCP to insist that the Soviet Union should be included in international joint action and in a united front against U.S. imperialism. The position of the Japanese Communist Party was that the situation could be improved only by adopting what we called a revolutionary dual policy in united action; it meant making a clear and positive evaluation and promotion of what is correct and criticism of what is wrong.

The JCP considered that the CPC leadership's blunt policy switch to "an anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" would have a negative effect on the struggle in support of the Vietnamese people, and was resolved to do all in its power to overcome these ill effects.

The central staff of the Japanese Communist Party set about an energetic re-study and deep analysis of the political and theoretical problems centering around formation of an anti-imperialist international united front. In addition to analyzing the Vietnam situation, then at a very serious stage, and exposing the true character of U.S. imperialism, there was another important task to be tackled, viz., to make a total practical and theoretical analysis of the question of a united front, from the standpoint of scientific socialism, studying Lenin's achievements on the united front issue and the historical lessons of the 7th Congress of the Comintern (July 1935), where anti-fascist united front tactics were worked out. All statements on the united front issue were gathered from "Lenin's Collected Works". It was a very arduous job, and produced an enormous number of excerpts full of rich material for the historical study of the united front issue.

In the effort to strengthen the anti-imperialist international united front, the joint struggle of Asian parties, the parties of China, Vietnam, Korea and Japan, were regarded by the JCP to be of major importance. But the leadership of the Communist Party of China had by then adopted the policy of exclusion of the Soviet Union from international united action in support of Vietnam. The JCP therefore considered it necessary to put its position clearly before them in discussions, with the hope that the Chinese party would stand for an anti-imperialist international united front in support of the Vietnamese people. It was recognized

that it would not be easy to reach an agreement of views with the Chinese leadership, but we thought it may be possible to find some solution if the issue was discussed sincerely, frankly and coolly, in recognition of the tense situation in Vietnam.

Our ground for such thinking was our expectation toward Mao Zedong. In his article "Last Discussions with Mao Zedong", Chairman Miyamoto says:

> "It was my third meeting with Mao Zedong. The first was in February 1959 in Zhengzhou, and the second in the fall of 1964 in Hangzhou. When I met him the first time, he had unexpectedly told me that the attitude taken by the CPC toward the 1950 split in the JCP had been a 'mistake'. This made me feel something of the greatness of Mao Zedong; for a long time I had regarded his theory and practice of the Chinese revolution as epoch-making.
>
> "My second contact came in the spring of 1964. I was in a run-down condition after a long bout with pneumonia, and hardly able to walk, and the Chinese Party kindly invited me to recuperate in the warm climate of Hainan Island. At that time, Mao Zedong, visiting Guangdong, had wanted to see me but did not come there out of consideration of my being under medical care. When told of this later, I realized how considerate he was and this heightened my impression of him.
>
> "So, in visiting China in 1966, we had hoped to reach agreement in calm discussion with Mao Zedong, because that was the kind of man he was, though we realized that such an agreement would not be easy to reach, judging from articles that so far had been published by China."

As we were to discuss the Vietnam problem with the Chinese leadership, we deemed it necessary first to visit Vietnam to get a true picture of the situation there, as well as the facts about aid received from the Soviet Union and from China, to enable us to put forward the JCP views on the strength of the facts.

The Japanese Communist Party Central Committee in December 1965 proposed to the Party leaderships of China, Vietnam and Korea that we should send a large delegation to all three countries. All parties agreed to our proposal, and sent us official invitations. The sending of such an unprecedentedly large delegation, to include General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto as leader and three presidium members, was an indication of the importance and urgency with which we viewed this task.

When the official announcement of the sending of this delegation was made on February 4, 1966, "Akahata" published a non-attributed article entitled "For Strengthening International United Action and a United Front against U.S. Imperialism". The long article, known as the "February 4 article", covered four pages of "Akahata", in which the JCP position was discussed in great detail, dealing with political and theoretical studies done by the Party on the question of the united front.

The article covered three main subjects: "international united front against U.S. imperialism", "modern revisionism weakening anti-imperialist international unity for national liberation and peace", and "strengthening international united front and unity of the international communist movement". Analyzing the situation surrounding Vietnam, the article discussed from all angles the important role of an international united front against U.S. imperialism, and fully exposed the fallacy of various opportunist trends, which failed to see the centrality of the struggle against U.S. imperialism. The tendency was to take a subservient attitude toward it, and evade the struggle. In reviewing historic and international experiences on the united front issue, the study went into Lenin's appeal to the Second International and the Two-and-a-Half International for united action (1921), and formed the clear conclusion that there should be no rejection of non-revolutionary forces becoming partners in a united action program.

The deep analysis made in the "February 4 article" on the united front issue was an important theoretical contribution to this struggle, and was a strong affirmation of the position of the Japanese Communist Party in working to strengthen the international united front.

(notes)

Second International--The international organization of socialist parties, founded in Paris in commemoration of the centenary of the French Revolution, under the guidance of Friedrich Engels. In World War I, it collapsed as a result of the cooperation of its members with their respective governments in carrying on the imperialist war. After the war, in opposition to the establishment of the Communist International, it was revived in 1920 by right-wing socialist parties of certain countries, and in 1923 amalgamated with the Two-and-a-Half International, proclaiming itself the Socialist Workers International.

Two-and-a-Half International--The international organization established by the centrist social democratic parties of Germany, Britain, France and some other countries, and was called the "International League of Action of Socialist Parties". Because its political position lay somewhere between the Second International and the Third International, it was called the Two-and-a-Half International.

On February 7, 1966, the JCP delegation left Tokyo at 7:10 p.m. by the night limited express train "Asakaze" (Morning Breeze). They were seen off by Party Central Committee Chairman Sanzo Nosaka and other Party leaders, as well as representatives of democratic organizations and many more Party members and supporters. It was a chilly night at the beginning of the spring, but they crowded together in the cold on the platform.

After the overnight train journey, the delegation arrived at Moji at 10:49 a.m. on the 8th. After some rest and lunch at Tobata station, shortly before 2:00 p.m. we took a launch to the Chinese cargo ship "Hongqi" (Red Flag, 16,000 tons), which lay at anchor in Port Wakamatsu, and comrades of the Fukuoka Prefectural Committee gave the party a warm send-off. Clad in overcoats against the cold sea breeze, the delegation members passed through customs at Tobata and an hour later boarded the "Hongqi", to be warmly received by the captain and crew.

The "Hongqi" left port for Shanghai next morning at 7:15 on February 9, and as we sailed, about twenty comrades, including Hyakuro Hayashi, House of Representatives member, circled the ship by launch to wave farewell.

It was a 34-hour journey to Shanghai over the East China Sea. There was then a normal route to Guangzhou via Hongkong in traveling to China, but the British Embassy in Tokyo refused the party visas for Hongkong, so it was necessary to go by sea. The direct flight from Tokyo to Shanghai is now only five hours.

A great number of documents and various materials on the international communist movement and the Vietnam problem were in the luggage carried by the delegation, and the long journey enabled the members to spend time reading the materials again and again, in preparation for the talks. It was a very calm sea, and between our working hours we were able to stroll the decks in the biting cold, sometimes play table tennis or shogi (Japanese chess).

The "Hongqi" was a cargo ship with very narrow bunks, but the JCP delegation was treated warmly by the captain and the 63-member crew. Dinner was a time for chatting with the seamen, and an exchange meeting was also held. Badges of the 1965 Akahata festival were presented to the officers and crew. Early in the morning of the 10th we came near a Chinese warship just before sunrise, and the long trailing white wake on that boundless sea left a deep impression.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AT THAT TIME AND THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

During the trip on the "Hongqi", a non-attributed article was completed for "Akahata", titled "Again on Interventions and Subversive Activities against the Japanese Communist Party and Democratic Movements by the CPSU Leadership and Its Institutions and Organizations". It appeared in the February 20 issue of "Akahata".

This chapter will be a review of the international communist movement at that time, covering JCP-CPSU relations and JCP-CPC relations.

EXPANDED POLEMICS AND 81-PARTY MEETING

Around the 1960 period, differences of opinion were gradually expanding within the international communist movement on the evaluation of U.S. imperialism and other issues.

On September 28, 1959, a mass meeting was held in Moscow to welcome Nikita S. Khrushchev after his visit to the United States. As the first Soviet Premier to visit the United States, Khrushchev had met and talked with U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower at Camp David. In his speech at the rally, Khrushchev enthusiastically told the Moscow citizens that Eisenhower was a man who "understands peace", and who "displayed the wisdom of the nation, courage and will". Ever since, the so-called "Camp David spirit" has been used as though it would open up a "new era in international relations". The understanding reached between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, however, was dissipated soon after this when the

U.S. U-2 was shot down over the territorial air space of the U.S.S.R. In spite of this, however, Khrushchev again praised President John F. Kennedy, who had succeeded Eisenhower, calling him "a statesman of peace", and a "representative of reasonable circles". In June 1961, Khrushchev met with Kennedy in Vienna, and later told the Soviet people through television that Kennedy was a person who was "aware of the important responsibility that falls on the governments of the two powerful nations", the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership was thus led by Khrushchev to base its foreign policy on rapprochement with the United States.

This Soviet move was related to a major change in the global strategy of U.S. imperialism. From the end of World War II through the 1950s, the U.S. imperialists had followed the strategy of "containment of the Soviet Union". In keeping with this, their policy was one of intervention and aggression all over the world, but still they could not stop the struggle of the peoples of the world. So a tactical change was made, to seek "rapprochement" with the Soviet Union and concentrate the imperialist attacks on Asia. First it was "containment of China", and then the Indochina Peninsula was made the major target of U.S. aggression.

Under the illusion created by this U.S. imperialist policy change, Khrushchev was relieved to feel free of the stifling atmosphere of confrontation with the U.S., and the whole world took on a rosy hue in his eyes. He poured out one proposition after another: "imperialism is now forced to accept peaceful coexistence"; "that the worldwide struggle between socialism and capitalism will mainly be decided by the expansion of economic strength of the socialist countries, and that the Soviet Union will move into the stage of communism in the 1980s". This amounted to the emergence of new forms of revisionism in our contemporary world.

Khrushchev did not limit this line to the CPSU but tried to force it on the whole international communist movement, resulting in difficulties and disunity throughout the movement.

In June 1960, immediately after the third Congress of Romanian Workers' Party (the present Romanian Communist Party), a meeting of the representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties attending the Congress was suddenly called. The Japanese Communist Party was represented by Itaru Yonahara. On June 23 he was told by P.A. Satyukov, then chief editor of "Pravda" of the CPSU, that a meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties was to be held at the same place. Satyukov showed Yonehara a letter sent about a week earlier from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. "Read it", he was told, "and you will realize what the agenda will be". In April that year, the Communist Party of China had published an article entitled "Long Live Leninism!" by the editorial board of the "Hongqi" (Red Flag) magazine. The article was devoted to criticism of the Khrushchev line though not by name; it said that the "peaceful coexistence" policy advocated by Khrushchev was a form of submission to the United States.

As was learned later, there had been differing opinions between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on some issues, including "peaceful coexistence", "war and peace", and "the transition to socialism". Differences were also evident in the foreign policies of the two Parties.

The purpose of convening the Bucharest conference was for Khrushchev to condemn China on the strength of a majority vote and have the whole international communist movement adopt the Khrushchev line in the international meeting. The CPSU's letter to the CPC contained criticism of China's "Long Live Leninism!" It condemned the CPC, taking up problems of "peaceful coexistence", "war and peace", "transition to socialism", and so on, which later became the main subjects of polemics in the whole international communist movement. To organize an international conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in this way without any prior consultation is naturally wrong. But up until then the international communist movement had managed to maintain unity in spite of the danger of international confrontation and split within the movement. This was the situation when the representatives of all the 50 parties present at the Romanian Workers' Party Congress met in conference.

Khrushchev gave a one and a half hour speech, devoted to a fierce attack on China. The Chinese representative, Peng Zhen, replied in refutation of Khrushchev's accusations. The JCP representative Yonehara did not follow up the condemnation of China by Khrushchev. The Japanese Communist Party had made an independent and far-reaching theoretical analysis of questions about the aggressive character of U.S. imperialism, the policy of peaceful coexistence, and other issues, through the long period of whole party debate on the Party Program. In the conference, Yonehara expressed opposition to both the one-sided emphasis on peaceful coexistence and the total rejection of it. When the debate ended, the Bucharest conference decided to hold an international meeting of Communist and Workers' parties in the autumn of 1960, to attempt to resolve the issues, from which background the 81-Party Meeting was held in 1960.

The 81-Party Meeting was an authentic international conference, meeting under the agreement reached in Bucharest by 50 of the world's Communist and Workers' Parties. It proved to be a very difficult meeting because of the sequence of events that led to it. A preliminary session for the

Meeting lasted nearly one month in Moscow, followed by the plenary session from November 10 to December 1, 1960.

The Japanese Communist Party sent a delegation to this meeting under the leadership of General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto, along with Satomi Hakamada, Tomio Nishizawa and Itaru Yonehara. In both the preliminary session and the Meeting itself, the delegation played an active part in the attempt to consolidate the unity of the international communist movement, based on a correct and principled policy.

The most important points made by the JCP delegation were as follows: the need is to expose the aggressive character of U.S. imperialism and firmly carry on the struggle against it; all Communist and Workers' Parties are independent and have equal rights, and in the present international communist movement there should be neither a "leading Party" nor a leading international center, such as the Comintern, to operate on the principle of democratic centralism; the international communist movement should proceed with theoretical debates in principled ways, but must not cause any organizational split in the movement, excluding neither the CPC nor the CPSU.

The preliminary session was held as a meeting of the drafting commission made up of representatives of 26 parties. At that time Khrushchev was attending the U.N. General Assembly, and returned to Moscow when the preliminary session had almost ended. A document drafted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was submitted to the preliminary session. Presidium Chairman Miyamoto (then General Secretary) in an interview with the weekly "Asahi Journal" in July 1967, made the following reference to the preliminary session and the role played by the JCP delegation:

> "The CPSU submitted to the preliminary meeting a draft which contained many important points in question. In short, Khrushchev's opportunist point-of-view regarding U.S. imperialism was reflected in various problems. Parties of Asian countries which were suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression or which were deeply involved in national liberation struggles naturally expressed many frank criticisms of this draft. We proposed more than eighty amendments, making every effort to bring the draft into line with Marxist-Leninist principles. Other Parties also presented many suggested amendments. On the other hand, many Parties were, in principle, for the Soviet draft, so many discussions were held on questions of principles or strategy and tactics."

The Statement unanimously adopted by the meeting said that U.S. imperialism "has been an enemy of the peoples of the world", and "is the chief bulwark of world reaction and an international gendarme".

Some Parties put forward the idea of restoring an international leading center, but the JCP delegation, stressing that all Parties are independent and self-reliant, strongly opposed this. Our position was reflected in the adopted Statement, which set out the proposition that all parties "are independent and have equal rights; they shape their policies according to the specific conditions in their respective countries and in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles, and support each other", and that differences of opinion between parties should be dealt with in necessary consultations between the leadership concerned. This formulation was epoch-making in the history of the international communist movement. In respect of this, Presidium Chairman Miyamoto, in the same interview, said:

> "At the farewell party for representatives of many Parties, after the preliminary meeting, in which Khrushchev also took part, he turned to me and said that he had heard that the JCP representatives were afraid of the restoration of the state of affairs that existed at the time of the Comintern, but this was not their intention. We emphasized that communist Parties, whether big or small, having independent and equal rights, should never decide matters by majority vote, but should work to the formula of unanimity in their joint meetings. Though some Parties tried to refute this, we did not yield our ground, but emphasized that this was the most fundamental principle for the unity of the present international communist movement."

The draft Statement presented by the CPSU was not satisfactory in all points when adopted by the meeting. For example, the Japanese Communist Party categorically opposed the tendency to regard the CPSU as the "leading party", but the Statement contained a definition that did give the CPSU a special status.

At any rate, the Statement of the 81-Party Meeting played an important role in preserving the unity and cooperation of the international communist movement. Presidium Chairman Miyamoto in his interview, also said:

> "Although there still remained some vague and incorrect provisions, the joint statement of this meeting as a whole played a big role in assuring collaboration in the international communist movement in a correct and principled way. It also meant a certain victory of the revolutionary trend in the international communist movement over various deviations from Marxist-Leninist principles."

After the meeting, the Statement was ratified by the central committees of all Parties.

Scarcely a year later, however, the norms of relations between Parties, which had been approved by the Statement of the 81-Party Meeting, were broken by Khrushchev.

It happened in the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in October 1961. From the rostrum of the Congress, Khrushchev made an open attack by name on the Albanian Party of Labor. In the report he said: "The Albanian leaders no longer conceal their disapproval of the course adopted by our Party with a view to completely eliminating the harmful consequences of the cult of Stalin's person, severely condemning abuses of power and reestablishing the Leninist standards of Party and government activity". Condemning the Albanian leaders for practicing the cult of the individual, Khrushchev demanded that they "break away from erroneous views". But the real reason for the attack on Albania was undoubtedly that the APL was increasingly critical of the Soviet Union in the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In fact, Khrushchev said that in spite of the "all-round disinterested help" given by the Soviets to Albania, Albania had become critical of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's attack on Albania at the CPSU Congress was followed by the Parties of Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Hungary, Spain, U.S.A., Chile and other countries. The CPSU asked the JCP delegation, led by Central Committee Chairman Sanzo Nosaka, to follow CPSU in condemning Albania; but the JCP delegation, which disapproved of the use of a Party congress to criticize another party, rejected the Soviet request.

In addressing the Congress, Zhou Enlai, leader of the CPC delegation, refuted Khrushchev's condemnation of Albania, and then left the Congress to return home. The reason he gave was that disputes and differences of opinion should be resolved by discussions, and that an open and unilateral condemnation does not provide a solution to a problem.

The condemnation of Albania by Khrushchev had brought out the differences of opinion within the international communist movement. There were great repercussions throughout the world to this, affecting Japan as well. In January 1962, the Japanese Communist Party published a special issue of "Sekai Seiji Shiryo" (World Political Materials), the predecessor of the present "Sekai Seiji" (World Political Affairs), devoted to "problems" related to Albania". It introduced articles of both the CPSU and the APL, and their leaders' speeches, so that the position of these two parties could be studied objectively. This step meant a search for truth through an objective examination of the issues, and avoidance of superficial conclusions. G. Zhukov of the CPSU, who visited Japan in the spring of that year, criticized the JCP for what it had done, but the JCP leadership rejected his criticism. The CPSU has used every opportunity since then to raise the issue and condemn the JCP. But the JCP has firmly stood its ground, from the firm position of observing the norms set in the Statement of the 81-Party Meeting on relations between parties, and so that all JCP members could study the "Albania issue" independently.

In connection with the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, there was another important problem concerning JCP-CPSU relations. The JCP proposed that that part of the draft program of the CPSU as submitted to the Congress relating to Japan should be rewritten.

The Program of the Japanese Communist Party had been adopted at the 8th Party Congress held in July that year in Tokyo. It defined the present situation in Japan as follows:

> "Fundamentally, those who control Japan today are U.S. imperialism and its subordinate ally, Japanese monopoly capital. Although it is a highly-developed capitalist country, Japan is virtually a dependent country, semi-occupied by U.S. imperialism... By allying itself with U.S. imperialism and intensifying the exploitation of the working class and the masses, Japanese monopoly capital has been revived and strengthened, forming the core of the traitorous forces."

At that time a handful of anti-Party renegades who had dropped out of the JCP attacked the Party, using quotations from various foreign writings and asserting that Japan was an independent imperialist country. The 8th JCP Congress, taking up for study the theories of scientific socialism, made an original and independent analysis of the real position of Japan, leading to the unanimous adoption of the Program. We can rightly claim that the definition of the present situation in Japan, as set out in the Program, and the basic line adopted, have been proved correct by these 20 years of historical development.

The message of the Central Committee of the CPSU to our 8th Party Congress referred to the struggle "against the two main enemies of the Japanese people, U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, which betrays national interests, as well as other domestic forces of reaction", thus expressing affirmation of the JCP Program.

Nevertheless, the draft Program of the CPSU, while pointing to the contradictions between U.S. and Japanese monopoly capital, was not clear on the subject of Japanese monopoly capital's subordination to the United States.

The leadership of the JCP considered this a very important international and domestic problem, and decided to send Party representatives to Moscow to resolve the question. The then General Secretary, Kenji Miyamoto, was named as the representative to attend the 4th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, and then to visit the Soviet Union formally on the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU to take a holiday. General Secretary Miyamoto left Yokohama by ship on September 5, 1961, with his family and a secretary. A delegation of the Japanese Communist Party Diet member group visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. deputies' group traveled by the same ship. The delegation comprised Yoshio Shiga as leader, Kan'ichi Kawakami and Zentaro Taniguchi, House of Representatives members, and Goro Sudo, House of Councilors member, and was accompanied by Tomio Nishizawa, CC member in charge of international affairs at the Party Center. Upon arrival at Nakhodka, General Secretary Miyamoto and Nishizawa went by plane to Pyongyang, and the Diet member group and Miyamoto's family and secretary took the train for Moscow, and after attending the Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, Miyamoto and Nishizawa went on by plane to Moscow.

General Secretary Miyamoto as JCP chief representative held two rounds of talks with the CPSU over the definition in the draft program of the CPSU.

The first discussion took place on September 19 at CPSU Central Committee office, in which Miyamoto was accompanied by Yoshio Shiga, Presidium member, and Tomio Nishizawa, CC member. The CPSU was represented by Presidium members and Secretaries M.A. Suslov and O.V. Kuusinen, and CC members B.N. Ponomarev, and M.B. Mitin. As the question of definition concerned Japan, the Soviet side listened seriously to us and promised that they would take up and examine the problem with Khrushchev. General Secretary Miyamoto and his party then took a holiday in the Crimea. The second discussion was held in a Kremlin drawing room immediately before the CPSU Congress, which opened on October 17. Present at the talks from the Japanese party were General Secretary Miyamoto and CC member Nishizawa, and from the Soviet party CC member Ponomarev. In this meeting the Soviet representative said that there was no precedent of a foreign party making a proposal affecting the program of the CPSU. But because the problem involved the definition of the present situation in Japan, and the basic line of the Japanese revolution, General Secretary Miyamoto systematically expounded the views of the Japanese Communist Party.

Finally, the CPSU agreed to a change in the draft relating to this problem, and the program adopted subsequently by the Congress included these words; "In the Far East the American monopolies are vivifying Japanese militarism, which is in a certain way dependent on them", thus setting out Japan's subordination to the United States.

After the talks General Secretary Miyamoto joined the JCP delegation attending the 22nd CPSU Congress, led by Central Committee Chairman Sanzo Nosaka. After a few days at the Congress he left for home via Peking.

These two historical facts relating to the 22nd CPSU Congress are a never-to-be-forgotten experience, confirming the JCP position of self-reliance and independence.

Another episode about the talks on the draft CPSU program should be added; a story about Yoshio Shiga, who was present at the first round of talks. When the first round of talks was about to end, after Miyamoto had explained the JCP position in detail and the Soviet representative promised to take the matter up, Shiga suddenly stood up and expressed his support for the Soviet draft; he said "I am wholly for Comrade Suslov's position. I shall adopt it in my future activities". Naturally, on returning home he was severely criticized in a leadership meeting. But two and a half years later, in May 1964, in submission to the Soviet Union, he went so far as to begin open anti-Party activities over the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and was expelled from the Party. Immediately after his expulsion, the Party published a non-attributed article entitled "Destination of Revisionists--Refutation of the 'Arguments' of Shiga and the Like" ("Akahata", May 28, 1964). Knowing of his attitude taken at the 1961 JCP-CPSU talks enables one better to understand the following passage from that article.

> "Before the 7th Party Congress Shiga took an ambiguous attitude toward the Party Program, and even after the 8th Party Congress, when the Program of the CPSU was made public, he again wavered, and double-crossed the JCP as though completely lacking in confidence."

From late 1962 through early 1963, East and West European communist parties held a succession of congresses in which open condemnation of the Communist Party of China was made, and the CPC began open refutation of the attacks. This meant the expansion of the disunity of the international communist movement, with intensified open polemics creating a serious situation in the whole international communist movement. When JCP delegations which participated in these Party congresses went to Moscow, CPSU representatives expressed deep dissatisfaction with the JCP for not joining in the condemnation of China.

In July 1963, the Communist Parties of China and the Soviet Union held talks in Moscow, which ended in rupture, and when representatives of the CPC complained that the JCP did not condemn the Soviet Union, the Japanese Communist Party refused also to take their side in the dispute.

The Japanese Communist Party took a consistent attitude; however fierce the Sino-Siviet open polemics became, the JCP refused to engage in polemics against either party as long as itself was not openly attacked. If the JCP were to do that, it would amount to violation of the norms governing relations between Parties, and would only serve to promote the split in the international communist movement. The JCP's position is not neutral on questions of polemics, but is solidly founded and elaborated independently, as was shown in the 81-Party Meeting.

RUPTURE OF JCP-CPSU RELATIONS: A RESULT OF INTERFERENCE

Having found that the Japanese Communist Party would not fall into line, Khrushchev and his ilk began intervening in the Japanese Communist Party and Japanese democratic movements.

In August 1963, Khrushchev signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which they previously had opposed, togehter with the U.S. and Great Britain, with a view to promoting the U.S.-Soviet rapprochement.

This treaty was aimed at temporarily banning atmospheric and underwater nuclear explosion tests, while leaving underground tests to continue, ensuring that it never would tie the hands of U.S. imperialism, which had already reached the stage of being able to push ahead with nuclear weapons development through underground tests. The failure of this treaty to curb nuclear weapons has been confirmed by the hard fact that U.S. imperialism has continued the extensive developments of nuclear arms through hundreds of underground nuclear tests since the treaty was signed. But Khrushchev and others of his ilk praised the treaty and tried to impose support for it on the JCP and Japanese democratic movements, claiming that this treaty would "bind the whole imperialist world", and become "the first step toward the achievement of the goal" of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, opening up an era of "mutual trust" throughout the world.

The position of the Japanese Communist Party was absolutely clear, that it could not support the treaty. At the same time, because some people involved in the Japanese movement against A & H bombs supported this treaty, the Party insisted that, in order to preserve the unity of the movement, support for or opposition to the treaty should not be brought into the movement, and while continuing deeper discussions on the treaty, unity should be built around common tasks on which the whole movement could agree. The JCP delegation to the 9th World Conference against A & H Bombs, held in August that year, stood firm on this and thus contributed to the success of the Conference.

A delegation led by Y. Zhukov, Vice-President of the Soviet Peace Committee, attended the Conference. Prior to the Conference, the JCP delegation explained the Party's position in detail to the Soviet delegation. In the Conference the Soviet and other delegations spoke in support of the treaty, while the Chinese and other delegations opposed it. But no resolution either supporting or opposing the treaty was adopted. Whatever the attitudes of the foreign delegates toward the treaty, applause and chants for peace shook the Conference hall, with a pledge of struggle for a total ban on nuclear weapons, a ban on all nuclear weapons tests, and support for and solidarity with the Japanese people in the struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggression and nuclear arms, including the struggle against the calling of atomic powered submarines at Japanese ports and against the deployment of F-105s equipped with hydrogen bombs. The Soviet chief delegate Y. Zhukov was among those who drew up the "appeal for international joint action", and supported it, bringing the World Conference to a successful conclusion.

But shortly after returning home, Zhukov wrote an article entitled "The Voice of Hiroshima", which was published by "Pravda" on August 25. It openly condemned the Japanese Communist Party by name, saying that "some Japanese communists" denied the "positive significance" of the treaty, "as instructed by the Chinese delegation". This was the beginning of open attacks on the JCP by the CPSU. A splittist meeting had been held by some members of the Socialist Party and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (SOHYO), who had tried but failed to dominate the World Conference, and Zhukov also took this up in his article, describing this meeting as a "World Conference", on which he gave positive evaluation. His actions were not limited to writing the article; while he was in Japan he secretly met with those responsible for holding the "splittist meeting".

The actions of Zhukov provided the opportunity for interventions in JCP affairs by the CPSU leadership under Khrushchev and other organizations under their leadership. The Tokyo correspondent of the Soviet government organ paper "Izvestia" intrigued with JCP members to "struggle against the JCP Central Committee, and to support the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty". The Soviet Embassy in Tokyo began the massive and indiscriminate dissemination of documents carrying CPSU views and attacking foreign Parties, sending them to local JCP organizations, democratic organizations and individual JCP members. They tried to split up the Japan-Soviet Association, combined with countless other attempts at Soviet intervention.

The Japanese Communist Party did its utmost to solve the problem of its worsening relations with the CPSU, dealing with it as an internal problem, in line with the principles of independence, equal rights and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

In March 1964, the Party sent a delegation led by Satomi Hakamada to Moscow for talks with the CPSU. The delegation proposed that problems that divided opinions between the two Parties should be subject to further discussions, and demanded that the CPSU halt its intervention and subversive activities. But the Soviet party called it only a "trifling episode", yet they claimed that the JCP demand amounted to an attempt to stop the activities of Soviet agencies in Japan, or to bring them under JCP control. Ultimately, the CPSU tried to force the JCP delegation to accept a draft joint communiqué they had drawn up, but which the Japanese side rejected, saying that the JCP could not agree to publishing such a communiqué without the problem of intervention being resolved. The talks thus ended in failure.

Immediately after the talks, the CPSU Central Committee sent a letter dated April 18 to the JCP Central Committee. It contained unbelievable accusations and slanders on the line of the JCP; that the JCP "is alien to Marxism-Leninism" and "wants another world war and a thermonuclear war in particular". Further, in disregard of the U.S. imperialist escalation of the war of aggression against Vietnam at that same time, the letter set out views that amounted to evasion of the struggle against the U.S. imperialist policy of war and aggression, using such expressions as "the imperialists have lost the material basis for implementing their policy of 'position-of-strength' and "the imperialists are forced to agree to peaceful coexistence between states".

Later, the CPSU leadership under Khrushchev launched open activities to overthrow the JCP leadership, sparing no expense. At the ratification of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in the Japanese Diet in May that year, Yoshio Shiga and Ichizo Suzuki, both Presidium members and Diet members, voted for the treaty in contravention of the Party decision. They issued an "anti-Party statement" and began activities aimed at destroying the Party, for which they were immediately expelled on the grounds of violation of Party discipline. "Pravda" and Radio Moscow reported every action of Shiga and his group, as well as the "anti-Party statement" along with interviews with them. Shiga had been in secret communication with the Soviet Embassy in Japan even before being expelled from the Party.

On July 15, Shiga and others began publication of an anti-Party paper they called "The Voice of Japan". "Pravda" took it up at once, and accompanied the report on July 16 with a photo, with words of highest praise: "A new and militant organ paper was born for patriots, loyal sons of the people, internationalists, devoted activists for the cause of peace, democracy and socialism".

The July 18 issue of the CPSU Central Committee's magazine "Party Life" one-sidedly made public the April 18 letter attacking the JCP.

The British daily "The Guardian", commenting on this attitude of the CPSU leadership, said that "this was the first case for the Soviet Union to tolerate the principle of democratic centralism (of Parties) being broken in the world communist movement. Whether it was "the first case" or not, it was, without doubt, interference in the internal affairs and subversive action against the Japanese Communist Party. It is clear that Khrushchev attempted to overthrow in one stroke the JCP leadership which he could not subjugate at will.

"ANSWER" TO THE CPSU CC

With the problem at this stage, the Japanese Communist Party began a counterattack. In the July 24, 1964 issue of "Akahata", after having waited one year to exercise its right of refutation, the Party published a full reply to the Zhukov article, as well as a refutation of "Pravda" and Radio Moscow, which had supported the action of Shiga and Suzuki at the time of ratification of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the Diet. Subsequently, on August 26, the Party Central Committee sent a reply by letter to the CPSU Central Committee letter of April 18, and published it in "Akahata" on September 2. It was a very long letter, covering eight "Akahata" pages, and was even referred to as the longest letter ever in the world. The Party also published the CPSU Central Committee's letter to the JCP. Since then, in the course of polemics between the two Parties, the JCP has never failed to publish CPSU's articles in full, but the CPSU has not published the JCP refutations.

The JCP reply was not merely a protest against the intervention and subversive activities, but a detailed item by item refutation of the other Party's arguments in the polemics between the two Parties. On their argument that a major determining factor in the development of the contemporary world is the existence of the socialist countries, the Party stated clearly that world development is determined by the three contemporary revolutionary forces; the socialist countries, the national liberation struggle, and the struggle of the peoples of capitalist states. Taking issue with the idea that the major prerequisite for the worldwide victory of socialism is greater per-head production under socialism than under capitalism, the letter of the JCP pointed out that this is an economist viewpoint that emphasizes onesidedly the inherent significance and role of socialism. The letter also exposed the deception perpetrated by the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, as setout above. It pointed out explicitly the fallacy of the argument that U.S. imperialism has lost its "material basis" for implementing its policy of "position of strength" and had been compelled to accept peaceful coexistence, an argument that completely ignored the U.S. imperialist strategy maintained since the days of the Kennedy Administration, the strategy to seek "rapprochement" with the Soviet Union and concentrate its aggression on Asia, and in Indochina in particular. (The JCP defined this strategy as "defeat one-by-one" tactics.)

It is natural that a socialist country should choose the policy of peaceful coexistence, which means that states with different social systems can coexist without war. But it is also incorrect to regard such peaceful coexistence as taking precedence over the liberation struggles of the peoples of the world; the working class struggle in capitalist countries and the national liberation struggles, and that peaceful coexistence will determine the conditions for these struggles. It is still a more serious mistake to use the policy of peaceful coexistence as a pretext on which to force the whole world to follow and praise U.S. imperialism. On this aspect, the letter pointed to what had happened in the Warsaw session of the World Peace Council in November 1963, in connection with the assassination of John F. Kennedy. In this gathering, under the de facto leadership of the Soviet delegation, a silent tribute was paid to Kennedy. The letter called this a typical mistake due to the unprincipled U.S.-Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy, emphasizing that "it is a natural duty for Marxist-Leninist Parties to fight against the revisionist distortion of peaceful coexistence". It also clarified the relations between the foreign policy of socialist countries and the struggle of the peoples of the world, pointing out that the struggles of the peoples of the world can never be replaced by the foreign policy of a socialist country. As for the Soviet claim that bringing a slogan for the struggle against U.S. imperialism into the democratic movement is a mistake, the JCP said in reply, in so far as the real essence of the struggle for the defense of peace is opposition to the imperialist policy of war and aggression, it is natural for communists to uphold the policy of struggle against U.S. imperialism, and to seek popular support for that policy in the world peace and democratic movements.

The theoretical point of view developed in this letter to the CPSU has become increasingly eloquent, tested by practical application in history.

The role of the JCP in this is that it entered into deep polemics with the CPSU and led a resolute struggle against their intervention.

But at the same time, the consistent attitude of the JCP is that a party which has at least officially declared opposition to the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam should not be excluded from the joint struggle against it.

On July 9, 1964, at a big meeting in Bunkyo Public Hall in Tokyo, marking the 42nd anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Communist Party, in the speech of General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto he said:

> "Any communist will surely oppose the U.S. imperialist war of aggression against Laos and Vietnam. Any communist will surely oppose U.S. atomic submarines calling at ports of various countries around the world, with aggressive intensions and the danger of radio-active contamination of the sea. Any communist will surely approve the demand for a total ban on nuclear weapons. Any communist will surely give earnest support to the national liberation struggles.
>
> "Despite the fact that some problems concerning these principles have not yet been settled, it is necessary for us to win an agreement on actions between communist parties."

Khrushchev and others were planning to hold an international conference of Communist and Workers' Parties with the aim of taking "collective steps" to settle polemical issues by a majority vote. They announced that a "drafting committee" meeting for the conference would be held from December 15, 1964 in Moscow. It was obvious that this would mean a decisive split in the international communist movement. On October 5, that year, in the midst of the struggle against intervention by Khrushchev, etc., the Party issued an "Akahata" editorial "International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties Should Be Held, not to Serve a Split, but to Achieve Unity--Proposal of the Japanese Communist Party". The editorial set out the Party's opposition to the idea of settling polemical issues by "collective steps", and proposed that the international communist movement should build unity on points of agreement in the anti-imperialist struggle, and an international meeting should be prepared in accord with this aim.

Khrushchev was dismissed from office on October 14. Just two months before this, on August 2, the framed "Tonkin Gulf Incident" was used by U.S. imperialism to justify the August 4 decision of President Lyndon B. Johnson to carry out full-scale bombing of North Vietnam.

> "These events made plain to everyone the fallacy of the modern revisionist line of Khrushchev and his ilk, who had insisted that the way to defend world peace was to avoid the struggle against U.S. imperialism and to maintain 'peaceful coexistence' between the United States and the Soviet Union, by capitulation and subservience to U.S. imperialism. The barbaric aggression against Vietnam ordered by Kennedy and Johnson, whom Khrushchev had praised so highly and whose hands he had taken, revealed the betrayal committed by Khrushchev diplomacy and its substance in a most vivid form before the eyes of the world's people." (From "Modern Revisionist Theory on War and Peace, and the Judgment Passed on It by History", "Akahata", August 14, 1965)

In the Central Committee Report to the 9th Congress of the Japanese Communist Party, held on November 24-30, 1964, General Secretary Miyamoto said: "Khrushchev played the chief role in the international current of modern revisionism which created and widened the disunity of the international communist movement and the international democratic movements". He pointed out that the foremost characteristic of modern revisionism was: "galloping along the road of outspokenly unprincipled rapprochement with U.S. imperialism, as clearly shown by support for and praise of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty concluded between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union"; "the theory of beautification of U.S. imperialism and the theory of the transformation of modern imperialism, which claim that the main forces of U.S. imperialism have accepted the peaceful coexistence policy and that the enemy of peace is now confined merely to

the ultra-reactionary section and madmen".

When the dismissal of Khrushchev was reported on October 16 by Tass News Agency, General Secretary Miyamoto held a press conference at Party headquarters at the request of the press, and made the following comment on his dismissal: "At least it is one clear manifestation of the revisionist bankruptcy. We cannot draw any conclusion yet on how it will develop; whether they will try to find a way out of the immediate difficulties by some adjustment or will use this opportunity to proceed toward full re-examination, going back to the far more basic questions. It will also be affected by the struggle against modern revisionism in the world communist movement and other connections".

Some changes were evident in the position and action of the new Soviet leadership. In February 1965, Premier A.N. Kosygin visited North Vietnam. The JCP carefully noted these changes. In dealing with the international communist movement and the international democratic movement, the new leadership began to call for "unity and cohesion".

But its actual attitude became evident on March 1, 1965, when it unilaterally called what they termed a "consultative meeting", renaming what had been the "drafting committee", for a new international meeting such as had been planned by Khrushchev. Soviet intervention in the JCP continued under the new leadership with disruptive activities. After the movement against A & H bombs was divided, and the movements for Japan-Soviet friendship and others were also divided, linked with the maneuvers of Shiga and other anti-Party elements and anti-communists. The new Soviet leadership clearly had a dual character.

The article finished by the delegation on board the ship on the way to Shanghai exposed the intervention and subversive activities against the JCP and Japanese democratic movements by the CPSU leadership and its agencies, and strictly protesting these actions, demanded serious reconsideration of the issues.

An event that happened later in connection with this problem needs to be recalled. In January-February 1968, talks were held in Tokyo between the Japanese Communist Party delegation led by General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union delegation led by M.A. Suslov, Politbureau member. In the course of the discussion, the CPSU delegation asserted that the CPSU, regarding the JCP as the only vanguard of the Japanese working class, would have no relations with Shiga or other anti-Party elements in any form. It was agreed that JCP-CPSU relations would be normalized, in accordance with the principles of independence, equal rights and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, even though differences of opinion remained between the two Parties. This meeting took place after the JCP had replied to the CPSU leadership proposal for normalizing bilateral relations, saying that it was ready to hold discussions with the CPSU in Tokyo, on condition that the Soviet delegation does not meet with anti-Party elements, including Yoshio Shiga.

But then, in August 1968, the forces of the Soviet Union and other four socialist countries invaded Czechoslovakia. As the JCP resolutely opposed this, new relations developed between the CPSU and the anti-Party elements in Japan. In April 1970, Soviet Embassy personnel attended and addressed a meeting organized by the anti-Party group "The Voice of Japan", led by Yoshio Shiga.

In the 1968 talks in Tokyo, the JCP delegation did not enumerate examples of Soviet interference and ask for their reconsideration, because the CPSU delegation pledged they would have no relations in any form with the anti-Party elements in Japan. But now that another Soviet interference had taken place in spite of their pledge, the JCP decided that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union must publicly correct in some way the mistake it had made in praising Yoshio Shiga in "Pravda", symbolic evidence of interference in the past.

In December 1979, talks between a JCP delegation, led by Presidium Chairman Kenji Miyamoto, and a CPSU delegation, led by General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev, were held in Moscow. The talks took place on the premise that interference would be resolved following the long preliminary discussions, in which the CPSU admitted that it was "not correct" for the CPSU to have given support to Shiga and others. The document of agreement reached at the preliminary talks in April 1979 said, "In particular, the Japanese side positively evaluated the constructive approach to the issues in the past of relations between the two Parties displayed by the representatives of the CPSU at the preliminary talks in Tokyo", thus indicating a positive evaluation of the Soviet statement that it was "not correct" for them to have supported the Shiga clique through "Pravda". The agreement also said, "The Soviet side also declared that any action in the name of the communist movement by former members of the Japanese Communist Party or different groups are manifestations of anti-Party activity, and that the Soviet side has no relations with activities of such groups whatever flags they may carry and whatever pretext they may use". This was reaffirmed in the further JCP-CPSU talks held in December 1979. A principled settlement was thus made on the Shiga problem. It was really a long road, taking 15 years to reach a conclusion, from the time Khrushchev began interference.

However, the remnants of the Soviet intervention have not yet been fully eliminated from the Japanese movements. True, the Shiga clique, which is the immediate product of such intervention, is politically ignored by the people of Japan and literally reduced to a mere handful of conspirators. They still seem to believe that unconditional allegiance to the CPSU embodies real internationalism, and from this angle they are continuing subversive actions against the JCP. Of course, we will continue the severe criticism and struggle against the Shiga clique until such actions are ended.

In the field of mass movements, the split in the movement against A & H bombs, caused by the General Council of Trade Unions (SOHYO) and the Socialist Party, with Soviet intervention, has not been healed, and the Japan-Soviet friendship movement is also still divided.

When the movement of a country is split by foreign intervention, its harmful effects are very deep and continue for a very long time. Although relations between the JCP and the CPSU have been restored, these serious realities are still there.

DISAGREEMENT ALREADY EVIDENT BETWEEN THE JCP AND THE CPC

At the time when the JCP delegation made the "three-country visit", the Party was in a fierce dispute with the CPSU, and a rumor was spread that the JCP had become "pro-China". But, as I have already said, from the outset there was a wide gap between the positions of the JCP and the CPC on controversial issues.

In the interview with "Asahi Journal" referred to earlier, General Secretary Miyamoto said:

"On my way home from the 22nd Congress of the CPSU (1961) via China, I had talks in Beijing with the leadership of the Communist Party of China, in which they argued that the international communist movement would inevitably be split in the future, from the viewpoint of 'one dividing into two'. But our Party did not agree.

"In 1963-64, a proposal was made by the CPSU leadership for an international meeting. Khrushchev was clearly determined to justify his own position by setting international issues by a majority vote. Our Party's position on this was that the time was not appropriate to hold a meeting to discuss issues that involved principles, but that it was quite possible to meet for joint action against the U.S. imperialist aggression against South Vietnam and other parts of the world. So we rejected the Soviet proposal, and made a counterproposal. The Party emphasized further that such an international meeting should be called only when all the parties concerned agree to its convocation, and adopt the principle of unanimity in making decisions. But the Communist Party of China failed to put forward a counter-proposal, simply rejecting the plan put forward by the CPSU leadership. The CPC, however, expressed its attitude, saying that 'an international meeting would better be held later rather than then; and that it would be far better not to hold it' (May 1964).

"The CPC leadership regarded the international democratic movement as a platform for the exposure of revisionism, whereas we of the JCP emphasized the need for efforts to advance united action in actual opposition to the U.S. imperialist policy of war and aggression. The JCP position was that the struggle against opportunism would become really effective through such efforts.

"Regarding united action with social

> democratic parties, there was a 'Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement', put forward by the leadership of the CPC in June 1963, which set out a policy on joint action with left social democrats, and the isolation of right-wing social democrats. The JCP has maintained that joint action should be organized with the whole of the Socialist Party, and through such joint action to fight against the influence of opportunism and splitting tactics.
>
> "These differences were discussed at Party level as an internal issue, and there was no need to make such discussions public. One reason was because the major mistake in the international communist movement was committed by the CPSU leadership under Khrushchev.
>
> "In the summer of 1963, while I was in bed with pneumonia, Zhao Anbo, who was a Chinese delegate to the World Conference against A & H Bombs, came to see me and said 'You had better begin to criticize Khrushchev, or you will miss the bus'. I told him that we would do so when we deemed it necessary, but we would never blindly follow in the wake of others."

When he had visited Japan previously as a member of the Chinese delegation to the World Conference against A & H Bombs, Zhao Anbo used to say unofficially that Mao Zedong is the leader not only of the Chinese revolution but also of the world communist movement, as if he were out on behalf of the Chinese leadership as in the "Great Cultural Revolution", which occurred later, trying to persuade the world communist movement to accept the absolutization of the authority of Mao Zedong. It was natural for the Japanese party of independence to refuse to pay attention to such an egocentric statement.

The difference between the JCP and the CPC became more serious when the leadership of the CPC published an article in November 1965 advocating an "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front", putting the Soviet Union on the same level as U.S. imperialism.

SHANGHAI-HANOI-BEIJING

On February 10, at 5:00 p.m., our ship, the "Hongqi" berthed at Wusong Port on the Huangpu River in Shanghai. In light rain, over 1,000 workers, students and other citizens were there to greet the JCP delegation. From the Chinese party, Liu Ningyi, Central Committee member (then Chief of the International Relations Department of the Communist Party of China); Zhao Anbo, responsible for a Central organ; Chen Pixian, Secretary for the East China Bureau (First Secretary of the Shanghai City Committee) and other officials, received us. That evening we were guests at a reception given by the Chinese party, and the next two days were spent visiting factories and a museum. Peng Zhen, Politbureau member and First Secretary of the Beijing City Committee; Kang Sheng, candidate member of the Politbureau, and some others arrived later in Shanghai, and talks began with them on February 13.

ON THE EVE OF THE "GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN SHANGHAI

It was later learned that the delegation had arrived in Shanghai on the eve of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", as it was called.

Already in November 1965, the Shanghai newspaper "Wen Huai Bao" had published an article by Yao Wenyuan entitled "On the New Historical Play 'Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office'". (Yao was purged in October 1976 as a member of the "Gang of Four".) "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office" was a libretto of a Beijing opera written and published in 1961 by Wu Han, historian, and at that time Vice-Mayor of Beijing City. It was based on an old Chinese story about Hai Rui, an upright and clean government officials of the Ming Dynasty, who was always concerned about the hardships of the toiling masses, but dismissed from office simply because he never fawned upon the emperor, but frankly expressed his opinion. Mao Zedong interpreted this as an insinuation against him, associating the story with the dismissal of the then Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. (Peng was purged when he opposed Mao Zedong's "Great Leap Forward" and the "People's Commune" policy, at the Lushang conference--the 8th plenary session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in August 1959.) Yao Wenyuan's criticism of Wu Han was written under Mao's directive, which was used by Mao for launching an attack on the Party's Beijing City Committee, which he himself had complained about, saying "It never allowed water to permeate or a needle to pierce it".

In May 1967, Mao Zedong told an Albanian delegation:

> "Our Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution should be said to have begun with comrade Yao Wenyuan's criticism of 'Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office' in the winter of 1965. At that time I suggested that Comrade Jiang Qing (Mao's wife) organize the criticisms written against the play, 'Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office'. But nothing could be done in this Red City (Beijing), so it had to be done in Shanghai. I read the article three times; I thought it would do basically, so I let comrade Jiang Qing take it back and publish it."

In dealing with "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office", Mao Zedong and others took it as a political issue and attacked it on the ground that it was "a poisonous plant for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist revolution", whereas Peng Zhen and others wanted to treat it as an academic problem. In February 1966, Peng Zhen drew up "An Outline of the Report of the Five-Man Working Group of the Cultural Revolution concerning the Present Academic Discussions", and released it all over the country in the name of the Party center. It is what was called the "February Outline" (made public in May 1967). The "Five-man Working Group for the Cultural Revolution" was led by Peng Zhen, with Kang Sheng, Lu Dingyi (Chief of the Party Center Propaganda Department), Zhou Yang (Deputy Chief of the Party Center Propganda Department), and Wu Lengxi (Editor-in-Chief of "Renmin Ribao"). The "February Outline" regarded the "Cultural Revolution" as a struggle in the field of ideology, arising from antagonisms among the people, and confined the criticism of Wu Han strictly to the academic and ideological approach.

According to what was learned later, on February 8, two days before the arrival of the JCP delegation in Shanghai, Peng Zhen went to see Mao Zedong and presented him with the "February Outline".

> "On February 8, Peng Zhen visited Chairman Mao Zedong and made a report on the 'February Outline'. Chairman Mao asked him: 'Isn't Wu Han anti-party and anti-socialist?' Peng Zhen replied: 'I investigated this, but I have found he is not'. Peng also proposed that the leftists should be disciplined, and Chairman Mao said 'It is a matter to be dealt with in about three years time'." ("Wenyi Hongqi" [Literary Red Flag], June 15, 1967)

At that time Mao Zedong is believed to have been in Shanghai, and Peng Zhen published the "February Outline", allegedly with the approval of Mao Zedong, with whom he had met in Shanghai, before he came to talk with the JCP delegation.

In Shanghai, our discussions with Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng and others were held on the afternoon of February 13 at the Jinjiang Hotel, where the delegation was staying. It was our first meeting during our "three-country visit". It was for an exchange of information, so to speak, no more than a preliminary meeting before the forthcoming official JCP-CPC talks.

It was a relaxed atmosphere, with our discussions lasting about four hours, where Politbureau member Peng Zhen was the main speaker.

He began with the theme of the "socialist education movement" then being carried on in China.

> "A struggle is being waged at present between the road of socialism and the road of capitalism throughout the country. It is what we call briefly the 'Four Cleans Movement'; the aim is to clean up politics, the economy, the organization and thought. We call it a socialist education movement. This class struggle is aimed at re-education of the people, using mainly educational methods.
>
> "The 'Four Cleans Movement' is going on within the Party. It is an intra-party struggle against 'those in power' of capitalism. 'Those in power' means those who hold power in our production teams, factories and in the people's communes."

Emphasizing that in the Soviet Union the bourgeoisie came to real power forty-five years after the victory of the revolution, Peng Zhen said that in China, too, the tendency of "Three Selves and One Undertaking" in the domestic scene, and the tendency of "Three-Unities and One-Smaller" in the international realm appeared from the latter half of 1959 through the first half of 1962. These tendencies were seen not only among cadres of lower and intermediate Party organs but also at the Party

Center, he said. The "Three Selves and One Undertaking" means private arable land, free market, individual responsibility for profit and loss, while decentralizing the management of cooperatives. The "Three Unities and One Smaller" means reconciliation with U.S. imperialism, India and other reactionaries, and revisionists, while extending less aid to the world revolution, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.

Peng Zhen continued his explanation saying: in the 10th plenary session of the 8th Central Committee in 1962, Mao Zedong said "The class struggle should be continued one hundred more or even hundreds of years more", but the communiqué on the plenum simply said that the class struggle should be carried on for a long time, without specifying time. A fraternal Party advised us not to state how many years it would take to deal with the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement, but in our 9th article criticizing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union we said that one hundred years or hundreds of years would be needed to complete the class struggle in a socialist society.

(note)
The 9th article--"Pseudo-Communism of Khrushchev and Its Historic Lessons--our 9th criticism of the open letter of the CPSU", joint article by the Editorial Boards of "Renmin Ribao" and "Hongqi", July 14, 1964.

Peng Zhen also said, "It is more than two years now since we began the socialist education movement in 1963, and we will be able to complete nearly one-third of the 'four cleans movement' program in rural areas by the spring of this year. But we will need two more springs to complete it in full"; "some 2-4 percent of the cadres are bad". "There have been some weaknesses in our work", he said. "but I'll leave that out of my talk today. The Twenty-Three Points of the socialist education movement has been translated, which we will present to you".

He added some comments on the "Literary Rectification" movement which started in 1964, saying:

> "The struggle between the two roads is also seen in literary activities.
>
> "On this subject we have not been very careful for a long time. In China, the people are the masters, based on the worker-peasant alliance under the dictatorship of the proletariat. But on the stage, workers, peasants and soldiers are not the masters; instead, the bourgeois people and feudal forces are the masters.
>
> "While we were busy carrying out the revolution and construction, the people with bourgeois views and bourgeois outlook on history established control over artistic activities. Even our children have been given bourgeois education. Recently, the Vice-Mayor Wu Han of Beijing, where I am mayor, wrote the scenario of a play entitled 'The Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office'."

Later, in our bilateral talks in Beijing, and in our talks with Mao Zedong, the domestic situation in China and the socialist education movement were scarcely mentioned. But it is now very clear that the conflict between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi sharpened rapidly over the socialist education movement.

I had accompanied General Secretary Miyamoto twice to China, in 1964 and '65, and had seen the literature on the "socialist education movement", but it was not the "Twenty-Three Points" which Peng Zhen explained, but "Ten Points", an experience that made me feel acutely the fierce struggle going on within the Chinese Party.

Chronicles relating to this issue include the following:

May 1963 - Mao Zedong's "Draft Resolution of the Party Center on Some Problems in Immediate Rural Activities" (abbreviated as "the former Ten Points").

September 1963 - A "draft resolution of the Party Center by Liu Shaoqi on a few concrete policies for the socialist education movement in rural areas" (abbreviated as "the latter Ten Points").

September 1964 - Liu Shaoqi's "revised draft resolution of the Party Center on a few concrete policies for the socialist education movement" (abbreviated as the "revised latter Ten Points").

In the "former Ten Points", the emphasis was on the class struggle, whereas the other two drafts dealt mainly with the education movement.

In January 1965, Mao Zedong issued "Several Problems Raised Now in the Rural Socialist Education Movement" (abbreviated as "Twenty-Three Points"). Here for the first time the expression "those in power carrying out a capitalist line" is used. And the "Four Cleans Movement", meant for the examination of bookkeeping, stock, property and work, began to take up politics, the economy, organization and thought. The emphasis had moved clearly to the struggle against "capitalist roaders in power".

The "socialist education movement", as explained by Peng Zhen, comprised "Twenty-Three Points". The criticism of Wu Han over the play "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office", as explained by Peng Zhen within the framework of "Rectification of Literature", was the signal for the "Great Cultural Revolution" launched from Shanghai against Peking by Mao Zedong, who had been irritated by the slow rate of progress of the "Four Cleans Movement" with the "Twenty-Three Points", i.e. the struggle against "those in power who are taking the capitalist road". At this stage, the spearhead of the attack was directed against Peng Zhen.

In a conversation after the talks in Shanghai, JCP delegate Kurahara asked about the play, "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office", to which Peng Zhen murmured: "That's very troublesome". He said "It is not a political issue, but a historical play. Chairman Mao says it is a political issue. How troublesome!" Referring to the Yao Wenyuan's article he said "In China, criticism, mutual criticism, must be made in the presence of the person concerned. Unilateral criticism runs counter to the Chinese way of Party life. Moreover, we have the Party Central Organ 'Renmin Ribao' (People's Daily), so the publication of this kind of article in a local paper is questionable".

But Peng Zhen said confidently: "The socialist education movement, the struggle between capitalism and socialism, is under way not only in people's communes, factories, shops, the Party and the government, but also in the academic, cultural and ideological fields as a whole. It has brought about conspicuous results, and very quickly".

It was barely three months later, in early June, that Peng Zhen was revealed to have been dismissed as First Secretary of the Party Peking City Committee, as well as from the Politbureau, and deposed. And in late January of the following year (1967) he was condemned as "a capitalist-roader in real power", with Lu Dingyi, Luo Ruiqing (Chief of Staff of the PLA), Yang Shangkun (Director of Central Committee General Office), and Wu Lengxi. He was held with hands twisted like a jet plane by the "Red Guards", carrying a tag in big characters which read: "Peng Zhen, counter-revolutionary revisionist element". This photo was reported in Japan at a time when a general election was nearing voting day.

"ENCIRCLEMENT OF CHINA" BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION STRESSED

In the course of the talks in Shanghai, Peng Zhen discussed the economic situation in China, the Sino-Soviet border dispute, the Vietnam problem, Sino-Cuban relations, and so on.

He made a strong point in particular about the "encirclement of China" by the United States and the Soviet Union, cooperating with each other, and the Soviet plans for aggression.

"The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. have not only joined in a chorus against China throughout the world, but are carrying out military encirclement", he said, giving examples, including a plan for aggression to use India and Pakistan; the Soviet Union massing large concentrations of troops and subversive maneuvers along the borders with Mongolia and Xinqiang Province; the extensive anti-Chinese campaign taking place in the Soviet Union; the Sino-Soviet border dispute, and the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the (Japanese) Sato Government.

> "Recently Shastri, Kosygin, Humphrey and Rusk held talks in the attempt to get India and Pakistan to attack China together. Of course it is difficult for them to do this because of the Kashmir question. But the problem is that some Pakistani leaders are thinking of provoking war against China in alliance with India to get financial help from the U.S.
>
> "Since 1959 the Soviet Union has been giving aid to India... They sell new types of aircraft to India, but not to China. Why is the Soviet Union giving aid to India after India has begun to attack us?
>
> "Some time ago, Brezhnev and Malinovskii (Soviet Defense Minister) went to Mongolia and issued a joint communiqué calling for strengthened national defense. We do not station our troops close to the border with Mongolia... They are also concentrating their armed forces near Xinqiang Province. They attempted to get Xinqiang to rise in an 'independence movement'. Tens of thousands of people stood up in riots in 1965."
>
> (note)
>
> On talks between Shastri, then Indian Prime Minister; Kosygin, Soviet Premier; Humphrey, then U.S. Vice President; and Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State; there was actually no such meeting at that time.

Citing these facts, Peng Zhen said; if the United States expands the war of aggression in Vietnam to attack China, the Soviet Union will act in accord with this and attack China; it will invade China, making use of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Alliance Treaty and calling it aid to seize Chinese territory; then the United States will occupy the South and the Soviet Union the North. Peng said China is preparing for war "both quickly and extensively" to deal with possible attacks by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Peng Zhen also revealed that the Soviet Union had proposed to China the holding of three-party talks between the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam, in support of Vietnam. But the "plan was so deceptive" he said, "that China rejected it, and our immediate political task is to expose this plot".

The idea that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are planning to divide China into two at the Yangzi river was also put forward later by Mao Zedong in the discussions. Peng Zhen was very serious in making a big point about this.

It was made clear later by the U.S., which emphasized the need to assure Beijing that the

United States did not intend to attack mainland China (Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, before the House Subcommittee). In the U.S.-China talks in Warsaw, the U.S. had told China that it had no plan to expand the Vietnam war beyond the border with China. The Chinese side had also said that its armed forces would not cross the border for war, as stated in January 1965 by Mao Zedong in his meeting with the American journalist, Edgar Snow.

Peng Zhen went on to say: "The Workers' Party of Korea and the Vietnam Workers' Party proposed holding talks between several parties, but it was not the right time to do so, and as there was no problem relating to such talks, the plan was called off. It is not easy to reach agreement in multilateral discussions; bilateral talks are more productive. We hope to hold many more bilateral talks with left parties."

General Secretary Miyamoto made no comment on what Peng Zhen had said, because the purpose of the meeting was to exchange information in preparation for the coming official talks.

Miyamoto briefed the Chinese side about the great advance made by the JCP in the 1965 House of Councilors election and the election for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly; the situation in Japan and the struggle against the Japan-ROK (South Korea) treaty, and the plan to introduce a small constituency system, and the struggle against anti-Party elements, including Yoshio Shiga. He also spoke about the urgent need for and the importance of an international anti-imperialist united front against U.S. imperialism, and for support of the Vietnamese people, and asked them to study the non-attributed article published by the JCP on February 4.

In reporting on these talks, "Akahata" only said that they were held in a "very friendly atmosphere".

But the talks in Shanghai made us aware that many difficulties would arise in the coming official talks.

TALKS WITH VIETNAM WORKERS' PARTY

Winding up our four-day Shanghai visit, the delegation took a plane on the afternoon of February 14 for Guangzhou, the provincial capital of Guangdong; from there we were to fly to Vietnam, the first country for an official visit. Vietnam was chosen as the first country to visit because the main theme of the "three-country visit" was the Vietnam problem, and we realized that unless we learned directly about the real situation in Vietnam, and in particular, the need for aid to be extended to Vietnam, there could be little real meaning in discussions with the other Parties.

Accompanied by Liu Ningyi and Zhao Anbo, the delegation arrived at Baiyun airport and was met by Tao Zhu, First Secretary of the Middle-South Bureau (Vice-Premier) and cadres of Guangdong Province and Guangzhou City. About 2,000 workers and citizens took part in the welcome ceremony, with clanging gongs, drums, five-color streamers and so on. A song and dance troupe performed the lion dance and the Japanese Awa-odori dance.

We had a heavy schedule there; guests at a dinner party given by Tao Zhu, paying visits to people's communes, and making preparations for the visit to Vietnam. We left for Hanoi via Nanning on February 17.

Our arrival in Hanoi was at 7:00 p.m., because the U.S. air raids made it necessary for planes to arrive or depart only in the early morning or at night.

It was already getting dark at the airport in the suburbs of Hanoi, where the delegation was received by First Secretary Le Duan, Political Bureau members Truong Trinh, Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh, and others of the Vietnam Workers' Party, who exchanged warm greetings and embraces with General Secretary Miyamoto and other members of the JCP delegation.

That day over 1,000 Hanoi citizens crowded in front of the guesthouse where the delegation was staying, to welcome us with waving hands. Women were wearing their beautiful aodai, the Vietnamese gala dress. At the entrance to the guesthouse, President Ho Chi Minh received the delegation and clasped the hands of General Secretary Miyamoto and the others. As Ho Chi Minh appeared at the entrance young boys and girls ran to him, and the citizens expressed warm greetings to the President. And if we felt that the delegation was being overlooked, we keenly realized how beloved President Ho was by the Vietnamese people.

"Nhan Dan", the organ of the Vietnam Workers' Party, on February 18 gave top front page coverage to an editorial entitled "We extend a warm welcome to the Japanese Communist Party delegation". Other Hanoi newspapers carried similar editorials and articles.

A welcome reception was given the JCP delegation by President Ho Chi Minh, First Secretary Le Duan and other leaders; a rally was held for the delegation by the Hanoi Municipal Committee of the VWP, and a delegation of the Vietnam Workers' Party, led by Le Duan, met and talked with the JCP delegation.

Altogether, five days, up to a total of 30 hours, were spent in these discussions, with exchanges of views going into the details of the situation in Vietnam, the situation in Japan, the conditions under which the peoples of both countries are waging

revolutionary struggles, and the question of an international anti-imperialist united front. On February 27 the delegations signed a joint communiqué after the exchange of views of both parties, the full text of which is given in the Appendix.

First Secretary Le Duan, in a detailed discussion of the situation in Vietnam, said that during the early days of the bombing of the North, countering the attacks had required great efforts, but after the first year they had learned how to counterattack effectively. He very earnestly stressed the great importance of support for the Vietnamese revolution by the world anti-imperialist and democratic forces, including the socialist camp and the national liberation movement, by formation of a broad united front. He again expressed thanks to the Japanese Communist Party for its consistent struggle in the name of the international united front against U.S. imperialism.

He went on to say: "We will be able to effectively counterattack if the Soviet Union and China take joint action with Vietnam, but if we try to face the U.S. in joint action only with China, it will provide a golden opportunity to the United States to expand the aggression to China". Le Duan gave, as an example of their hardships, the fact that even though they found it would be safe to escape into Chinese territory during an airbattle, the Vietnamese made it a rule not to do so; rather, they sacrificed themselves on their own territory of Vietnam.

During the talks, President Ho Chi Minh came in unannounced. Clad in an old summer jacket and wearing sandals, he entered the room with a light heart, unaccompanied. He opened one hand, and pointing to each finger, said "This is how the socialist countries are aiding us". Then, making a fist, he said "They are not united, but divided. If they were united in aiding us, they would be able to exert more strength; unfortunately the difference between the two major Parties is becoming wider, unable to unite". A Vietnamese comrade also said "Our militants in the South are very heroic, and woman fighters are so courageous that they defeat the enemy alone in a pillbox; but they burst into tears when they hear about the Sino-Soviet dispute".

It is within this context that the Japanese Communist Party's appeal sets out what the Vietnamese Party cannot openly claim because of its position, the appeal to the socialist camp and all the other anti-imperialist democratic forces to put aside any differences of opinion existing between them and join their efforts in the struggle to support Vietnam, at this time when one corner of the socialist camp is exposed to daily air strikes.

The JCP delegation gave the Vietnamese Party the English version of the "February 4 article", which they translated into Vietnamese overnight, and all the Vietnamese delegation members had read it by the time of our talks. The "February 4 article" and other JCP articles on formation of an international anti-imperialist united front were published later, and gave tremendous encouragement to cadres at all levels in Vietnam. It was later reported by an "Akahata" correspondent that South Vietnam National Front for Liberation fighters were studying the JCP articles in the trenches in South Vietnam.

Speaking about aid from the Soviet Union and China, the Vietnamese comrades told us that they "receive Chinese and Soviet aid half and half".

Through the discussions with the VWP delegation and a trip taken to Thanh Hoa Province, 100 km south of Hanoi, a target of indiscriminate U.S. bombing, the JCP delegation felt deeply the Vietnamese people's earnest trust in and solidarity with the Japanese Communist Party and democratic forces. We were told that the news of the delegation's visit to Vietnam was broadcast for the South Vietnam National

Front for Liberation, and people in the South were very delighted with the news of the visit.

The delegation became increasingly convinced that the strengthening of support for the Vietnamese people's heroic frontline struggle against U.S. imperialism was the foremost international duty of all anti-imperialist democratic forces.

The joint communiqué published in "Akahata" and Nhan Dan" on March 1 said:

> "Defying the protest of the world's peoples and the American people, the U.S. imperialists have dispatched more than 200,000 troops of the United States and its satellites and are using on a large scale the most barbarous war means, poison gas and toxic chemicals of various types, carrying out the policy of 'kill all, burn all and destroy all', killing en masse civilians in South Vietnam along with fierce bombing and strafing of schools, hospitals, pagodas, churches, dams and densely populated areas in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The U.S. imperialists' aggression in Vietnam constitutes a big crime against the national liberation movement, an unpardonable encroachment upon the socialist countries, and a most arrogant provocation against peace-and-justice-loving people all over the world.
>
> "The two parties unanimously hold that at present the formation and expansion of a united front of the world's peoples against U.S. imperialism, for world peace and national independence, is an extremely important and urgent task. The Vietnam Workers' Party and the Japanese Communist Party will do all in their power to make active contributions to carrying out this task.
>
> "The two delegations are firmly confident that the warm friendship and militant

solidarity between the Vietnam Workers' Party and the working class and people of Vietnam, and the Communist Party, working class and people of Japan, will strengthen and develop with every passing day so as to step up the common struggle against the U.S. imperialists, to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and to contribute to winning victory for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism in the world."

Winding up the ten-day visit to Vietnam, the delegation left Hanoi on February 27, seen off by VWP First Secretary Le Duan and others.

After an overnight stop at Nanning, the delegation arrived in Beijing by air on the afternoon of February 28. At the airport the delegation was met by Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Kang Sheng and other leaders of the Communist Party of China, as well as more than 2,000 people from various circles in Beijing.

From seven o'clock that evening a banquet was held in honor of the delegation in the "Shanghai room" in the People's Great Hall. Present at the banquet from the CPC were Party Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, Political Bureau members Li Fuchun and Li Xiannian, candidate members of the Political Bureau Lu Dingyi and Kang Sheng, CC members Liao Chengzhi, Lin Feng, Ye Jianying, Liu Xiao, Liu Ningyi, Xiao Hua and Xie Fuzhi, and candidate CC members Yang Chengwu and Zhao Yimin.

Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi, in a speech at the banquet, said, "Our two parties have consolidated close and friendly relations through the long struggle against imperialism and the forces of reaction of various countries. Of late, our two Parties have entered into the closest relations ever in their struggle against modern revisionism. I hope that the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of China and Japan will win greater victories, and that the relations between our two Parties will be developed continuously". He concluded with the words, "We shall unite to defeat imperialism".

In response to Liu Shaoqi's speech, General Secretary Miyamoto said:

> "Friendship between our two Parties has been forged in the struggle against the forces of reaction and in the struggle against modern revisionism. U.S. imperialism is continuing the outrageous bombing of Vietnam. At this juncture, to build stronger unity between our two Parties, which has been forged in historic struggles, is very significant not only for the two Parties but for the struggle of the anti-imperialist peace forces of the world."

Disagreement between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China over the issue of an anti-imperialist united front had already become evident, but this could be overcome if the two parties found the way to a solution through frank and reasoned discussions--this was the conviction of the JCP delegation at that time. In spite of a rather oppressive feeling in the Chinese attitude at the banquet, the atmosphere was one of solidarity and friendship, and many toasts were drunk together.

On February 25, while the JCP delegation was still in Vietnam, "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), the central organ of the CPC, gave three pages to the full text of our "February 4 article" which had been published by "Akahata". The same issue also carried a commentary by the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) opposing joint action.

It was agreed that the JCP-CPC talks would open on March 3, and the delegation set about preparation for the discussion, holding meetings and arranging documents at the guesthouse "Diaoyutai".

"Diaoyutai", where the JCP delegation was accommodated, had a big pond and bridge, with the atmosphere of a grand garden. General Secretary Miyamoto and others of the delegation enjoyed strolling around the garden of "Diaoyutai" during intervals from work.

On March 1, the delegation laid a wreath at the monument to the people's heroes at the Tiananmen Square, in memory of the martyrs who had laid down their lives for the Chinese revolution. An "evening of culture and art" was organized in honor of the delegation by the Cultural Department of the Chinese Government, and a modern ballet "Hongse Guzi Jun" (The Red Detachment of Women) was presented. General Secretary Miyamoto had a temperature with a slight cold, and the deputy head of the delegation, Oka, took his place.

JCP-CPC TALKS OPEN IN BEIJING

The talks between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China opened in Beijing about 3:30 p.m. on March 3. In the four rounds of talks held, the respective situations in their countries were hardly mentioned, the discussions being concentrated on the Vietnam problem, the formation of an anti-imperialist international united front, the struggle against modern revisionism, and problems of the international communist movement.

The Chinese delegation was made up of Liu Shaoqi as leader, with Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Liao Chenzhi, Liu Ningyi, Wu Lengxi, Zhang Xiangshan and Zhao Anbo. Some of them were in top leadership in the Communist Party of China, though Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were not present at the talks. Liu Ningyi had been to Japan four times as leader of the Chinese delegation to the World Conference against A & H Bombs in 1955 (the first conference) and again in 1960, '64 and '65. Liao Chengzhi, President of the China-Japan Friendship Association, Zhang Xiangshan, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and Zhao Anbo, Secretary General of the China-Japan Friendship Association, who had been students in Japan, spoke fluent Japanese and had close relations with Japan. Wu Lengxi, then Editor-in-Chief of "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily) and President of Xinhua (New China) News Agency, was said to be a writer of international articles criticizing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, published jointly by the Editorial Departments of "Renmin Ribao" and "Hongqi" (Red Flag) magazine.

On the morning of March 3, the Beijing newspapers published the text of the joint communiqué issued by the Japanese Communist Party and the Vietnam Workers' Party. On the same day a statement was issued in Japan by the JCP Central Committee Presidium calling on all democratic forces to block the proposed visit to Japan of Nguyen Cao Ky, head of the Saigon puppet regime.

On the arrival of the JCP delegation by car at the People's Great Hall, where the talks were to be held, the members were received by their opposite Chinese numbers, and greeted with warm handshakes.

The big carpeted room in the People's Great Hall had a massive table in the center covered with green cloth, laid out with fruit plates, tea sets, ashtrays, cigarettes, etc.

On a sofa in one corner of the room the two leaders of the delegations, Kenji Miyamoto and Liu Shaoqi, were engaged in lively conversation, before the delegates of both parties came to the table to begin discussions. There were ten members in the Japanese Party and nine in the Chinese, with an interpreter for each Party. The two leaders, Liu and Miyamoto, took their places at the center, on opposite sides of the table.

Liu Shaoqi asked, "How shall we proceed?", to which Miyamoto replied, "If you have something to discuss first, we would like to hear it, or would you like me to speak first?" "Go ahead, please", said Liu.

The smiling faces of the members of each delegation created a pleasant and friendly atmosphere, as of a reunion of old and close friends. Tea and fruit were brought in.

"I hope our discussions will be without formality; I shall open the subject up", Miyamoto said.

STRENGTHENING ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY DUAL POLICY

> "We have so far waged a struggle against U.S. imperialism and a struggle against modern revisionism, but there is now some complexity in these struggles, and we want to take this question up in our present discussions; this is why we are here."

After explaining the purpose of the delegation's "three-country visit", Miyamoto then took up the main theme. In the thirty minutes of his introductory speech, he explained the position of the JCP.

> "Although we had known about it, we saw that the behavior of U.S. imperialism was recklessly unrestrained in attacking the socialist country of Vietnam everyday. While the Vietnamese people are very heroic in meeting the U.S. attacks, they certainly want to see strengthened support from the international anti-imperialist forces, with increased aid.
>
> "The statement issued by the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties says that the socialist camp is stronger than the imperialist camp, and peace forces stronger than the war forces. But U.S. imperialism, with its command of the air, is bombing Vietnam everyday; this means that the relevant correlation of forces is not reflected in Vietnam. Vietnamese comrades are getting ready for all possible escalations of the war. But we hold that we must not allow the present bombing of this socialist country to go on unhindered; we must not allow this war of aggression to be expanded, including its escalation in Hanoi and

Haiphong, and air strikes against China.

"In our struggle to defeat this plot of U.S. imperialism, military aid for Vietnam is important, but we feel acutely that it is necessary to form an enormously strong anti-imperialist international united front, which will take political action to check the expansion of the U.S. imperialist war of aggression, and strengthen the international struggle against U.S. imperialism."

Miyamoto went on to say, "This general direction was already emphasized by Comrade Mao Zedong in his statement in 1963, made in opposition to the U.S. aggression against South Vietnam, and in the statement in support of the people's struggles in Panama, Congo and the Dominican Republic; we have no objection to this", but "one problem is its relations with the struggle against modern revisionism". He continued to discuss the need for correct unity in the task of strengthening an anti-imperialist international united front, and the struggle against modern revisionism.

"As is well-known, modern revisionists first openly capitulated before U.S. imperialism, and took a consistently passive line in what they said, but recently they have found it necessary to speak out against U.S. imperialism and to some extent give practical aid to Vietnam.

"In a number of international conferences of democratic movements, they are now unable to praise U.S. imperialism as openly as they once did, and are forced to vote in support of resolutions which rightly oppose U.S. imperialism."

In analyzing the situation in which modern revisionists were forced to take a dual attitude to the struggle against U.S. imperialism, the leader of the JCP delegation said: "For one thing, I think it is because the present situation has brought to light the true color of U.S. imperialism; and if the revisionists follow it, they will all be given up by the world's people. Another factor is that you and our Marxist-Leninist parties have sharply criticized and theoretically exposed their line of following the United States".

Miyamoto then discussed ways of strengthening the anti-imperialist united front by fighting against this dual attitude.

"In our opinion they show some weaknesses, making them unable to fight strongly against U.S. imperialism. Nevertheless, as our Vietnamese comrades told us, they have provided Vietnam with considerable numbers of anti-aircraft guns and missiles, and they have no reason not to support the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's four conditions. I think this is one of the questions we should examine.

"In our discussions the other day, Comrade Peng Zhen said that the appeal for joint action made by the Soviet leadership was a trap. They may even be considering laying various traps; there is also the danger that they will try to take over hegemony in a joint struggle and lead the whole struggle to a compromise. But there is another trap; they may call for joint action, and if we rejected it, it would justify their position; they could say, 'we were prepared for struggle, but our appeal was rejected; that's why the anti-imperialist struggle has not grown, and the attacks on Vietnam are continuing'.

"There are now some favorable conditions for strengthening the international struggle

> against U.S. imperialism. First, no one can indulge in praise for U.S. imperialism, and when it comes to the Vietnam problem, the world's people as well as those forces which carry the anti-imperialist democratic banner, are forced to speak in support of the Vietnamese people. We should take this situation into account and take the initiative by raising the banner of a strengthened anti-U.S. imperialist international united front for national liberation and peace."

This position set out by Miyamoto was a further illustration of the position of the JCP as enunciated in the "February 4 article", based on facts learned during the visit to Vietnam.

Now that the CPSU leadership has appealed for joint action to oppose the U.S. war of aggression, while giving material support to the Vietnamese people in their struggle, Soviet participation in an anti-imperialist international united front should not be rejected. This was the position of the JCP, explained Miyamoto; he placed major emphasis on the need to adopt what we called a revolutionary dual policy; while striving actively under the banner of an anti-imperialist united front, to make concrete criticism in practice of the opportunist fallacy.

In relation to the Vietnam problem, he said, this meant calling for increased struggle and aid for Vietnam, while criticizing any betrayal or vacillation in the struggle, which would "enable progressive and well-intentioned people to distinguish between the correct line and the opportunist line, and actually deal a blow on the U.S. imperialist stratagem for expansion of the war".

In response to Miyamoto's statement, "I have just explained our general view", Liu Shaoqi, leader of the Chinese delegation, said, "Comrade Miyamoto has talked about formation of an anti-imperialist united front and joint action, but do you have any concrete plans for it? If so, what are they?"

ASSESSMENT OF HAVANA TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE FOR SOLIDARITY AND ANTI-U.S. UNITED FRONT

In continuing his speech, Miyamoto took up the question of the international democratic movement.

> "We are actually faced with a number of complicated problems, but in a number of meetings of the international democratic movements held last year, those who had praised Kennedy were forced to support the move to oppose U.S. imperialism. This is the situation in which the international democratic movement finds itself, so it is necessary for us to put special emphasis on opposition to U.S. imperialism, taking into account the character of each respective part of the movement."

As one example of confirmation, he referred to the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana in early 1966.

The first Conference for Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America took place from January 3 to 15, in Havana, with the participation of 512 delegates from 82 countries of the three Continents, plus 64 observers from international democratic organizations, etc. It declared that the people's of the three continents would resolutely struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, of which U.S. imperialism is the leader. In the conference, Japan was represented by eleven delegates mainly from the Japan Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and an observer from the Japan

Council against A & H Bombs (GENSUIKYO), all of whom had worked hard for the success of this meeting. The conference adopted a "General Declaration", a "General Political Resolution", a "Resolution on Vietnam" and resolutions in support of the peoples in their struggles, which were very significant in consolidating an international anti-imperialist united front for national liberation and peace in the world. The unprincipled line of following the U.S., and other fallacious tendencies, as advocated by some delegates, were overwhelmingly rejected, and the conference confirmed explicitly that U.S. imperialism is the chief enemy of the peoples of the three continents and the rest of the world, and called for strengthened solidarity of the forces for national liberation and peace of the world in their joint struggle, and for first priority, to support the Vietnam people in their just struggle.

To organize this struggle effectively, the Conference elected a Provisional Executive Secretariat, and set up a "Committee for Support of the Struggle for National Liberation and against Neocolonialism", representing 12 countries. At that conference, the leader of the Chinese delegation, Wu Xueqian spoke, and called for "the establishment of the broadest possible united front against imperialism, headed by the United States".

Recalling these facts, Miyamoto said: "Though limited to the three continents, this conference represented a united front, I would say. I believe it is possible and necessary for us to make use of the results of that conference in our work, and the bodies then set up, to strengthen international united action against U.S. imperialism, with a view to positively cementing the anti-U.S. united front".

"The international democratic movement, participated in by major countries and forces in the world, can be developed to hammer out various positive ways of dealing with the Vietnam problem", he stressed. His introductory speech was concluded with the following words:

> "I think that the important thing now is for us to take political initiatives with concrete steps and perspectives, such as I have said, as our policy."

Liu Shaoqi asked Miyamoto: "By concrete ways, do you mean what you have referred to?" Miyamoto said, "If agreement is reached on this issue, more concrete problems can be considered."

"THE ROLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING IS NOT VERY IMPORTANT" SAYS THE CHINESE PARTY

The Japanese delegation's introductory speech was followed by two hours of speeches by the Chinese delegation.

The leader of the Chinese delegation, Liu Shaoqi said,

> "The Tricontinental Conference was an excellent meeting, which resulted in the setting up of the Provisional Secretariat. I think it is good to promote the movement against U.S. imperialism all over the world and generalize the campaign in support of Vietnam. We do not have any differing opinions about it. In this sense the organization of the Afro-Asian solidarity committee will be available. In addition, it would be better if a solidarity meeting of the peoples of the world is held to set out basic policy and draw up a basic program for the world struggle against U.S. imperialism, including also Europe, North

America and Oceania. We don't have any objections; we support the idea."

Having expressed support for the views presented by the JCP delegation, Liu Shaoqi said "But the problem is this", and explained the position of the Chinese Party.

"What major influence will such an international conference and an international organization exert? Historically, such an influence is not great. The First International, founded by Karl Marx, the Second International and the Third International, as well as the 1957 Moscow Conference, the 1960 Meeting of 81 Parties in Moscow, and the Tricontinental Conference, and international organizations, including the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Peace Council--these international bodies may have some role to play, but the role is never a big one. These international organizations can be effective in propaganda and organization, but I think that the revolutionary struggle of each respective country depends on the struggle of the Marxist-Leninist party and people of that country."

(notes)

First International--The International Workmen's Association (First International) was the first international revolutionary mass organization founded by Karl Marx.

Third International--Communist International (Comintern), the international body of communist parties.

1957 Moscow Conference--The conference of representatives of 12 communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries.

Deng Xiaoping added:

"The two Moscow meetings played a major role in organizing joint action; but how long did they continue to be effective? The 1957 Conference in Moscow was fine basically; moreover it made a clear formulation on the source of modern revisionism. Actually, however, it was effective only several months. The statement of the 81-Party Meeting of 1960 was not effective for even one day. Addressing the reception held on the night of the day when the statement was made public, what Khrushchev said was a contravention of the agreement reached on the formulation of the Statement concerning Yugoslavia. Thus it was not effective even 24 hours."

Most Chinese delegation members laughed. Discussions went into the central issue,

Miyamoto: "But that is evidence we are now using to expose the betrayal by Khrushchev. To this day in our criticism of them, we have frequently used the Moscow Statement which said that U.S. imperialism is the chief enemy."

Peng Zhen: "Everything that had been opposed by us and deleted from the Statement in the drafting work, was adopted by the 22nd CPSU Congress."

Miyamoto: "That does not matter now, because we do not approve the 22nd CPSU Congress."

Liu Shaoqi: "We may say that the roles of the 1957 Conference and of the 1960 Meeting were not very big, nor are other international conferences and organizations."

To prove this, Liu Shaoqi cited the following:

> "When the Russian October Revolution was won, there was no International; the Second International had collapsed. Without an International the October Revolution was crowned with victory. When the Chinese Revolution triumphed, the Third International had ceased to exist. If the Third International had existed the Chinese Revolution would have failed. The victory was possible because the Third International had been dissolved. To put it another way, we won the victory by thinking and acting for ourselves, without any international intervention. Victories of the Cuban revolution and the Algerian revolution, the Korean revolution, and the Vietnamese revolution were all possible without an International."

On whether the Soviet Union should be allowed to join an anti-imperialist international united front or not, Liu Shaoqi said:

> "In principle, we support the idea of building an international united front against U.S. imperialism, with the people of the world rallying around it. We must oppose modern revisionism as well as imperialism. We are also for this. Without opposing revisionism, the struggle against imperialism will not be successful.
>
> "But is it possible for us to oppose imperialism in alliance with the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union? This is doubtful. In our view, the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union and other countries and parties are not a force fighting against imperialism, but a force of capitulation to imperialism."

He said, "We may send our representatives to a tricontinental conference, an Afro-Asian solidarity conference, and the like", but added that their purpose of participation in such a conference was to carry on the struggle against modern revisionism, to organize a propaganda campaign and expose revisionism; and he stressed again that the role of conferences of the international democratic movement is not very big.

"We cannot rely on such conference to lead the revolution of the world's people to victory. To achieve victory, the peoples of all countries must unite themselves and struggle", Liu Shaoqi said.

Regarding the international communist movement, he said that a meeting such as the Moscow meetings would only be able to issue a joint communiqué at the same level as the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, and would be disadvantageous under the present circumstances.

He also said that China had told the Vietnamese comrades that it refused the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the top leaders of China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, to discuss ways of supporting Vietnam. The Polish United Workers' Party had sent a letter to the Chinese Party, proposing a meeting between the Warsaw Pact countries and the Asian socialist countries, but China had refused to support it. Liu Shaoqi explained China's reasons for refusal as follows:

> "If such a conference were held it would adopt some document. Without the adoption of any document the conference would result in disagreement, which would be rather disadvantageous. Our prediction is this: as a result of our struggle, the Soviet Union and the East European countries may be forced to accept a revolutionary policy. But if this were to be published in a document, it would amount to deceiving the people. The peoples of the

> world, including the Soviet people and others led by revisionists, would regard the Soviet and other revisionist leaderships as opposed to U.S. imperialism. Such a way would amount to helping the revisionism of the CPSU, and only serve to decieve the people.
>
> "Why did the new Soviet leadership propose a meeting with us and joint action in support of Vietnam? It is because their opposition to China is no longer trusted by the people. If they continue to oppose China, it will be very difficult for them to maintain their rule. So they are trying to hold a joint conference and publish a joint document so that they can escape from this dilemma. They talk about opposition to imperialism, but it is a lie. Occasionally, they talk about anti-imperialism and extend some measure of aid to Vietnam, but this is a dual policy. What is their main aim? Their basic line is to seek an alliance with the United States and to build Soviet-U.S. cooperation to dominate the whole world. In their dual policy, the major emphasis is on Soviet-U.S. cooperation. That is the point on which we cannot join hands with them; there is no basis for joining with them.
>
> "During the anti-Japanese war, we were faced with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)'s dual policy. They maintained a dual anti-Japanese and anti-communist policy, but the major emphasis was anti-Japan. And now, the Soviet revisionists put the emphasis on an alliance with the U.S. and the reactionary groups of other countries, to oppose China."

Liu Shaoqi cited a few examples: the Soviet Union, in the attempt to complete the encirclement of China in collaboration with the U.S., is instigating India and Pakistan; it recently concluded a treaty with Mongolia, and divisions of the Soviet armed forces are stationed there; Japanese reactionary forces have changed from an anti-Soviet line to an anti-China line.

Concerning the possibility of an attack on China by Soviet ground troops, he said "It may happen at some certain time", but added, "the Soviet revisionists are slandering China and writing anti-Chinese articles, but much measures are not supported. If they send in troops, the people's mind will turn away from them".

CHINESE POSITION ON VIETNAM PROBLEM

Liu Shaoqi now moved on to the Vietnam problem.

> "Comrade Miyamoto, you said that U.S. imperialism is waging unrestrained aggression against Vietnam, but the Americans are not wholly unrestrained; they have some anxieties. They are unable to launch air strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong. So far their ground troops have not reached North Vietnam. The characteristic of the Vietnam war now is that the people have begun their armed struggle against the U.S. aggression.
>
> "In the Vietnam war it is not only the imperialists that take the lead in the attacks. The people in South Vietnam are also attacking and holding their lead. There is some possibility that U.S. imperialism will have to expand the war to secure a way for their own survival. But debates in various circles within the United States have shown that there is no way out for them by expanding the war. When the U.S. cannot even suppress the people

> of South Vietnam, can they expand (the war) as far as the North? The more the U.S. ground troops try to reach the North, the more they lose their means of waging the war. In America, there is some misgiving about the possibility of China's participation in the war.
>
> "Although we see the difficulties in the Vietnam war, mainly in the battles in the South and air raids in the North, we are optimistic in general. It is true that some are being killed by the U.S. air bombing, and buildings are destroyed, but that is not so serious; perhaps some 2,000 casualties or thereabouts, I suppose."

Miyamoto promptly responded: "The Vietnamese comrades told us that some 8,000 people had been killed, and almost the same number had been wounded".

Liu Shaoqi went on to say that the role of the air force is not very important, citing the experiences in the anti-Japanese war and the Korean war, and emphasized that victory was possible even when the U.S. commands the air.

> "We have also had some experiences of air raids. Both Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the Japanese forces had aircraft, but we had no planes; nor anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. In the Korean war, the United States mobilized a great number of war planes. At that time we joined the air battles in North Korea with anti-aircraft guns and machine guns and only part of our air force. Yet the United States had command of the air. Of all U.S. planes lost in that year those downed in air battles were no more than ten percent; more than 90 percent were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. This meant that the role of the air force was not so very important. In spite of the U.S. command of the air, it was possible for us to carry on operations, and we repulsed the U.S. troops from the Ya Lu River and drove them south of the 38th parallel."

> Deng Xiaoping added:
>
> "In the Korean war, 400,000 of our people were killed in the three years of air raids and battles. Among the Korean people, it is said that more than one million were killed in air raids and battles. But since the armistice, Korea has recovered its population, and is making good progress in reconstruction. This shows the very limited role of aircraft in battles."

Liu Shaoqi said, "Even if you hoped that the Soviet Union would launch air attacks on U.S. military bases in South Vietnam, they would not do so; they failed to do that in the more than three years of the Korean war". He reiterated the Chinese position: "If the major emphasis in the Soviet dual policy were really to be put on opposition to U.S. imperialism and not on opposition to China and the world people's revolution, we would form an alliance with them to some extent. The Soviet Union says that its general line of foreign policy is peaceful coexistence, but what it really means is global domination through Soviet-U.S. cooperation. Unless they thoroughly rectify this general line we can scarcely take joint action with them".

In the assessment of what aid is actually extended to Vietnam, Chinese thinking was different from what the Vietnamese Workers' Party leadership had told us. They said, "China and the Soviet Union are aiding Vietnam equally".

Liu Shaoqi: "At present, the Soviet Union sometimes condemns the U.S. imperialists and aids North Vietnam, but not South Vietnam."

Miyamoto: "The Vietnamese comrades told us that the Soviet Union had recently begun to aid the South."

Deng Xiaoping: "They certainly give some weapons to the South; I hear such rocket guns as the Katyusha have been supplied. But judging from the firing frequency of such a gun, their small quantity of ammunition would be used up in just a few minutes."

Liu Shaoqi: "The Soviet Union is attempting to put the war in Vietnam within the orbit of Soviet-American cooperation. So their involvement in the Vietnam war is not prompted by goodwill. The amount of their aid is not very much."

Miyamoto: "I hear they have granted one billion rubles."

Deng Xiaoping: "The prices of items are very high in their calculation. ...The Soviet military supplies are all sent by land transport through China. We have the cargo lists, so we well know what stuffs are being sent to Vietnam. Some are of the 1930s."

Miyamoto: "We understand that more recently they are transporting by sea."

Deng Xiaoping: "That's fine. That's what we hoped."

Peng Zhen: "We advised that it would be better for non-military aid materials to be transported by the sea lanes. On this alone, we had long discussions with them."

In this serious situation surrounding Vietnam, the top leadership of China are not correctly informed on actual aid. This keen impression was confirmed later when we met with Mao Zedong.

The Chinese arguments concerning aid to Vietnam emphasized that Soviet aid to Vietnam is small in quantity and bad in quality, and that, by comparison, Chinese aid is big and good.

But the JCP delegation had just been in Vietnam, where testimonies concerning aid had been given by the Vietnamese Party to the delegation.

"SOVIETS ARE A DETACHED U.S. CORPS", CHINA SAYS

The Chinese condemnation of the Soviet Union continued as the talks went on.

Going back historically into the Soviet attitudes toward Vietnam, Deng Xiaoping said: "In 1962, when the guerrilla struggle began in South Vietnam, Vietnam asked the Soviet Union for arms supplies, but was refused; but China, supporting the struggle in South Vietnam, did its utmost to send all weapons stored in China in support of the struggle in South Vietnam".

He also told us that in 1964 the Soviet Union had put forward a plan for the neutralization of both North and South Vietnam, but was opposed by both Vietnam and China. He said: "After Khrushchev was dismissed, the new Soviet leadership could not maintain the "withdrawal policy" and changed to an "involvement policy", beginning military aid to North Vietnam in 1965; the Soviet Union used this aid to intervene in China, demanding the opening of an air route between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and the use of a Chinese air field".

Deng Xiaoping also complained of the Vietnam Workers' Party:

"The Soviet Union has switched to an 'involvement policy' and begun aid for Vietnam,

> but is spreading lies throughout the world that China is sabotaging Vietnam aid; that China charges the Soviet Union for transporting aid materials to Vietnam, asking for payment in dollars. We have told the Vietnamese comrades to reject these claims in explicit terms, but they have never done so openly...the Vietnamese comrades ought to clarify this matter. If we are interfering with aid, they should tell it as it is."

Discussing the Soviet aid to Vietnam, Deng said, "The change by the new Soviet leadership in adopting an 'involvement policy' was made under tacit agreement with the United States", and emphasized the need to see the Soviet way of doing things from the angle of its global strategy.

By this he meant that the Soviet Union is following a relaxation policy in all areas in the world, with the aim of not checking U.S. imperialism, but allowing the U.S. to concentrate its forces in Vietnam without trouble. "I find the novel 'All Quiet on the Western Front' (Im Westen Nichts Neues, by Remarque, Erich Maria). This is also the case now", said Deng Xiaoping. "It will take longer hours to discuss this problem; in short, Soviet-American cooperation is now going on over the Vietnam problem".

"The problem is this", Peng Zhen said:

> "They are carrying the banner of Lenin, of the revolution, but actually they are cooperating with imperialism and opposing the revolution in other countries, so they are embarrased when this is exposed. Khrushchev failed. Can we be sure that the new leadership will not fail? So they made up a well thought out plan, to organize a conference of Marxist-Leninist parties, including the Chinese Party, to take what they call joint action and cover up their own crime. They also aim to keep our mouths shut so that we cannot expose what they have done."

Liu Shaoqi concluded the Chinese Party's position:

> "In my opinion, the Soviet revisionist leadership is a detached corps of U.S. imperialism. We can never trust them. They are following a dual policy, which is not actually dual; they have only one face. The Soviet revisionists are mistaken in two points; they refuse opposition to U.S. imperialism and are engaged in splitting actions. Far from opposing imperialism, they are now aligned with the U.S. and oppose the revolution, the revolution of the whole world.
>
> "In their own country, they are pushing ahead with capitalist restoration. The Soviet Communist Party is not a communist party any more; it has become a bourgeois party. The Soviet government is no more the dictatorship of the proletariat; it is the dictatorship of the privileged bourgeois class. ...They say that they are opposing U.S. imperialism and supporting Vietnam, but that is only a phenomenon. The fact is that they are aligned with U.S. imperialism, opposing the revolutionary struggle of the peoples in the world, and in their own country suppressing their opponents. Our task now is to expose their acts. We have no other way of opposing them than by exposing them."

The Chinese delegation leader Liu Shaoqi said, "Shall we stop our discussion for today? Comrade Wilcox (General Secretary of the Communist Party of

New Zealand) is visiting us, and I'm going to attend a banquet for him this evening..." So the talks ended for that day at 6:30 p.m.

After this session all members of both delegations lined up for photos in memory of the meeting, the usual practice. The picture was carried by the March 5 issue of "Akahata" with top front page coverage, under the title "The Delegations of the JCP and the CPC after the Talks on March 3".

Shaking the hands of the CPC delegates, the JCP delegates left the People's Great Hall.

Spring had come to Japan, but here in Beijing it was still very cold in early March.

The bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, a corner of the socialist camp, is going on today, and the socialist camp and the anti-imperialist and democratic forces are urged to concentrate their power in effective counterattacks, and strengthen the international struggle in support of the Vietnamese people.

As we went by car, provided for the JCP delegation, through the streets of Beijing after sunset, my thoughts were on the bitter struggle being waged by the leaders and people of Vietnam, where we had been only a few days before.

SECOND SESSION: "ANTI-U.S." OR "ANTI-U.S., ANTI-SOVIET"

On the afternoon of March 4, the talks began again at 3:30.

On the previous evening and on the morning of the 4th, the JCP delegation held a meeting at their hotel to sum up and analyze the points discussed at the first session. They discussed how to broaden the points of agreement reached by the two Parties, and how to develop the positive arguments of the JCP on the main subjects.

It was bitterly cold in Beijing also on that day.

COMMON EFFORTS IN INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS

The delegations of the two Parties assembled at the same table in the People's Congress Hall as on the previous day.

"Comrade Miyamoto, please speak first today as you did yesterday", said the head of the CPC delegation, Liu Shaoqi. The JCP delegation leader, Miyamoto, developed the viewpoints of the Japanese side in detail on the arguments the CPC had advanced in the previous session.

> "Naturally, I am pleased to find that you are generally in favor of the establishment of an anti-imperialist united front. I am also glad to know that you are supporting the further development of the Tricontinental People's Solidarity Conference, and also the convocation of a worldwide conference in solidarity with

the peoples of the world, if possible."

After stressing agreements on the opinions expressed by both parties, Miyamoto dealt with the issue of the international democratic movement and international conferences.

> "We are of course aware that there are certain limitations to these international conferences and organizations. But I believe these conferences make a positive contribution to meeting the expectations of world peoples, now that the international communist movement is faced with so many difficulties, and its unity is being damaged by splitting actions."

Following on from the previous day, he stressed the significance of the Havana conference, and said "there are conditions in which Vietnamese comrades can take the initiative in developing the international struggle in support of Vietnam". He said that five important conferences held in the previous year, 1965, were fruitful:

"The Fourth Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference" (Winneba, Ghana, May);
"The Second Conference of International Trade Union Committees Against U.S. Imperialism, in Support of Vietnamese Workers and People" (Hanoi, June);
"The World Conference for Peace, National Independence, and General Disarmament" (Helsinki, July);
"The 11th World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs" (Tokyo, August);
"The International Conference for Withdrawal of Foreign Military Bases" (Jakarta, October).

Appreciating the achievements of these conferences as forms of international action, which put forward generally correct policies without permitting revisionists to force their opportunist line on them, Miyamoto offered his opinion on the CPC views expressed at the previous day's session:

> "Of course, these conferences cannot take over the role of a revolutionary struggle in each country. I am of the same opinion as our Chinese comrades in recognizing that a revolutionary struggle must be led by the vanguard party in each country, which must be responsible for uniting the people of its own country, and for their victory.
>
> "In the preliminary session of the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties, we argued that the line of the revolutionary struggle in each country must be made by the communist party of that country, and this argument was included in the Statement. And in the Meeting, we opposed the proposal that a permanent international organ should be set up."

After making these statements, Miyamoto pointed out as follows:

> "But at the same time, it is obviously important to clarify the common orientation of the peoples of the world, based on proletarian internationalism, and mobilize them in the struggle. The importance of this has increased, especially in the present situation, because the indignation of the masses is increasing over what U.S. imperialism is doing."

"We have another thing in mind". (Miyamoto continued in the quiet room.)

"In a country where the communist party is not yet in power, international united action or a conference cannot but have a great impact on democratic movements. In a socialist country like yours, a bad resolution adopted in a conference of an international democratic movement can be left unreported to the people, if you wish. But in our country, if a bad resolution is adopted, the reactionary forces, the right-wing social democrats, and anti-Party revisionists, will make much propaganda about anything discrediting the Japanese Communist Party."

Head of the CPC delegation, Liu Shaoqi, nodded in agreement.

"Two thirds of the countries in the world are non-socialist countries like Japan. In these circumstances, especially when opportunist policy lines have spread seeds of confusion in these several years, an effort must be made in an international conference to shape a correct policy."

Drawing attention to the climate of some international conferences, where participants hesitated to use the term "U.S. imperialism" while Kennedy was being lauded, Miyamoto made clear the line of struggle, connecting our struggle against U.S. imperialism with that against modern revisionism, saying: "Only by maintaining a correct line in the context of the practical movement, will we be able to defeat revisionism in practice. We have drawn this lesson from our experience in past successful conferences".

"In other words, on one hand we must carry through a struggle by making known our action program based on the immediate, urgent demands of the masses, upholding it and rallying the peoples of the world, and at the same time we must fight against both the opportunism and splittism that obstruct our effort. If we study the demands of the masses deeply and lead the struggle in a correct way for selective demands on which agreement can be found, right-wing social democrats and revisionists will find it difficult to oppose our efforts. If they dare to obstruct, they will be isolated from the masses and be defeated as long as we wage our struggle correctly. Therefore, it is important in criticizing revisionists not merely to expose their nature, but to combine this with the tasks undertaken in common by all parties concerned. Otherwise it would be our side that would lose the people's support."

In this respect, Miyamoto emphasized, the JCP, the CPC and other Parties in Asia, such as the Parties of Vietnam and Korea, had to try to work in concert to establish a correct policy line in the international democratic movement, even though among them, views on the international communist movement may differ.

DISUNITY HELPS U.S. TO INCREASE BOMBING OF NORTH

Miyamoto then took up the question of Vietnam. A few days before, the JCP delegation had held talks with the leadership of the Vietnam Workers' Party, during the visit to Vietnam; these talks provided the basis for the frank views of the Japanese Communist Party presented by Miyamoto.

"Our Vietnamese comrades are carrying on a very courageous struggle, but they admit frankly that the situation is complicated and difficult. Of course, they are resolved to carry on their struggle to the end, convinced that they will win the final victory."

Miyamoto went on to stress first that U.S. imperialism was trying to take advantage of the disunity in the socialist camp to defeat socialist countries one by one, with Vietnam as its first target.

"What we have taken as especially serious is that the irresolute reaction of the socialist camp, the Soviet Union in particular, to the U.S. tentative exploratory actions on a smaller scale before the bombing of North Vietnam encouraged the gradual escalation of the war by the U.S. and the bombing of North Vietnam.

"By the bombing of Laos, by framing the 'Tonkin Gulf Incident', and then bombing North Vietnam at the beginning last year, U.S. imperialism tested the reactions of the socialist camp, and resumed the air raids on North Vietnam after a 20-day interval, on the day after March 1, 1965, when the split meeting (the Moscow meeting participated in by 19 Communist and Workers' Parties) was held. It is obvious that the bombing was resumed by the U.S. imperialists after reaching the conclusion that the socialist camp was not in a position to unite and establish a strong formation to challenge the U.S. action."

Miyamoto referred to the 1960 Statement agreed on by the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties, citing that part which stressed the superiority of socialism.

The "Statement" said:

"For the first time in history, war is opposed by great and organized forces: the mighty Soviet Union, which now leads the world in the decisive branches of science and technology; the entire socialist camp, which has placed its great material and political might at the service of peace;...

"The combined forces of the socialist camp reliably safeguard every socialist country against encroachments by imperialist reaction."

In the light of that Statement, he pointed out, the strength of the socialist camp, including the Soviet Union, had not been effectively used in the struggle against U.S. imperialism, and although the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was clearly a serious violation of the sovereignty of a socialist country, no proper counterattack had been organized.

"It is true that a courageous and heroic struggle is being carried on in South Vietnam, with four-fifths of the land liberated under difficult conditions, along with a great number of people living there. But it is also true that South Vietnamese comrades in their courageous struggle earnestly desire international support in their resistance to the U.S. bombings.

"Being obliged to thank countries and organizations for their support, our comrades of the Vietnam Workers' Party have not complained. They say that assistance from the Soviet Union and from China is central to their support. However, when a socialist country is subject to continual bombing--although it has been affirmed that the socialist camp and the peace-defending forces are superior in strength to the imperialist camp and war forces--the

JCP, as a party in a capitalist state, feels seriously that it is its duty to struggle as effectively as possible, rallying forces at the international level.

"When we charge U.S. imperialism with atrocities, we mean that they have command of the air, and are bombing schools and hospitals in Vietnam and committing barbarities with napalm bombs, etc. So (if we assist the Vietnamese people in this regard) it will not conflict with the intiative taken by our Vietnamese comrades in South Vietnam in the struggle against the United States.

"It is true that, seen from the sacrifices that a war of revolution demands, the number of the dead and wounded is still small, compared with the Korean war. And, as you said, it is also true that final victory can be won without holding command of the air. But what we are seriously concerned about is that U.S. imperialism is taking political advantage of the disunity in the socialist camp in their policy of defeating socialist countries one by one, with the first target the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

"This should not be taken to mean that we are pessimistic about the future of Vietnam", said Miyamoto. The clear view of the JCP is, "We attach much importance to the above fact, because we must arouse the indignation of people all over the world at the brutal aggression by U.S. imperialism, so that many struggles against U.S. imperialism will arise throughout the world"; "and while denouncing modern revisionism, historically and sharply, for helping the present state of affairs to develop, we must at the same time adopt an active policy primarily aimed at uniting all people in the world to defeat U.S. imperialism".

"I once said to our Vietnamese comrades jokingly...", Miyamoto went on, "the Soviet Union succeeded in landing a satellite on the moon. Important as it may be for them to conquer the moon, we cannot be satisfied with the conquest of the moon if a corner of the socialist camp is left under a daily shower of bombs".

At the beginning, the bombing of North Vietnam made headlines everyday in Japan, but it became so routine that it came to be treated as "regular news items", with little space, he said. "I am afraid that such reporting will accustom the Japanese people to the bombing, and they will take it for granted. Bourgeois newspapers always play such a role--a very serious fact. It would be wrong to think that the situation is not so grave but will grow serious if Hanoi or Haiphong are bombed". "We must continue to fight, vigilant that we do not become accustomed to the unrestrained bombing of a socialist country", he said resolutely.

Miyamoto referred to the aim of W.W. Rostow's (special advisor to the U.S. President) visit to Japan, saying that it was to learn the reactions of the Japanese people if the war of aggression is expanded to China. He also reported that the Sato cabinet was claiming now that the sending overseas of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces would not violate the Constitution, if they went as United Nations Forces.

> "In this situation, while highly evaluating the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people, we consider it necessary to be determined not to allow the bombing of the North to continue, and to try to unite the anti-imperialist forces all over the world and establish an international united front."

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES, AND COUNTER-PROPOSAL OF JCP

The next point taken up by JCP delegation was the issue of an international conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties. Miyamoto explained the stand of the JCP, whose position had been repeatedly made clear about the "Consultative Meeting of 19 Communist and Workers' Parties" convened unilaterally by the CPSU leadership in Moscow from March 1, 1965, through March 5.

As already mentioned, on October 5, 1964 "Akahata" carried an editorial entitled "International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties Should Be Held not for Split but for Unity--Proposal of the Japanese Communist Party", and after that the paper also carried another editorial, "Again on the Problem of an International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties". This was on January 21, 1965. In these editorials, the Japanese Communist Party demanded that the plan to call such a 'Meeting' be cancelled, because there was no ground for its convocation in terms of either procedure or themes; it would exacerbate the disunity of the international communist movement and cause a decisive split. The JCP made a counter-proposal, that "thorough preliminary consultations should be made with concerned Parties, and a concrete agreement should be reached about a joint struggle against imperialism, headed by the United States".

In spite of this, the Meeting was arbitrarily held on March 1. The Japanese Communist Party published a long non-attributed article entitled "The Meeting Convened in Moscow from March 1 by the CPSU Leadership" in the April 13 issue of "Akahata", thoroughly criticizing the "Meeting".

The article said:

> "If the CPSU leadership really desires the strengthening of 'joint actions' against imperialism, in particular, against U.S. imperialism, as stated in the Comminiqué, a divisionist meeting such as was held on March 1, should not have been convened in such a grave situation, with U.S. imperialism more ferociously expanding its war of aggression. We imagine that it is not by chance that U.S. imperialism resumed the large-scale bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam one day after the meeting was held, that is, on March 2, after a 20-day interval. The holding of the 'Consultative Meeting', which was intended to bring the split to the surface and to give the split 'a definite formula', obviously encouraged U.S. imperialism."

After mentioning these points, Miyamoto again stressed the importance of the JCP's counter-proposal, that "a conference should be held only after essential procedures, under an agreement of all parties, with limited items for discussion, and on the premise that the conference will be helpful to unity".

> "Our counter-proposal had two aims: one was to defeat the scheme to hold a splittist conference; the other was to provide persuasive evidence of the unreasonableness of the conference to participants of goodwill, who are seeking unity.
>
> "Under existing conditions, it is sure that the calling of such a conference would be difficult, but theoretically, the following seems possible: Because of the wide gap in opinions, there is no possibility for the time being of convening a conference to solve problems of principle. But it is theoretically

possible to hold such a conference if the themes are limited to a very few items, such as the issue of support for Vietnam; support for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; if agreement is reached beforehand among the Parties concerned, and if proper preparations are made. Our position on this proposal has not changed.

"This would be helpful both in fighting against modern revisionism and in expressing active solidarity in the struggle against U.S. imperialism. Of course, we don't consider this the most important factor among current issues."

MAJOR TASK IS TO ISOLATE U.S. IMPERIALISM

Miyamoto then went into the question of how to look on the CPSU leadership and how to take joint action with it.

There was an important difference between the attitudes of the JCP and the CPC: the JCP claimed that the Soviet Union should be included in anti-imperialist international joint actions and a united front; but the CPC had declared in the previous day's session that it took an "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet" stance. This had already been revealed in an article "We reject the so-called 'joint actions' by the CPSU Leadership", published jointly by the editorial boards of "Renmin Ribao" and "Hongqi" in November of the previous year.

On this question, Miyamoto made the following points on the position of the JCP.

--We have recognized the CPSU leadership as a revisionist leadership that came to power in the Party of a socialist country, and is following a big-power chauvinist, splitting line. But their line is now facing failure from the changing and developing situation, the advancing struggles of the peoples of the world, and systematic criticisms by Marxist-Leninist Parties. The important question is, what changes will take place in the CPSU; will they be beneficial to the working class; either it will change into nothing less than imperialism, or become a Leninist Party. We believe it will be the latter.

--Objective conditions has obliged them to take a dual policy; a clear traitorous policy would exacerbate the contradictions between the CPSU leadership and the Soviet people and all the CPSU members, contradictions with the principle that operates in a socialist country, and with the struggles and demands of all the peoples of the world. In our opinion therefore, now that the CPSU leadership is officially taking a better attitude toward Vietnam, the focal point of world contradictions, supporting the demands of the Vietnamese people and joining an international anti-imperialist front, we should not exclude it.

JCP delegation head Miyamoto then went more deeply into this question.

"The important thing to note is that our primary aim in joint actions is to act in concert with the masses under the influence of the CPSU leadership. The CPSU leadership has a firm grip on the Government, and has political as well as international influence, and its admission to a united front would, generally speaking, enable all the Soviet people to rise

> together in support of Vietnam. In a negative sense, there might be danger of creating the illusion that the CPSU leadership has become a resolute anti-imperialist force, a danger which our Chinese comrades stress. But the admission of the CPSU leadership to a united front would not mean approval of its foreign policy as a whole; such a united front would be formed with specific tasks, with the CPSU leadership required to implement its promises and assist Vietnam. Nor would we ever give up our right to criticize.
>
> This would make it possible to involve the CPSU leadership more deeply in the struggle against U.S. imperialism.
>
> If determined to fight, they must be active in the struggle against U.S. imperialism. If determined not to fight, they will reveal that their talk about anti-imperialism is no more than lip-service. Whichever way is chosen, it will give the people a correct understanding of the issue."

Miyamoto went on, "We studied Lenin in our analysis. He proposed joint actions between the Second and the Third International"--the international experience of the united front is what Lenin taught us to how to undertake joint actions with Parties under opportunist leadership.

In our "February 4 article", we made it clear that Lenin had argued, even after the establishment of the Communist International following World War I, that the Communist International should take joint actions and establish a united front with the Second, and with the Two-and-a-Half International, to fight against international capital, even though the leadership of such organizations was in the hands of people with revisionist and opportunist tendencies. In order to fight the class enemy, and to overcome opportunism and revisionism on a mass scale in an ideological and political struggle, we should never hesitate to undertake, when necessary, international united actions with the forces of opportunist and revisionist tendencies, whose influences over the masses is relatively strong--this is the lesson we learned from Lenin. Miyamoto continued:

> "While Lenin revealed that the Second International had an unstable alliance with the bourgeoisie, he considered that on the demand for the eight-hour day, it would be possible to struggle in unity with the rank and file under the leadership of the Second International, and in doing so, raise the level of their consciousness and lead them back to the right course. There is no Fourth International now, of course, but the Soviet Union is a member of the socialist camp."

"We have another point of view on this", Miyamoto said, offering two alternatives:

> "Which is the better of the following two options: for the Soviet Union to align itself with the United States and tighten the encirclement of China, or to frustrate the effort these two countries to form an alliance, and consolidate that wing of the revolution. We prefer the 'latter'."

After pointing out that it was quite impossible for the Soviet Union to follow the lead of U.S. imperialism like Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) or the Pak Jung Hi clique, and that there was a fundamental contradiction between the tradition of socialism laid down by Lenin, and U.S. imperialism, Miyamoto put the view of the Japanese Communist Party in the following words: "Our main task is to isolate U.S. imperialism and deal it a blow. To do this it is important to combine the struggle against modern revisionism with the struggle against U.S. imperialism".

"Now it is time to wind up my speech". After nearly two hours the JCP presentation ended. The tense atmosphere briefly relaxed.

"THERE CAN BE NO JOINT ACTIONS WITH SOVIET UNION", SAYS CHINESE SIDE

After five-minute recess, the talks resumed. Before the recess the respective basic views of both parties had been presented, followed by expressions of opinion given in turn by the CPC and the JCP each for two days.

The CPC representatives presented their view as follows: "Comrade Miyamoto has dealt with a lot of very important matters", CPC delegation head Liu Shaoqi said.

He said he was well aware that the JCP had consistently opposed U.S. imperialism and the Japanese reactionary forces, as well as revisionism. "In this respect, the JCP is better than some other leftist parties".

> "Such parties are opposing U.S. imperialism, but not opposing revisionism. They claim that opposition to imperialism means opposition to revisionism. But we say that to oppose imperialism we must oppose revisionism; if we don't oppose revisionism, we cannot oppose imperialism. The stand of such parties is different from ours."

He also said, "But you seem to be upset by one thing; the U.S. bombing of Vietnam".

"No, we are not upset by it, but we do take it seriously", replied Miyamoto without hesitation.

Liu Shaoqi said "you say that you cannot overlook the bombing", but it is impossible to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, he stressed.

> "Is there any way to stop U.S. planes bombing North Vietnam? We thought about this and what to do, but found no way to stop the bombing."

After Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Kang Sheng, and Peng Zhen had each given numbers and figures and detailed explanations of the contents and quantities of Chinese assistance to Vietnam, they said, "Our assistance has not been able to stop the U.S. bombing of the North. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have also probably thought about how to stop that bombing, but it appears they have failed to find any effective means; there is no possibility of them finding and using effective means" (Liu Shaoqi).

Deng Xiaoping said:

> "It will be impossible for us ever to get command of the air. With the United States mobilizing more than 2,000 planes in the war in Vietnam, we cannot get command of the air even if we threw into the battle scores or even more than a hundred Mig 21s. We must accept the present situation in which the United States holds supremacy at sea too. Guerrilla war is our line, or as we say, on two legs."

Supporting Deng Xiaoping's statement, CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi said:

> "Once Japanese militarism destroyed the U.S. navy in Hawaii. Now most of the U.S.

> naval vessels have gathered off the coast of Vietnam, and the number of their warships is far greater than at that time in Hawaii. Big naval vessels fear war planes. Even if we were to call on the Soviet Union to send in their bombers and sink the warships, it would never do so, and even you would not favor this way of doing things, because it would trigger a new world war.
>
> "The United States has six big aircraft carriers off the coast of Vietnam. It also has many airfields in South Vietnam, along with its bases in the Philippines, Taiwan, Guam, Okinawa and others. Even if socialist countries and the Soviet Union were unitedly to destroy all such bases totally, the United States would not stop the bombing of Vietnam... Moreover, the United States would not restrict itself to the bombing of North Vietnam, but would expand the bombing to China and the Soviet Union.
>
> "If China were to bomb the U.S. fleet, a major war would break out between China and the United States. If the Soviet Union were to do it, it would trigger a new World War."

This view says that it is impossible to wage an allout struggle against the U.S., or to stop the bombing of the North because the war might expand to China, or escalate into a world war.

The JCP proposal was not for military action such as bombing the U.S. Seventh Fleet or U.S. bases. Both the Soviet Union and China has shot down U-2s that intruded into their airspace. What was needed was to provide assistance jointly that would be able to shoot down and beat back U.S. planes as they came over the coast to intrude into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This would need the whole international communist movement and the combined socialist states to lead the struggle of anti-imperialist democratic forces against the war of aggression in Vietnam, and for the socialist countries to take further determined diplomatic steps against the U.S. Administration.

Leader of the CPC delegation, Liu Shaoqi, said, "The Soviet Union has delivered some anti-aircraft guns and missiles to Vietnam, the missiles being deployed largely in and around Hanoi and Haiphong. As the Soviet Union informed the U.S. about their disposition, the U.S. will not bomb those locations". When JCP delegation head Miyamoto said "We have heard that some Russians in charge of those missiles have been killed or wounded", Liu Shaoqi said "Those casualties could possibly have been caused in other places". Peng Zhen, a member of CPC delegation added, "They (the Soviets) have informed Washington where those missiles are located".

But less than four months after this, on June 29, the U.S. imperialists openly began the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

CPC delegation head Liu Shaoqi went on:

> "Comrade Miyamoto said that even though the Statement of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties declared that the forces of socialism are superior to those of imperialism, and the forces of peace stronger than those of war, such superiorities have not been displayed in Vietnam due to differences in opinions...But revisionism arose before the Statement of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties was issued. Almost no change has occurred in the situation since then. Revisionism is still revisionism, the differences in opinion still exist, and imperialism is still imperialism. The balance of forces is almost the same as it was."

Then he said, "The forces of peace, and the forces of war needs to be clarified", and pointing out that a war was being fought in Algeria while the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties of 81 Countries was being held, and since then we have seen local wars being fought somewhere in the world all the time; they have not ceased for a moment, Liu Shaoqi stressed that "an analysis must be made of what are the forces of war and the forces of peace".

> "As Marx and Lenin put it, a war can only be eliminated by a war. It is a revolutionary war that will eliminate the forces of a war of aggression and reaction. To be sure, mass rallies, demonstrations, worker strikes and student strikes can express opposition to the counter-revolutionary force of war. So I admit that they are effective to some extent, but the major effect will come from the effort to arouse the consciousness of the people and build the power of revolutionary war.
>
> "During World War I, Lenin called for 'turning an imperialist war into a civil war'; on the eve of the World War II, however, no such preparations were made. Now that we are faced with the threat of a third World War, the communist parties in the world must make preparations for a revolutionary war. In my opinion, this must be done at once.
>
> "Otherwise, once a war breaks out, if we have even 200,000, or 300,000, or 1,000,000 party members and organize the people into mass movements, worker strikes and student strikes, these things cannot be effective enough. On the other hand, if several thousand or several tens of thousands of people can rise with weapons in hand, they can check the imperialist forces of war. This is the most important key question. Therefore, while we are opposed to the forces of counter-revolutionary war, we actively organize the forces of revolutionary war. War can be eliminated from the world only after imperialism and reactionary forces have been eliminated."

Apart from what the CPC had declared earlier, that no effective counterattack would be made because of the danger of it becoming a World War, the CPC side now stressed the need to make preparations to rise with weapons in hand in opposition to a World War. In a war the role of mass movements is reduced; even a small number of armed people will be far more effective in that event. This was nothing more nor less than an "only arms" theory, or the "only by armed-struggle" theory that rates the Chinese-style "people's war" as the only way of revolution in the world.

This is the argument that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"; this was later used as an important lever for the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong to interfere in and attack the Japanese Communist Party. It was also from this standpoint that the Chinese leadership praised the pseudo-leftist violent groups for their irrational and violent activities.

THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL UNITED ACTIONS AND SUPPORT OF ANTI-PARTY FACTIONS

In the subsequent CPC speeches, Liu Shaoqi expounded his views on the issue of an international conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties.

He said "I am not in favor of the alternative proposal made by the Japanese Communist Party", and expressed the views of the Chinese side on this question:

> "Can they (the CPSU leadership--Ed.) take joint actions really with us on specific issues? No. The CPSU leadership and other revisionist parties have now come to accept your proposal. They don't say so in words, but only say they are of the same opinion as your proposal.
>
> "If we accept joint actions with the CPSU leadership on some specific issues, such as assistance to Vietnam, we will only help the CPSU to deceive the people of the Soviet Union and other countries, putting rouge and powder on their face. Nor is this the only negative effect. It would also have the effect of obscuring our position. It would make the world's people unable to discern our resolute position against imperialism and revisionism; it would become impossible to draw a line of demarcation between us and revisionism.
>
> "Their (the CPSU leadership--tr.) aim in taking joint actions with us would be to shut our mouths and stop us criticizing them.
>
> "For a rather long time, they have been saying, 'Let us stop open polemics', 'Let us stop factional activities', and so on, but we have refused their demands. If we joined in a conference and started joint actions with them, it would encourage them so much that they would demand the end of open polemics and factional activities."

The view of the Chinese side was they were not able to take joint actions with the Soviet Union because if they did, it would obscure the boundary between revisionism and the revolutionary position, confusing "leftist" parties, and lead to a call for an end to factional activities as well as an end to open polemics.

Liu Shaoqi added that even if it were agreed that an international conference be held, a debate would take place about which faction of each party in each country would be eligible to take part, and no agreement could possibly be reached.

> "Now many parties are split into factions. Leftist groups have been created within the Party of every Latin American country, such as Brazil and Peru, and within Parties of many other countries, including Ceylon, France, Italy, Belgium, and Britain. If we were to participate in a conference that excluded such leftist parties, they would criticize us, saying 'We are not allowed to participate, but revisionist groups are admitted'. Or if we decided to allow all groups to participate, no agreement would be reached. If Yoshio Shiga were allowed to participate, you would not agree."

By "leftist" parties, he referred to groups of blind followers of China, who had been expelled from the Parties of their own countries; it had become usual in many countries for second or third "Parties" to be created.

CPC delegation member Deng Xiaoping said, "when the Tricontinental Conference was held in Havana, leftists were very dissatisfied because revisionist factions took part from Latin American countries". CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi said, "even if good declarations or appeals are adopted in an international conference of communist parties, they are not so effective", and went on to stress:

> "Even if a specific document, for example, a document concerning joint actions to support Vietnam is adopted, the situation will not improve; it will remain the same as it was. A few more planes and anti-aircraft guns may be

> delivered, but they will be of little use. Now Vietnam has many anti-aircraft guns, more guns than China possesses.
>
> "A proposal has been made from the Soviet Union to organize joint actions to support Vietnam, a proposal which was accepted by comrades in Vietnam and Korea, but rejected by us. If you want to try joint actions with them, you may do so. For our part, we will not participate.
>
> "We have two reasons for rejecting participation. One reason is that they (the CPSU leadership--tr.) will attempt to use such an opportunity to deceive the peoples of the world, and the other is that such joint actions with them would authorize them to negotiate with the U.S. on behalf of all of us."

CPC delegation member Peng Zhen intervened:

> "We once took joint actions with them (the CPSU leadership--tr.) When the 'Conference for World Peace and Disarmament' was held in Moscow in 1962, the CPC delegation participated in the Conference and reached an agreement with them by conceding our position. At that time, your Party took a different attitude. Your delegation, and the delegations from Korea and African countries were dissatisfied with our way of doing things. Khrushchev was so satisfied that he said he would grant a gold medal to our delegation. It does no good to agree with revisionism. To get a bit closer to it would obscure the demarcation line between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. On the 1962 case, we have made self-criticism before you."

Liu Shaoqi wound up the speeches from the CPC side, by saying:

> "On this question, it is long since you have made your first proposal. We also have expressed our view time and again. We have done it again today. I think the Party of each country should have its own opinion on the question of joint actions based on its own conditions. You should try joint actions with them. We will not take part. We will observe what result will be produced."

The talks ended for that day at 6:30 p.m.

"We will take a recess tomorrow. How about the day after tomorrow, Sunday?" said Liu Shaoqi. Deng Xiaoping added, "We should finish our work in two days, I think".

It was decided that the talks would resume two days later, with a one-day recess.

For two days the two sides had set out their basic thinking. The exchange of opinions proceeded in a frank atmosphere, but the disagreements remained and both opinions stayed in parallel.

On that very day, six provinces of North Vietnam suffered large scale bombing and strafing by the U.S. air force, the bombing being escalated to all provinces of North Vietnam, with the exception of Hanoi and Haiphong. The escalation of the aggression had reached a new stage.

At night, the news came that a Canadian Airline plane had burned at the Tokyo International Airport. We were shocked at this tragedy, causing 71 dead and wounded. Then on the next day, March 5, came the news that all 124 passengers and crew were killed in an accident of British airliner over Mt Fuji. Terrible air disasters on two successive days! What's with the Japanese sky?--strong voices of indignation were heard among the JCP delegation members that evening at dinner.

THIRD SESSION:
KEY POINT THROWN INTO RELIEF

On Sunday, March 6. After a one-day recess, the third round of the talks opened from 3:30 p.m.

Liu Shaoqi: "How will we proceed with the talks today?"

Miyamoto: "You go first, please. You have not yet finished, I think."

Liu Shaoqi: "No, we have not yet finished. Well, we will go first."

So the talks opened with a speech by the Chinese side.

UNITY OF SOCIALIST CAMP AND WAR OF AGGRESSION

The CPC leader, Liu Shaoqi said:

"In the preceding session, I raised two issues; how to make U.S. imperialism stop the bombing of North Vietnam; the other is how to analyze the forces of war and the forces of peace. I took up the question of how to analyze the forces of war and of peace, because I wanted to say that we should never fear a war."

He emphasized the Chinese view:

"While we are opposed to an imperialist war and opposed to a counter-revolutionary war, we are in favor of a revolutionary war. We must not be afraid of a counter-revolutionary war, nor must we be afraid of a revolutionary war, and we must always be prepared for war. If a counter-revolutionary war breaks out, we must defeat it in a revolutionary war. This is a lesson Lenin taught.

"Since war, be it an imperialist war or even World War, will occur whether we fear it or not, we must be prepared for it, and not be afraid.

"There is one way to make the United States stop bombing the North. It is to bend the knee before U.S. imperialism, the way devised by the Soviet revisionists. They think that the United States will not attack us if we yield to U.S. imperialism and give up South Vietnam.

"After the air-raids over North Vietnam, the United States proposed negotiations with no conditions attached. This was an attempt to bring about peace negotiations through the bombing of the North. The United States considered the air-raids necessary to force the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to sit at the table for unconditional negotiations. The Soviet Union was in favor of this. The United States began bombing the North while Kosygin was in Hanoi. Thereafter, Yugoslavia convened the conference of 17 non-aligned countries, which proposed negotiations without conditions, with the United States and the Soviet Union instigating the move behind the scenes.

"Time and again the Soviet Union has suggested proposals such as holding a Geneva Conference, or bargaining with the United States. We are not always opposed to peace negotiations. The point is when and on what conditions negotiations are to be held."

He went on:

> "The aim of the United States is to get South Vietnam into their hands. Because the people of South Vietnam were forced to carry out their struggle against U.S. imperialism, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had to support that struggle, the United States was forced to bomb North Vietnam. As long as the people of South Vietnam refuse to give up their armed struggle, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam supports them, the United States necessarily clings to the bombing of the North. This is the inevitable course of events.
>
> "The Soviet Union is supporting the anti-U.S. struggle of the Vietnamese people because it wants to lead them into peace negotiations. It is trying to put out the fire of war in Vietnam. The Soviet Union is afraid that if the fire of war in Vietnam is not put out, it may expand into World War.
>
> "We are in favor of peace in the world. But we must not fear a World War. We must be ready for a World War. Only by being ready is it possible to prevent the United States from starting a World War."

Liu looked grimmer, his mild face deeply flushed.

He expounded the opinions of the Chinese side on the JCP views, that the United States was expanding its war of aggression outrageously by taking advantage of differences within the socialist camp and the disunity of the international communist movement.

The CPC was of the opinion that the United States would have committed aggression even without contradictions or differences of opinion within the socialist camp.

> "It was long before that the United States decided to occupy South Vietnam, before differences of opinion had emerged. It was murdering great numbers of people in South Vietnam, even while the socialist camp was not split. So it is not true to say that the differences of opinion within the socialist camp triggered the outrageous U.S. aggression in Vietnam.
>
> "When the Korean war occurred--while Stalin was still alive--the socialist camp was united, but the United States provoked the war and invaded North Korea."

Taking up the further examples of Taiwan and West Berlin, Liu Shaoqi stressed that those violations of the sovereignty of socialist countries took place even while the socialist camp was maintaining unity; he said, "It has not always been true to say that the unity of the socialist camp ensures the integrity of the sovereignty of a socialist country".

The Chinese argument was clearly at cross-purposes with the views put forward by the JCP.

At the second-day session, JCP delegation leader Miyamoto, citing facts, pointed out that U.S. imperialism was assaulting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its strategy of defeating socialist countries one by one.

At the time of the "Tonkin Gulf" incident, and the subsequent first bombing of North Vietnam that took place in August 1964, as open aggression against a socialist country, Khrushchev approved only of the case being submitted to the U.N. Security Council, taking the attitude of de facto acquiescence. Aware of this attitude, the Johnson Administration launched the large-scale bombing of the North in February 1965, when Kosygin was in Hanoi. Kosygin then visited Beijing on his way home, but failed in the attempt to arrange a joint counterattack by the socialist camp. Then on March 1, a meeting was held in Moscow, which openly revealed the disunity in the international communist movement. Noting this, the United States resumed its large-scale bombing of the North on the day following the meeting, after the bombing had been suspended for a while. It was clear that in escalating its aggression in Vietnam, the United States took advantage of the disunity in the international communist movement and the socialist camp, and that it took into its calculations the scale and extent of international assistance to the Vietnamese people. If the socialist camp had been united enough to confront the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression resolutely, Johnson could not so readily have resumed the bombing of the North.

"THREE DECEPTIONS AND THREE TRUTHS; FOUR ALLIANCES AND FOUR OPPOSITIONS"

"Now, I will take up another subject. Let us look at the argument that if we refuse joint actions with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union will take advantage of this to oppose our Parties and other leftist parties", said CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi. He went into the question of assistance to Vietnam.

> "The Soviet Union says that it tries to assist Vietnam but is blocked by leftists. But our leftist parties and countries are giving more, better and more constant support to Vietnam."

At the same time, he said "If the Soviet Union wants to give assistance to Vietnam, it can. We are not opposed to it. We, too, are advising the Soviet Union to assist Vietnam, and, if it does, to do more".

This statement contradicted the earlier argument of China, which had amounted to saying that it would be better for the Soviet Union not to give assistance because the assistance was deceptive, the aim being to deceive the world's people and sell out South Vietnam.

Liu went on to say:

> "The Soviet Union, however, now gives a small amount of assistance to Vietnam, and boasts of it all over the world. The Vietnamese comrades express gratitude for this assistance. But why does the Soviet Union boast about it, even though their assistance is less, slower, and of shorter duration than ours? We have never boasted of our assistance, even though our assistance is far more and been going on for a longer time. The Soviet Union says they will stop or cut assistance if no concerted action is taken with them. Their aim is to make peace."

Deng Xiaoping added:

> "On this question, we have talked to the Vietnamese comrades: which is more helpful in having the Soviet Union give more assistance; whether to take joint actions with the Soviet Union and issue a joint statement of the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China, or to criticize the Soviet Union without taking joint action with them."

Liu Shaoqi responded to this by saying, "What will happen if we take joint actions with them (the Soviet Union--tr.) It will eventually lead to the convocation of a Geneva conference, peace negotiations, submission to the U.S., and the yeilding of South Vietnam to the United States. We will never be in favor of this".

Then he added, "In this connection some comrades in Vietnam went to the Soviet Union, and expressed their approval of the Soviet proposal on peace negotiations". The statement referred to the internal affairs of the Vietnam Workers' Party.

> "There is a division of opinion over this question within the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party. Some are opposed to peace negotiations and some are in favor. In short, some people advocate war; some advocate peace. Behind the latter is the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union for their part say that China is behind the advocates of war.
>
> "We have said to comrades in Vietnam, 'You may wage the boldest struggle against U.S. imperialism. You need not be afraid of the expansion of the war, its expansion into China. If the war expands to China, we will fight shoulder to shoulder with you'. Fearing that the Vietnam war may expand, and that a world war may be provoked, the Soviet Union is trying to get the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to make peace with the United States. It is from this point of view that the Soviet Union is giving assistance to Vietnam."

After pointing out the deceptive nature of Soviet assistance, Liu Shaoqi said, "We cannot take joint action with the Soviet Union. But whether to bend its knee before the United States and make peace, or to fight on, is a problem which Vietnam should decide for itself".

Deng Xiaoping said "The central problems are the following two: one is that the United States must withdraw from South Vietnam, and the other is that it must recognize the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam as the sole representative of South Vietnam". Liu Shaoqi continued:

> "It is the right of the comrades in Vietnam to make a decision on the affairs of their own country, whether right or wrong. But it is our right to support it or not, if their decision is wrong. If they want to sit at the table of peace negotiations, take joint actions with the Soviet Union, and yield to the United States, they can do it. If they decide to fight against the United States, we are in favor; if they don't fight against the United States but yield to it, we are not in favor of it. But whichever course they choose is the affair of the Vietnamese comrades.
>
> "Thus, to oppose U.S. imperialism and to oppose Soviet revisionism are two closely related issues for the Vietnamese comrades.
>
> "It is obvious to us in the case of Vietnam, that it is impossible to fight successfully against U.S. imperialism if we don't fight well against revisionism. To oppose modern revisionism and to oppose U.S. imperialism are so closely linked that they cannot be separated."

On the JCP proposal for a correct combination between the establishment of an anti-imperialist international united front and a struggle against modern revisionism, the CPC side repeated its opinion as follows:

> "To the proposal of Comrade Miyamoto, my reply is that if we are to oppose imperialism, we must oppose revisionism, and that if we don't oppose modern revisionism properly we

cannot oppose imperialism properly. Is it possible for us to oppose U.S. imperialism better by aligning ourselves with the modern revisionists and taking joint action with them? We don't think so."

He said, "Although our Party and your Party have many points in common, there are some differences in our opinions on this question". He stressed that the only fundamental difference is the following one, a different understanding of the nature of the CPSU leadership after the downfall of Khrushchev.

Liu Shaoqi summed up the views of the JCP side as follows:

"According to your opinion,

--it is regarded as possible to lead the CPSU leadership to the side of the anti-imperialist struggle;

--it is regarded as possible for us to act in concert with them on some revolutionary actions;

--the assistance of the Soviet Union to Vietnam is regarded as in earnest, although the amount is still small;

--the Soviet Union is still looked upon as a socialist country and a member of the socialist camp;

--the Soviet Union is considered to be the greatest peace force, able to deal a counter-blow to U.S. imperialism in Vietnam;

--it is regarded as possible to lead the CPSU leadership back to Leninist principles;

--it is regarded as possible to cut the link of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union and persuade them to end the encirclement of China."

Making these points, Liu Shaoqi said strongly, "Our opinion is different from yours on these points, which results from a different understanding of the nature of the CPSU leadership".

"In our view", said Liu Shaoqi, the CPSU leadership was doing three real things while playing three tricks, and it was also engaged in four alliances and four oppositions.

He said: the opposition of the CPSU leadership to imperialism is a trick and its submission to imperialism is real; unity is a trick and splittism real; and support for Vietnam is a trick and betrayal real. He also said: the CPSU leadership aligns itself with the United States to oppose China; it aligns itself with all reactionary forces to oppose world revolution; it aligns itself with India to oppose China; and it aligns itself with Yugoslavia to oppose all Marxist-Leninist parties. "In our view, the nature of the CPSU leadership, both in the Khrushchev days and at present, amounts to three deceptions and three realities, four alliances and four oppositions", said Liu Shaoqi, looking around the JCP delegation.

The JCP delegation was far from supporting these views.

EVALUATION OF CPSU LEADERSHIP

"You appear not to support our views. For the sake of a further exchange of opinions, we had better give more explanations about the nature of the CPSU leadership", Liu Shaoqi went on, and expounded the CPC views on the CPSU leadership.

"In our opinion, the CPSU leadership of modern revisionism has already degenerated. As you look upon Yoshio Shiga, traitor of the revolution, as a little Khrushchev, so can we call them a greater Khrushchev. I think that they have forever lost their revolutionary function.

"They are right-wing, ultra-right-wing, not middle-of-the-roaders."

Liu Shaoqi was much harsher in his tone than expected in his strong criticism of the CPSU leadership.

Saying "We have time and again taken joint actions with them, in an attempt to pull them back from the side of U.S. imperialism, but it has become worse as they become an ally of U.S. imperialism", he gave some examples of Chinese-Soviet relations since the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956).

"We saw the mistakes made by the CPSU leadership in policy line at the time of the 20th CPSU Congress, after which the disturbances in Poland and Hungary took place, and increased anti-Sovietism was seen all over the world. At that time, we gave much help to the Khrushchev leadership. Comrade Deng Xiaoping and I went to Moscow to help to overcome the difficulties and resolve the Polish and Hungarian Affairs."

(note)
Polish Affair--A riot that took place in Poznań, Poland, in June 1956, participated in mainly by workers as well as other Polish people.
Hungarian Affair--This upheaval occurred in Budapest, capital of Hungary, and other places in the country from October-November 1956.

"In the 1957 Moscow Meeting, we made concessions on several questions to them (the CPSU leadership--tr.), accepting their opinions. On some questions we succeeded in rectifying errors committed in the 20th CPSU Congress. Our hopes were still anchored on them. Our way of doing things at that time was to reserve disagreements and undertake joint struggles on agreed issues.

"In the Declaration, they wanted to include some references to the 20th CPSU Congress and peaceful transition, and we made concessions for the sake of unity. 12 countries, other than Yugoslavia, signed the draft Declaration. It seemed reasonable for us to behave as we did. We considered that we were able to align ourselves with the Soviet Union because it followed a middle-road line, while Yugoslavia took an extreme right line. Our view was that we should keep the Soviet Union on our side and stop it from pushing ahead along the road of revisionism.

"But the 1957 Declaration was effective for only a half year. In summer, 1958, they proposed that we build a combined fleet, in an attempt to place Chinese ports under their control. We opposed this.

"When the China-India border conflict took place in 1959, the Soviet Union expressed its support for India through a statement in TASS. Subsequently, Khrushchev visited the United States to agree on the 'Camp David Spirit'. After his return, he visited China, calling on us to make concessions to India. He also pressed us to make concessions on the Taiwan issue.

"They (the CPSU leadership--tr.) published a number of articles calling for submission to U.S. imperialism, such as, 'Eisenhower also seeks peace as we do!', 'To build a world without war, arms or armed forces! (a world of three noes)', 'Let us definitely eliminate war from the world of humanity', and so on. So we then had to publish an article on 'Long Live Leninism!'

"Thereafter, CPC-CPSU talks were held in Moscow, and the Bucharest conference and the 81-Party Meeting were held. From the time of the 81-Party Meeting, we found we could no longer place our hopes on them. But we thought it would not be bad to test them once more. We thought that it would improve the matter if we issued a statement with them and organized joint actions, but the 81-Party Statement was not effective. It was a mere scrap of paper for them.

"And then, the Soviet Union signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the United States. Following the downfall of Khrushchev, we sent a Chinese delegation led by Comrade Zhou Enlai to Moscow, to hold a conference of leaders of socialist countries. We hoped that we could retrieve the past mistakes even a little. But they said that no difference existed on the Chinese question between Khrushchev and the new leadership, and that since they had dismissed Khrushchev we had to dismiss Mao Zedong, and if we did this the two countries would be able to cooperate and take united action, they said.

"From then on, the new USSR leadership took a series of steps in opposition to China, and aligned with the United States. Such actions went far beyond Khrushchev."

Looking round the JCP delegates, CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi went on:

"Are their domestic policies better than Khrushchev's?" Answering his own question, he began criticizing the domestic policies followed by the new Soviet leadership.

"They will not give up their argument about a party of the whole people and a state of the whole people... In agricultural and industrial policies, and in planning and management, they are running ahead of Khrushchev in their reversion to capitalism.

"What classes do they represent? They represent the high-salaried classes, labor aristocrats. In the rural districts, they represent rich farmers. They represent capitalist elements, the privileged strata.

"Their Party has degenerated into a fascist party. In fact they are not a democratic force."

Continuing his criticisms, he also said, "such conditions can be found not only in the Soviet Union, but also within our Party".

"Some individual factories and villages in our country are under the control of corrupt elements, thieves, and speculators. They are oppressing workers and farmers with extremely cruel domination. There are a lot of this kind of people in the Soviet Union. In our country, 1-2 percent, or even 3-4 percent of all units in China are under such rule."

"How to prevent the restoration of capitalism after the proletariat comes to power is a new problem of Marxism-Leninism, an unresolved problem, and a new problem in human history", Liu Shaoqi said, adding that it is possible that capitalism will revive not only in the Soviet Union, but also in all other socialist countries, including China, Vietnam and Korea.

"This is a serious problem", he stressed. He made reference to a tense struggle waged in China against the revival of capitalism and the emergence of revisionism. "We ask you to help the Chinese proletariat and people to overthrow revisionism if revisionism arises in China, since it is harmful to you as well", he added.

The Chinese view based its criticism of revisionism on the judgment that capitalism had already been revived in the Soviet Union. The Chinese view of the CPSU leadership was now made clearer.

But it was Liu Shaoqi himself who was "overthrown" in the "Great Cultural Revolution", which took place right after this, as "a Khrushchev of China" and a "ring leader of the power-circle within the Party which follows the capitalist way".

ROAD OF SPLIT OR ROAD OF UNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi went on to develop his argument that a split in the international communist movement would be unavoidable. He said,

> "Today, if we are to stick to revolution, if we are to stick to a world revolution and a Chinese revolution, and if we are to persist in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism, we must break off relations with the leadership of modern revisionism. Without doing this, we cannot carry the revolutionary struggle to success.
>
> "The fact is that the socialist camp and the international communist movement are already split. It is a total split politically and ideologically, and to some extent, organizationally. The question of the nature of the split, in other words, the form of split that will be favorable to the revolution must be taken into consideration, but it is impossible to avoid a split. The precedent was Lenin breaking off relations with parties belonging to the Second International.
>
> "At present revisionist leaderships or groups emerge in so many parties that it is inevitable that a genuinely revolutionary party, a Marxist-Leninist party will emerge throughout the world."

He also made the following point:

> "National contradictions exist between the Soviet Union and U.S. imperialism. It is impossible for these two to completely agree. They will never be able to reach a serious and fundamental cooperation. It is only an illusion, and it will never be possible for the Soviet Union and the United States to solve the problems of the world by means of cooperation between the two countries. When cooperation is difficult even between imperialist powers, how would it be possible between imperialism and revisionism? I don't believe it can be.
>
> "Of course, if the time ever comes when the CPSU leadership gives up the line of Soviet-American cooperation and seriously opposes U.S. imperialism, it will then become possible for us to take joint actions on some specific tasks."

Liu Shaoqi said again, "If the Soviet Union is serious in countering the U.S. in Vietnam, we can act together with them".

A little change seemed to have emerged in the tough Chinese position which until then had absolutely rejected joint action with the CPSU leadership. With certain conditions attached, the Chinese side suggested that it might be possible to take joint actions with the Soviet Union.

CPC delegation member Deng Xiaoping said:

> "If the Soviet Union is serious in its struggle against the United States, it should stop peace negotiations. If it wants to assist Vietnam in earnest, why does it relax tensions with the United States over questions in the West? In the present disarmament conference, it is trying to reach agreement with the United States on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Britain and other Western countries are loud in their praise of the Soviet Union, saying 'It has taken a reasonable attitude'. But this has enabled the United States to move several tens of thousands of troops from West Germany to Vietnam."

After setting out his views on the nature of the CPSU leadership, Liu Shaoqi pointed out that the CPC has differences of opinion not only with the JCP, but also with the Parties of Vietnam and Korea. "It is impossible for these Parties (of China, Vietnam, Korea and Japan) to reach agreement on every question", he said.

"In meetings of international democratic organizations, our two Paeties have cooperated relatively well. Let us strive to continue such cooperation in the future", he said. Following this statement by Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping expressed dissatisfaction with Vietnam; "At the Tricontinental Conference in Havana", he said, "the delegate of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam frequently consulted with the Soviet Union, but not with us". "Conferences of international democratic organizations sometimes adopt good resolutions, but inevitably adopt bad ones at other times. It is impossible to adopt good resolutions every time". This statement of Liu Shaoqi was followed by remarks by Deng Xiaoping, who said, "The last year saw 49 conferences of international democratic organizations, only five out of which adopted relatively good resolutions. Among these 49 conferences were such conferences as the Economic Forum held in Algeria".

Liu Shaoqi said, "Comrade Miyamoto said that if a conference adopts a bad resolution, the reactionary forces always publicize it. But since bourgeois newspapers oppose you all the time, a little more propaganda about a bad resolution will not be of much trouble to a party in a capitalist country".

> Liu Shaoqi: "In our country too, even a bad resolution is used by the newspapers for the sake of criticism. We make public every document and resolution issued in opposition to the Communist Party of China, even if they denounce us slanderously. The Chinese people are now used to hearing anti-China remarks, because we always make them known."
>
> Peng Zhen: "They act as an antitoxin."
>
> Liu Shaoqi: "It is a good thing when we are opposed by our enemy. The more strongly we are opposed, the better it is for us. If the enemy were not to oppose but praised us, it would be bad."

Liu Shaoqi then referred to the position which Miyamoto pointed out Lenin had taken on united actions between the Second and the Third International, saying "As a result of studying the articles of Lenin, we have reached a different conclusion".

"Lenin had talks with the middle-roaders, including K.J. Kautsky, in the Zimmerwald Conference. E. Vandervelde, Belgian extreme-rightist, refused to participate in the Conference. Following the Conference, the Third International was formed, marking a departure from the Second International. In terms of our relations with Khrushchev, we had held talks with him many times before he became so bad."

(note)
Vandervelde, Emile--(1866-1938) Belgian politician, Member of Worker's Party of Belgium and of the Second International, socialist deputy 1894-1938, and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1925-1927 (tr.)

"I have dealt with so many subjects. Now I have said all I want to say" Liu Shaoqi said.

"Let us take a recess", proposed Miyamoto. The two sides agreed to take a break of five minutes.

The Chinese side had spoken for nearly two hours.

COOPERATION ON AGREED POINTS PROPOSED AGAIN

In the resumed talks, leader Miyamoto expressed the JCP opinion on the Chinese views. "Having been given a systematic statement on the CPC position by Comrade Liu Shaoqi, we can now speak with more ease", Miyamoto began.

"As Comrade Liu Shaoqi said, the JCP and the CPC have many points of agreement in common", he continued, "On the question of the CPSU, our two sides have some differences of opinion, but in spite of this, we can develop cooperation on agreed points while studying the disagreements carefully". He stressed that the two sides had reached agreement on the following points:

The view of imperialism, the denunciation of revisionism, opposition to all forms of opportunism, an effort to develop the international democratic movement in opposition to U.S. imperialism, and so on.

"Our Vietnamese comrades owe the assistance given to them by various groups and countries, so they have to give far more diplomatic consideration to these questions than we do", he said.

"In their resolute struggle in South Vietnam against U.S. imperialism, (our Vietnamese comrades) have set an example of struggle for all the world. Comrade Le Duan said frankly that the Vietnam Workers' Party has not reached a consensus about peace negotiations, either in regard to timing or means. But it is clear that the Party is absolutely opposed to any solution that would hand South Vietnam to the United States. And even regarding the question of negotiations, the continuation of the struggle is an absolute prerequisite. Our Vietnamese comrades argued that in the Korean war negotiations were being held while the war was still going on. I believe you know more about this than we do.

"Even without making open polemics with the Soviet Union as we do, but seen from articles issued by the Workers' Party of Korea, there is no doubt that the Korean comrades are also opposing both U.S. imperialism, and basically, modern revisionism; they lead their Party from this position."

After stressing that "three Parties, the Parties of China, Japan and Albania, are now engaged in open polemics with the Soviet Union", Miyamoto pointed out that all of these polemics began in refuting the attacks made by the CPSU.

> "In our case, it was Y. Zhukov who attacked us first in 'Pravda', on the occasion of the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (1963), following the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the CPSU leadership. But what was the decisive provocation to us was their support for Yoshio Shiga who had betrayed the JCP, as well as attacks they made on the JCP in order to undermine the JCP from within. It was only when this stage was reached that we began our counterattack, and rebuffed all their attacks and refuted all their arguments.
>
> "While I was in bed recovering from pneumonia, Comrade Zhao Anbo (Chinese delegate to the 9th World Conference against A and H Bombs, 1963) visited me, in an attempt to persuade me to attack Khrushchev as soon as possible. Though he might have regarded my attitude as opportunistic, we were then considering when it would be necessary and appropriate to begin our counterattack, under conditions existing in Japan.
>
> "If we had followed the CPC in criticizing Khrushchev by name, we would have failed to win the support of most of our Party members and the Japanese people. As our decisive counterattack was launched only after their repeated errors had become clear to the Japanese people, we were able to win support from an overwhelming majority of Party members, and persuade the politically aware Japanese people to accept our criticisms of the subversive activities of the CPSU."

Nodding his head in agreement, Liu Shaoqi said, "That's fine".

Miyamoto said that if an inexperienced struggle against the Shiga clique had been wrongly waged, and as a result we had lost our majority to the revisionists, the whole position of world scientific socialism would have been weakened. In fact, the revisionists expected the JCP to be isolated and plunged into confusion. But the opposite was true, and a rapid advance was achieved after Shiga was expelled, both in the number of Party members and in "Akahata" readers, and in the Party's influence within mass organizations.

"I have told you about this experience", continued Miyamoto:

> "Because I want to stress that there are different ways of carrying on the struggle under different circumstances; that is, even if all the Parties of Japan, Korea, Vietnam and China, take a resolute attitude against imperialism and a basic stance against revisionism, in a real struggle it is possible that some Parties will engage in open polemics and others will stand out of such polemics.
>
> "It is not correct for us to decide that a Party standing out of open polemics is submitting to or making concessions to revisionism."

Miyamoto mentioned that a leader of a certain "left" party had said to an official of the JCP, mentioning several parties by name, that, as such parties "do not engage in open polemics, they were just as if assassinated while asleep by the CPSU leadership headed by Khrushchev". "As our Parties are both fully aware, when we have begun open polemics and criticized the CPSU leadership by name, we would rather become impatient with other parties for staying outside the open polemics", Miyamoto said.

"Varied as their ways of doing things are,

> the Parties of China, Vietnam, Korea and Japan all fought against Khrushchev revisionism at the time of the 81-Party Meeting, and refused to participate in the splitting meeting on March 1. These countries have this in common, that their territories are being violated by U.S. imperialism in this or that way. I think it is elementary therefore for these Parties to strive to maintain their unity, in the awareness that fundamentally they commonly oppose U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism, even though agreement has not been reached on all points of the complex questions that arise."

Miyamoto pointed out that it was not surprising to find that not only agreements of opinion but also differences of opinion are evident in the talks between the two Communist Parties. He expressed pleasure at seeing that the JCP-CPC talks held after an interval of one year have produced so few disagreements. (In February 1965, when JCP General Secretary Miyamoto visited China for medical treatment, he had held talks in Guangzhou with CPC leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, Kang Sheng, Tao Zhu, and Liu Ningyi).

He stressed especially that "what is important is that the two Parties have reached agreement that increased activity by them in the international democratic movement will be of great significance for the promotion of an anti-imperialist internatinal united front. It is necessary for the two Parties to develop mutual cooperation on concrete problems in other places than the present talks".

While the Chinese side regarded the international democratic movement as a platform for the exposure of revisionism, Miyamoto once more stressed that the important and urgent task was to clarify what are the common demands that can be taken up in the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

> "That we are raising both tasks, the formation of an international united front in opposition to U.S. imperialism, and the strengthening of the struggle against modern revisionism, does not mean that a joint struggle among the (communist) parties, a point now under discussion between us, is a decisive or central factor in carrying out these tasks. Though the question of a joint struggle among the communist parties is not yet resolved, and these parties have differences of opinions, it is still very promising in the field of the democratic movement for broad anti-imperialist forces to rally themselves at international level and form an anti-imperialist democratic united front on the best possible conditions.
>
> "It is very wise that Comrade Mao Zedong issued an appeal whenever an important event occurred (such events as occurred in Vietnam, Congo-Leopoldville, Dominica, Japan or other countries), and called for solidarity among the peoples of the world. No organizational proposal has been made, but the political viewpoint is important, to tighten the encirclement of U.S. imperialism by the world's people. In the light of developments over these few years, it will be of great importance to adopt the line of raising the banner to which all political forces in the struggle against U.S. imperialism can rally.
>
> "It has double significance: first, by doing this, we actively raise the banner of the anti-U.S. imperialist struggle to be fought by all the people of the world. Secondly, when the people throughout the world are ready in earnest for a struggle against U.S. imperialism, raising this banner means calling into action the struggle of the masses in the international political arena."

All members of the JCP delegation were firmly convinced of the correctness of Miyamoto's statement, it having been proved correct in both the domestic and international activities of the JCP.

> "By raising this banner, Marxist-Leninist Parties can find the right way to organize a struggle against modern revisionism, standing as it does in the way of fulfillment of these tasks. By applying this method, our struggle against revisionism will be much more effective.
>
> "Not all people in the world are Marxist-Leninists."

Miyamoto went on:

> "For us, the choice between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism is a very serious problem, involving the fundamentals of the international communist movement; for those people without a Marxist-Leninist view, however, their motives are found in their desire to struggle against the present repressions, aggression and exploitation by imperialism. Therefore, if revisionists obstruct and oppose a policy that sets out those demands, their traitorous nature will be exposed before those people who have no knowledge of Marxism-Leninism.
>
> "In a non-communist conference in the international democratic movement, our struggle will be weakened if we regard as our main task the exposure of modern revisionism, and pay little attention to taking up and fulfilling the people's demands... If we devote ourselves only to attacking revisionism, while regarding it as a secondary task to make clear our specific line of struggle, they will say that we are in the conference for the sole purpose of engaging in polemics.
>
> "Taking these points into consideration, if we consolidate solidarity between our two Parties as well as with all (Communist and Workers') Parties in Asia, while acting in concert with some active Parties in Europe, we will be able to command a majority in the international democratic movement, because disapproval of the pro-imperialist line is increasing."

With a positive outlook on the development of the international democratic movement, Miyamoto emphasized how critical it is in non-socialist countries, which make up two thirds of all the world's countries, to strive to adopt a correct policy in international conferences. Citing some Japanese examples, he said:

> "It will be from your feeling of strong confidence that you are publishing various comments made by the capitalist press. But there is a difference between your country as a socialist country and ours; that is, in your country, even if a wrong resolution is adopted (in an international conference), it will never lead mass organizations to adopt a wrong policy.
>
> "In our case, if some international conference adopts a wrong policy, or makes a decision to support a factional, splittist organization, it will directly affect the balance of influential forces in the domestic mass struggle.
>
> "So the most serious matter for us is not whether we can have a good resolution, or whether we will be slandered; but that a bad resolution will have a direct effect in

deciding which group will prevail our everyday struggle and movement. Right-wing social democrats and revisionists in Japan are trying to maintain their influence by having international democratic movements adopt such bad resolutions.

"What I have mentioned will show why we attach great importance to this question."

JCP speeches ended at 6:30 p.m.

The points at issue had been made clearer. Not only agreements but also disagreements were thrown into clear relief through the discussions.

While the JCP delegation proposed a joint struggle against U.S. imperialism with a view to a clear break in the serious situation in Vietnam, the CPC delegation put priority on a struggle against the CPSU leadership and the exposure of its character.

The CPC delegation informed the JCP delegation of its appointment to meet V.G. Wilcox of New Zealand on the following day, March 7. So it was decided that the fourth round of talks would be held on the next day.

That night, while Fuwa, Ueda and Kojima were talking in their room, Zhao Anbo came in, a little tipsy. "You must study the Chinese revolution and the Mao Zedong thought. Both Marx and Lenin passed away. Lenin died fifty years ago. Since then, who has generalized the international experiences of revolution?", he asked, and answering himself, said, "It is Mao Zedong". He began to emphasize the "greatness" of Mao Zedong. Aware that Fuwa and Ueda were unimpressed, he then went to the room of the Deputy Leader of the JCP delegation, M. Oka, to say the same thing. But Oka protested Zhao Anbo's attempt to force Mao Zedong thought on the Japanese Communist Party.

JCP-CPC TALKS END--
SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS REMAIN

After a one day interval, the talks resumed at 3:30 p.m. on March 8.

"Please speak first, Comrade Miyamoto", said Liu Shaoqi. So, following the previous round of talks, the JCP side took up the discussion.

"We will finish today", Miyamoto said. "Our opinions on a number of questions in the speech made by Comrade Liu Shaoqi were presented in part in the preceding round of talks. I will now take up remaining issues"; and he developed the JCP position on the question of Vietnam.

MORE ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

"On this question, there are some important points of agreement."

Miyamoto listed them as follows:

--Opposition to the U.S. aggression in Vietnam; support for the four-point stand of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-part statement of the United Front for Liberation of South Vietnam

--Opposition to the deceptive peace plan put up by the Johnson Administration

--Opposition to escalation of the war by the United States; opposition to any expansion of the war into China

--Increased international assistance to the Vietnamese people in their struggle.

"We evaluate highly the active assistance given by the Party and the Government of China in response to the Vietnamese request."

These points represented the JCP position in striving to broaden areas of agreement and develop the common struggle against U.S. imperialism, as well as for international united action by a broad range of anti-imperialist democratic forces.

Those who participated in the movement supporting the Vietnamese people in the 1960s will remember with deep emotion the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-part statement of the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam. In those days, support or non-support of the four-point stand and the five-part statement was the real test of support for the Vietnamese people. I will briefly set out both statements below:

The four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was in the following terms, as set out in a resolution of the Vietnamese National Assembly in April 1965, as the basis for a correct solution to the Vietnamese issue and as the essential conditions for a peaceful settlement:

(1) Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people, viz., independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity; U.S. forces must be withdrawn from South Vietnam and U.S. military bases dismantled; the aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam must be ended. (2) Pending the realization of the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, the military provisions in the Geneva Agreement must be strictly observed; banning either zone from joining any military alliance with a foreign country and refusal of any foreign military base in their respective territories. (3) The affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themsleves, in accordance with the program of the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam. (4) The peaceful reunification of Vietnam must be achieved by the people of Vietnam themselves.

The five-part statement of the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam was issued in March 1965 by the NFLSV Central Committee. The statement, entitled "Concerning the intensification and expansion of the U.S. imperialist aggressive war in South Vietnam", expressed in five parts the determination that the U.S. aggressors must be cleared out of South Vietnam, even if it takes ten, twenty, or more years to liberate South Vietnam, and realize an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam, and achieve national unification:

(1) to drive out the U.S. imperialists in order to achieve an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam, (2) any negotiations with the United States would be useless without the U.S. imperialists withdrawing completely from South Vietnam, and the NFLSV, the only real representative of the South Vietnamese people, would have the decisive say, (3) Vietnam is one country, and an attack on the North will be met with twice or three times severer punishment, (4) the NFLSV is ready to accept weapons and any other moral and material assistance from other countries, and if necessary, will call back South Vietnamese sons and daughters who have regrouped in the North and equip them with weapons, and (5) they are determined to fight until not a single U.S. aggressor remains on their soil, even if it takes ten, twenty or more years.

In establishing an anti-imperialist international united front it is necessary to rally all anti-imperialist democratic forces in support of these demands of the Vietnamese people. For this reason the Japanese Communist Party considers that the CPSU should not be excluded from such an anti-imperialist international united front, as it has expressed its official support of the "four-point stand" and the "five-part statement".

With emphasis on the points of agreement between the two Parties, and positively evaluating China's active assistance to Vietnam, Miyamoto said, "What is important is the relation between the struggle of the Vietnamese people and an international united front and assistance. The good results already achieved notwithstanding, we cannot be satisfied, but must make far greater efforts to improve and make a new breakthrough". Having thus referred to the JCP position in putting up the Vietnam question, he added:

> "For example, as we have said, before U.S. imperialism started air raids over North Vietnam, it had put up various conciliatory policies of the revisionists, involving difficult conditions such policies had imposed on the international communist movement."

It should be pointed out clearly, Miyamoto said, that the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression, which had been enforced in many countries over many years, had not been based primarily on disunity in the international communist movement and the socialist camp, but derives from the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism; the JCP takes this fact for granted, and our articles have pointed this out. He presented the JCP stand as follows:

> "While basing our argument on this one clear position, we also point out the following: Khrushchev had been presenting a pretty picture of Kennedy; he took up the Tonkin Gulf case in the United Nations when it occurred in August 1964; the bombing of North Vietnam, which had been stopped in February 1965, was resumed after about a twenty-day break, immediately fter the March 1 meeting convened by the Soviet Union. Based on these facts, we said that the U.S. aggression results from its aggressive nature, but the policy of the United States has taken into consideration the weak attitude of the revisionists, and what kind of counterattack can be expected from the socialist camp because of that weak attitude. This is an undeniable historic fact.
>
> "Since Khrushchev began praising Kennedy, the United States has become bolder in its aggression against South Vietnam and speeded it up."

"I have one more point to make", Miyamoto added. He recalled the remarks of CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi in the preceding talks, that China told Vietnam that it could adopt whatever bold operations it chose; that China would fight shoulder to shoulder with Vietnam if the United States attacked China; and that China would never be afraid of a new World War. Then he said:

> "In the last session, I said that the speech of Comrade Liu Shaoqi has made it possible for me to speak more freely. I said this because I found it difficult to understand what you said in the session before last; that an effective counterattack against the bombing of North Vietnam could lead to a World War; but since in the last session you said, 'we are not afraid of a World War', we reached the proper understanding of your intention and stand.
>
> "Khrushchev, on the other hand, had long restrained the national liberation movement in Vietnam, warning that a spark could light a World War.
>
> "The aim of our proposal to counter the air raids on North Vietnam is to unite the

> anti-imperialist forces of the world in a more effective struggle against U.S. imperialism, combined with the struggle of the Vietnamese people. It is not a question of it being possible to completely stop the bombing in the present circumstances.
>
> "It has recently been reported that the United States is planning to blockade the port of Haiphong. History teaches us that, by reason of its aggressive nature, imperialism expands its aggression step by step, while calculating the response of the enemy; it expands it if resistance is weak; it resorts to further aggressive operations to get out, if it is bogged down."

Miyamoto also explained why the Japanese side had cited the 81-Party Statement:

> "If one makes a comparison with the situation that existed then, it will become quite clear that the Soviet Union, equipped with powerful military strength and modern weapons, is disparaged by the United States for failing to fulfill its duty set out in the 81-Party Statement.
>
> "It is still doubtful, in spite of its inherently aggressive nature, that the U.S. imperialists would have gone so far as they have, had a resolute counterattack been made by the socialist camp against their aggression, which had occurred in the wake of the 81-Party Meeting."

Miyamoto emphasized that he did not mean that all past U.S. aggressions against socialist countries were the result of disunity in the socialist camp. Quoting again from the 81-Party Statement emphasizing the superiority of the socialist camp, he stressed that the balance of strength and other definitions as are found in the Statement are not reflected in the situation in Vietnam.

> "While highly evaluating the struggle of the Vietnamese people, and the significant assistance given by the Chinese and other revolutionary forces in active support of the Vietnamese struggle, we emphasized that we should not be satisfied with the present situation, taken as a whole, but should wage a more effective struggle by uniting the anti-imperialist forces, and raising the level of support.
>
> "Of course, this matter is directly related to the Vietnamese revolution, the central responsibility for which rests on our Vietnamese comrades. But if the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam goes on for a long time, and an unjust solution is forced on Vietnam--even though U.S. imperialism is certain to be defeated eventually--it will have a negative influence on the cause of the revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces in the world, as well as on the Vietnamese people. We are therefore required to deal with this issue; this is why our Vietnamese comrades earnestly desire strong support from the international democratic forces, while fighting their own struggle with all their strength."

Miyamoto continued: "We are well aware of the limitations of international conferences and international organizations, as Comrade Liu Shaoqi said". "But", he stressed, "as the Vietnamese question is a major focal point of confrontation in the present anti-imperialist struggle, international assistance will obviously have an important bearing on the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam". "As you know very well", he said and then quoted from Mao Zedong's appeal "Revolutionary Forces of the World Unite, Fight against Aggression by Imperialism" (1948), in which he said: "If there had been.....no anti-imperialist revolutionary united front in the West and in the East.....could one conceive of victory over fascist Germany, Italy, Japan and their running dogs?"

"In short, when I speak of the Vietnamese issue, I have in mind the fact that the Vietnamese situation is calling on us to make still greater efforts", said Miyamoto. Liu Shaoqi nodded. "You are right", he said.

THE POSSIBILITY OF PREVENTING WORLD WAR III

> "Next, I will deal briefly with the question of a Third World War."

JCP delegation leader Miyamoto offered a JCP opinion on the CPC proposition, "Let us be prepared for a world war".

First stating the premise that the JCP is not a pacifist organization that rejects a just war against aggression, and pointing out that it has persisted in the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism since the 81-Party Meeting, Miyamoto said "At the same time, we have two possibilities in mind". On the one hand, we must be prepared for a possible outbreak of world war; but at the same time we must do our best to ensure that world war is prevented.

> "Because 'Providing is preventing', it is important to be ready for a world war. Especially, I believe it is significant for a

> country like yours to take earnest and specific measures. But it is necessary for the international anti-imperialist democratic forces as a whole to defeat U.S. imperialism in its expansion of aggression, and do our best to further the possibility of the better way. This is what the masses are desiring deeply.
>
> "We are not fatalist, considering that the outbreak of a third World War is inevitable, or that that is our destiny even if we do our best. Only when we do our best to further the possibility for the better way, can we strike a stronger blow against U.S. imperialism if, in spite of our efforts, it dares to launch a world war or the like."

Miyamoto then explained the situation in Japan, and the struggle against reactionary forces, saying: "In a country like Japan, it is necessary to organize the masses in various circles and form a great and strong anti-U.S., anti-imperialist united front through activities defending the interests of the people, and in political and economic struggles, while opposing the U.S. aggression in Vietnam; we must oppose its expansion, oppose U.S. bases, and at the same time defend the living of the masses".

He stressed that this was an urgent task of the Japanese people, to develop this struggle to increase the possibility of preventing another world war.

On the CPC argument for armed struggle, Miyamoto said firmly:

> "If we were to put immediate priority on preparation for an armed struggle in anticipation of a World War, ignoring timing, conditions, and the sentiment of the people, the JCP would probably suffer a serious blow; the policy and stand of the Party would be

attacked by the enemy, and the Party itself would be isolated from the masses. In his essay, 'On the Question of War and Strategy', Comrade Mao Zedong makes a clear distinction between a revolutionary struggle in an advanced capitalist country and a struggle in a country like China before the revolution."

"We had a bitter experience", Miyamoto said in referring to the lessons of the split in the Party in 1950.

"At the time when the Korean war broke out, the Party was split. The Party suffered serious damage from ultra-leftist adventurism following a thesis prepared mainly under the guidance of Stalin and the CPSU leadership. As a result, the Party lost its influence in the labor movement, and within the people's movement it also lost its leadership. We faced tremendous difficulties in recovering our position.

"Since the Party was already divided, not all Party members were bound by that line. Learning from this failure, we have taken a firm attitude on always thinking for ourselves, and deciding our policy for ourselves."

Resolutely expressing the attitude of the Japanese Communist Party, Miyamoto said, "We will never repeat the ultra-leftist errors such as were committed at the time of the Korean war".

"This attitude is not contrary to our fundamental resolve to carry on our struggle for the revolution with great determination, based on Marxism-Leninism, while striving for unity with the working class, and to form a great and strong united front.

"U.S. imperialism and the Japanese

reactionary forces would be pleased to see the JCP commit ultra-leftist adventurist acts again and be dealt a crushing blow. If this happened, they would feel able to drive the Japanese people again into a war of aggression, and take the road to World War, with full assurance on the home front."

On how to view the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Miyamoto said: "Neither in our Party Congress nor in a Central Committee meeting have we defined such an attitude toward the Soviet Union as having become a country of state-monopoly capitalism, or that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a fascist party". The two Parties (CPC and JCP) certainly differ in their opinion on this, but more concrete facts and more scientific analysis would be needed to confirm or deny the definition given by the Communist Party of China; this is a theme for continued study by the two Parties.

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIVERGENCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL SPLIT

Taking up the question of the inevitability of a split of the international communist movement, as the CPC holds, JCP delegation leader Miyamoto set out the opinion of the Japanese Communist Party.

In the previous sessions, Liu Shaoqi had said that such a split was inevitable, and in fact the time to split had come; in other words, different though the process might be, the situation was similar to the time of the Second International split, when the Third International came into being.

But Miyamoto emphasized the difference between the present situation and when Lenin decided to establish the Third International.

"The Communist Parties in the world now have a common banner, however formal it may be, because they agreed on the 81-Party Statement, although actually a political and ideological difference has appeared...

"Our organizations are not now bound by any central organization such as the International.

"The important reason for Lenin to split from the Second International and establish the Third International was that parties belonging to the Second International had degenerated into social chauvinism, and were openly supporting the imperialist war. This meant not only the existence of opportunism and revisionism, but that a clear and critical error had been committed openly before the peoples of all countries.

"The question would be made clear if the CPSU leadership openly supported the U.S. aggression in Vietnam. If this happened, the situation would be similar to what it was during the Second International. But the CPSU leadership cannot but oppose the U.S. imperialist war of aggression in Vietnam, and support the four-point stand of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-part statement of the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam."

Miyamoto went on to stress that political and ideological divergence differs from an organizational split, as Lenin himself put it, and gave an analysis of Lenin's struggle against revisionism and opportunism:

"What I was talking about before was

united front tactics, such as Lenin used after the establishment of the Third International; at that time he maintained relations with those parties that belonged to the Second and to the Two-and-a-Half International. In short, there is no doubt that Lenin regarded such parties as parties in a shaky and unstable alliance with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. He also pointed out firmly that the call by the Second and the Two-and-a-Half International for a united front was an attempt to deceive the masses. But at the same time, Lenin said that he would use united front tactics in order to win over the masses under the leadership (of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half International), when the masses were demanding united action with a number of progressive slogans.

"We are not saying that we should act in concert with revisionism unconditionally at any and every time. We believe that it is possible to take united action that involves revisionists, because they have not betrayed the cause openly as the Second International did. At the same time,..."

Continuing, Miyamoto stressed that even if the leadership of a certain party commits a serious revisionist error, communists should not disregard the organizational principle of democratic centralism, but should adhere to the basic attitude of inner-party struggle based on principle. It would be very questionable for them to withdraw from the party mechanically, in rebellion against the revisionist party leadership, and form a split group calling itself "leftist".

When General Secretary Miyamoto had held talks with CPC leadership including General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in Guangzhou in the previous year, 1965, Deng Xiaoping said, "In spite of our advice to carry through a principled inner-party struggle, they are too impatient to stay in the party".

Miyamoto pointed out, "I don't know in detail what process they have gone through in forming such groupings, but, if they leave the party in some easy way, abandoning a principled inner-party struggle, the revisionist leadership will feel reassured". As to remarks by CPC delegation member Peng Zhen, "We had better stay away from the revisionist party", Miyamoto replied, "Your tactic is, 'a wise man keeps out of danger'; ours is 'nothing venture, nothing win'. We should study both to see which is the better tactic". "We have no desire to press our opinion on you. We have just stated our opinions in reply to the views put forward by you on a number of questions", said Miyamoto.

"Yes, I see", said CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi.

At the latter part of his speech, Miyamoto dealt with the Chinese view that the CPSU leadership had accepted a counter-proposal of the JCP on the March 1 meeting:

> "In spite of our call for the Meeting to be cancelled, the CPSU leadership did not call it off. They also ignored our view that there was no ground for convening a conference made up of only those attending the preliminary session for the 81-Party Meeting. They did not accept our proposal that such a conference should be held only on the agreement of all parties concerned, and with adequate preparation. In short, our proposal was rejected fundamentally.
>
> "To be sure, the CPSU began later to say for tactical reasons that joint action could be undertaken and there would be no interference in the internal affairs of other Parties. But these statements were included in the 81-Party Statement from the start, so there is no ground for saying that it is only or mainly because of our proposal that the CPSU leadership began to follow such tactics.
>
> "On our part, however, by raising the banner of unity of the international communist movement in a genuine struggle against imperialism, we can take the initiative by pressing the CPSU leadership to act positively, or else by criticizing it, pointing out, 'Your talks about joint action do not match your real action'."

Miyamoto continued, "So, we have done nothing to incur your displeasure, have we?"

Both delegations laughed.

In conclusion, JCP delegation leader Miyamoto again emphasized unity based on agreement:

> "On the question of the international communist movement, our two Parties have many points in agreement. We have consistently struggled against both U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism. Articles published by the Communist Party of China are in defense of the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, and our stance has been the same. It is true that our ways of struggle differ somewhat, but we are in agreement on consolidating militant unity between Marxist-Leninist Parties in Asia, where the anti-imperialist struggle is now concentrated.
>
> "Conditions that exist now in the international communist movement have never been seen before. So it is not surprising for us to be faced with problems requiring new research and solutions. There is now no International or

> Party to act as a Center. In these conditions each Party must make independent efforts to find a solution to every problem. Even if some differences occur in each Party's understanding and tactics, we must never allow these to damage our unity based on common grounds. At the same time, in the international democratic movement, we have a broad, fundamental agreement even on the way of struggle. And our evaluation of U.S. imperialism, Japanese monopoly capital, and the Sato Government is fundamentally in accord. It is necessary for us now to consolidate our unity in the struggle, theoretically and practically, based on agreed points. And we should modestly study each other's questions when opinions differ between us. By doing this we can reach broader agreement in practice."

This ended the JCP speeches.

The CPC delegates listened attentively to the statements of Miyamoto, as he positively developed the JCP arguments in reply to the CPC opinions. Some CPC members made notes, and some nodded.

NO AGREEMENT REACHED ON EVALUATION OF CPSU LEADERSHIP

After a few minutes break, the delegations met at the table again.

The CPC side spoke.

CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi said, "We have listened seriously to Comrade Miyamoto's speech. The exchange of opinions at this time has helped our two sides to understand each other. This is useful to relations and unity between the two Parties".

"As Comrade Miyamoto said in conclusion, the two Parties are in agreement on fundamental and important issues, but our evaluations of the CPSU leadership differ. Therefore the different opinions about the method of struggle", he continued.

Liu Shaoqi reiterated the CPC's attitude toward the CPSU leadership:

> "In our opinion, the Soviet Party is a party under actual fascist domination, and the liberalization that is taking place in the Soviet Union is a liberalization that assures no political freedom for the people and Party members.
>
> "We think that the present CPSU leadership is unable of itself to correct its errors. This can be done only when other Marxist-Leninist people rise and overthrow the present leadership.
>
> "It is impossible for the present revisionist leadership as a whole to return to the road of Marxism-Leninism. It may become worse; there is no possibility for it to become better. There is no other way to make it better but to overthrow it."

Deng Xiaoping said, "The matter will be determined in the course of practice", and Liu Shaoqi said, "This is a matter that has still to be studied".

Liu Shaoqi went on to say:

> "In the previous round of talks, Comrade Miyamoto said that each Party should develop its own way of struggle in accordance with its own specific conditions. We also favor this. It is also correct that our side should uphold the banner of solidarity in the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

> "First priority must be given to the struggle against U.S. imperialism. This must never be regarded as the secondary task. The struggle against imperialism and the reactionary forces is the utmost duty for the people and revolutionaries in the world."

At the same time, he said, "besides opposing U.S. imperialism and the reactionary forces, we must oppose their agents, their puppets"; "If we are to oppose imperialism, we must oppose those people who work in alliance with imperialism. They are the CPSU leadership and modern revisionists". "The anti-imperialist struggle is a task of first priority, and opposing revisionism is related to the first priority; these are to be undertaken simultaneously".

Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng began to speak in turn.

> Liu Shaoqi: "Now the Soviet Union is organizing another united front. It is organizing a counter-revolutionary united front against revolutionary struggles in various countries in the world, in alliance with the United States. The world now has two united fronts: one is a united front against U.S. imperialism and reactionaries in each country, and the other is a united front in cooperation with U.S. imperialism and in opposition to China and the revolutionary struggle in each country. These two united fronts are opposed to each other."
>
> Peng Zhen: "The latter united front includes Y. Shiga, S. Kamiyama, Eisaku Sato, and the right-wing social democrats."
>
> Liu Shaoqi: "According to our information, the Japanese Sato Government and the Japanese ruling class are trying to cooperate with the Soviet Union in an attempt to oppose China, and taking steps for this."
>
> Kang Sheng: "For example, it sent Nobusuke Kishi to persuade De Gaulle to oppose China. But De Gaulle did not favor the proposal. We regard this as an established policy of the Japanese Government."
>
> Miyamoto: "That's a story of the rather long past."

On the question of Vietnam, too, while stating "we are almost of the same opinion", Liu Shaoqi said, "how are present conditions for assisting Vietnam to be improved: the question is whether it will or will not lead to increased assistance to Vietnam if joint actions are taken with the Soviet Union and other east European countries dominated by revisionism". He stressed:

> "In order to persuade Vietnam to sit at a peace table with the United States without preconditions, the Soviet Union is now energetically using a trick, a threat and bait. Peace negotiation is a Soviet proposal. The aim of the Soviet proposal is to yield South Vietnam to the United States, while securing North Vietnam, and to force the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam to join the puppet administration of South Vietnam. Such a proposal may be acceptable to the United States, but we can never accept it."

Miyamoto replied firmly, "We can never accept it either".

CPC delegation leader Liu Shaoqi said, "the people of South Vietnam will not accept it. Most North Vietnam people cannot accept it either": Deng Xiaoping said, "Even if the Vietnamese Party were to accept it, we would not. But it is a matter to be decided by the Vietnamese Party themselves". Peng Zhen said, "The key to the Vietnam question is held by South Vietnam. The question is whether all U.S. forces will be completely withdrawn from the South".

Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen and others continued to criticize the Soviet Union.

> Liu Shaoqi: "The Soviet Union is in a position to counter the U.S. imperialist expansion of the war. It would be able to do this both in Asia in the east, as well as in the west. To do it, the Soviet Union must resort to brinkmanship. In other words, they must say, 'Don't expand the war any more, don't attack; stop the escalation; otherwise we will counterattack'. This would arouse deep concern in the United States."
>
> Deng Xiaoping: "Even if the Soviet Union didn't go that far, it would respond to Vietnam if it created greater tension in the west."
>
> Liu Shaoqi: "The Soviet Union should send its fleet, not to attack the United States fleet but to defend the coast of North Vietnam. If the U.S. planes raided the Soviet warship, it would trigger a world war. But actually the Soviet Union will never take such action."
>
> Deng Xiaoping: "Even if we called on the Soviet Union to create a more intense situation in the west, it would reject it. All it thinks of is to relax the situation. This always encourages the United States to attack Vietnam more."
>
> Peng Zhen: "If the Soviet Union were really desiring to support Vietnam in the struggle, it would create a tenser situation in West Berlin, to stop the United States boldly withdrawing its troops from West Germany to send them to Vietnam. This would be more effective than missiles."

After these speeches from the CPC side, Liu Shaoqi summed them up, saying, "Our opinion is that action by us in concert with the Soviet Union would only contribute to obstructing the Vietnamese struggle against the United States; it would be far from improving the present situation in the struggle against the United States".

"As I said in the previous session, if the Soviet Union were honestly opposed to U.S. imperialism on the Vietnam question, we would agree to act in unison with it even if it did not give up revisionism". "But the fact is that it is not. It does not confront U.S. imperialism on the question of Vietnam", said Liu Shaoqi repeating the CPC stand.

Following Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen said "The aim of the global strategy of the Soviet Union is to collaborate with the United States in dominating the world". Deng Xiaoping also said: "All its acts have been done in consultation with the United States, and done with the tacit understanding of the United States. On the question of joint action, I am of the opinion that each Party should act on its own judgment".

The CPC side continued:

On the question of a third World War Liu Shaoqi said, "The danger of another world war is increasing, but it is not likely to break out soon"; "however, our opinion is that the CPC, JCP and other parties should all prepare in anticipation of the outbreak of a World War". He continued:

> "In the event of a World War breaking out, if we have made no ideological, political or organizational preparations, we will be in too much of a flurry to act in time. If we have made preparations and a World War does not

break out we will have lost nothing."

"The danger of a third World War is increasing. This is because the CPSU leadership is attempting a Munich policy in concert with the United States", added Peng Zhen.

(note)
Munich policy--Drawing in France, Britain signed a pact with Nazi Germany in Munich in September, 1938, the aim of which was to have fascist Germany direct its spearhead of aggression against the Soviet Union by yielding Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany, in its alliance with Italy. A conciliatory policy such as Britain and France took toward Nazism, or a concession and a traitorous attitude toward aggressors is known as a Munich policy.

Liu Shaoqi said, "Needless to say, I am opposed to a World War. Opposing it means preventing it. But we must be prepared for an emergency, because it may break out".

He then recommended that the JCP engage in clandestine activity.

"You had better make preparations. If you fail to do so, it will cost you dearly. I advise you to pay attention to clandestine activity. While engaged in legal activities, you need to be engaged also in clandestine activities. Otherwise you will have to pay the price in the future."

"It is my private opinion", he said, "that you do not need to wage an armed struggle or an armed uprising. In the Korean War, a leftist error took place within your Party, damaging the Party. We also consider that the tactics adopted at that time were wrong". "But", he added, "the problem is the timing of an armed uprising; it should be undertaken when adequate provisions have been made, and must not be undertaken at random". This could only be taken to mean that he did not withdraw the theory of armed struggle.

Liu Shaoqi went on:

"Then, on the question of the international communist movement and the split in the socialist camp..., the question is whether an actual split has taken place or not. There is a split on the ideological front. Two ideologies, Marxist-Leninist and revisionist, are confronting each other. Is there a split along political lines? The political line of revisionism and our political line are also opposed to each other. This is a split."

"Organizationally, a partial split has taken place and (unity) is maintained only formally", Deng Xiaoping added.

Liu Shaoqi stressed:

"The Soviet Union is opposed to the leftist parties of China, Albania and other countries. And many parties of other countries are split. What will happen in the future? Since an ideological and political split has already taken place, an organizational split is unavoidable, because the organizational line is based on the ideological and political line."

This indicated that the CPC side was determined to continue organizing a separate party--"a leftist" party or group in every country.

The CPC side said that more than 50 "leftist" groups had been created so far. CPC leaders admitted that among these groups were some carrying the "anti-revisionist" banner, as well as Trotskyites, with the single aim of getting financial support.

The JCP side unofficially called on the CPC side to offer information on "leftist" parties, and the latter agreed, but ultimately this was not done. Liu Ningyi told us, "Little change will be found from the materials we gave you last year. Information about some countries is inadequate and some incorrect".

While emphasizing the "anti-Soviet, anti-revisionist" stand, Liu Shaoqi said that when he said we should not have contact with revisionism, he meant as a matter of principle and policy; it did not matter if we talked to or shook hands with revisionists. "We talk and shake hands even with imperialists. We send a congratulatory cable to a king on his birthday. When China has diplomatic relations with Japan, we will have to send a congratulatory telegram to the Emperor on his birthday".

"TALKS WERE USEFUL"; BUT NO PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS MADE BY EITHER SIDE

The talks drew to a close.

Liu Shaoqi said:

"I think you are right to say that some parties in Asia should strengthen solidarity. The Parties of China, Japan, Vietnam and Korea agree on many fundamental questions, and differ on some. The differences of opinion on a few questions should not be allowed to weaken their solidarity. We should have regular exchanges of views on matters of differing opinions, and make further studies in practice."

Liu Shaoqi said "We have spent much time on this round of talks, and viewpoints of both sides have been relatively clarified. The talks have been useful". Deng Xiaoping said, "In the international democratic movement, we can continue to cooperate. Your proposal is very good, that we should continue consulting with each other".

Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, and Liu Shaoqi expressed their opinions about Nobusuke Kishi's visit to France (in October, 1965) and the attitude of the Japanese Government in approaching the Soviet Union.

Deng Xiaoping: "I think it is time for us to close the talks. It is beneficial to have such a profound exchange of opinions."

Miyamoto: "Yes. It is a good thing."

Deng Xiaoping: "We will have another opportunity in the future to exchange opinions."

Miyamoto: "We have covered everyting. Let us finish now."

After discussing the event in Indonesia (the attempted coup in 1965), they declared the meeting closed.

JCP delegation leader Miyamoto invited the CPC leadership to visit Japan, saying "I hope you will visit Japan frequently for talks with us. It has so far been usual for us to visit China, but this is out of balance". "It would be natural for us to visit you, but the question is, will they (the Japanese Government--tr.) issue visas", said Deng Xiaoping. Peng Zhen added "the Japanese Government gave discriminating treatment to me, and to Comrades

Liao Chengzhi and Liu Ningyi". Peng Zhen was to have attended the 9th JCP Congress as head of the CPC delegation, but his request for a visa to Japan was rejected by the Japanese Government.

"If you come in your capacity as Mayor of Beijing, your request will not be rejected", Miyamoto replied. K. Kurahara, member of the JCP delegation, said, "The Mayor of Moscow has visited Japan..."

The talks broke up at 6:50 p.m.

In the four rounds of talks, a frank exchange of opinions had taken place between the two Parties. Points in common or in agreement were endorsed, and disagreements were brought to light. The two Parties had reached fundamental agreement on increasing international joint action and strengthening the united front, which were the main themes of the talks, but no agreement could be reached on whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be included or not.

It was not at this point that the talks broke down. The two sides confirmed that it was useful to have had an intense but frank exchange of opinions. They promised that the two Parties should further strengthen their friendship and solidarity based on agreed points, and that disagreements should be studied further.

The JCP delegation was to visit Korea on March 11, and all members of the delegation considered that all formal talks in China had ended. No suggestion was made by either side on issuing a joint statement or a joint communiqué.

The United States was intensifying its air raids over North Vietnam. In those several days, U.S. planes made over 60 sorties a day to bomb North Vietnam beyond the 20 degree north latitude, including even areas adjoining Hanoi and Haiphong, and areas bordering China. The situation in Vietnam was

reaching a new critical stage.

TALKS WITH THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA

The JCP delegation completed official talks with the CPC during its week in Beijing and left for Pyongyang by air on March 11. They were seen off by CPC leaders, who included Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen and Li Xiannian, and about 4,000 people. This grand send off was a sign, as far as its form was concerned, that the official visit had basically ended. The delegation thought that it would be able to return to Japan at the end of March after the visit to Korea.

The delegation arrived in Pyongyang at 5:00 p.m. At the airport, leaders of the WPK, including Chairman Kim Il Sung, Vice-Chairmen Pak Keum Chul, Li Hyo Sun and Kim Kwang Hyup, received the delegation. Thousands of people had gathered at the airport all round the delegation as they got off the plane to take the waiting cars. In prewar days Korea was a Japanese colony, and the JCP had consistently struggled against the colonial rule. It seemed that the people waiting in the cold weather had a special feeling for us because of this. They expressed their feelings of friendship by even breaking the lines, and pressing forward with waving hands.

The guesthouse where the delegation stayed was beside the Taedong River that flows at the foot of Moranbong Park, a place of recreation and relaxation for the citizens of Pyongyang. The House was a palatial building, built in the unique Korean style of curved roof, and surrounded by rich greenery, even though spring was slow to come. It was on a small hill, with a wide balcony giving a commanding view of the flowing Taedong River and a mid-stream sand bank just in front of it.

In Korea, as in Vietnam, the central organ of the WPK, "Rodong Sinmun" (Workers' Paper), featured an editorial on March 11, the day of our arrival, expressing an enthusiastic welcome for the JCP delegation, with detailed reports on each delegate's career and activities of the Party.

The same evening a reception was given by the Central Committee of the WPK in honor of the JCP delegation. The next day, at the National Theater in Pyongyang, a musical dance epic entitled "Our Glorious Fatherland" was performed as a welcome gesture to the delegation. With the leaders of the WPK, including Chairman Kim Il Sung, the JCP delegation enjoyed the drama, with its total of 3,000 performers, which told of the revolutionary struggle of the Korean people against foreign aggressors and their heroism demonstrated in the socialist construction of the country, expressed in poems, songs and dances.

On the 15th at the Pyongyang Great Theater, the largest in Korea, the WPK's Pyongyang City Committee organized a citizens rally of welcome to the delegation; it was marked by the overwhelming enthusiasm of workers, students and citizens who gathered there in spite of the rain.

Official talks with the WPK delegation, headed by Chairman Kim Il Sung, were held twice, on March 16 and 18, over a total of seven and a half hours, while talks with the top leadership of the WPK and the Presidium members of the JCP delegation took place three times, before and after the official talks. Chairman Kim Il Sung accompanied the delegation almost constantly, and talked with General Secretary Miyamoto; in this way the two Parties exchanged views in various forms in addition to the official talks. The delegation took a rest at the Ryonggang Spa, that faces the Yellow sea, from March 17 to 19. Even there, we were accompanied by top Korean leaders, including Chairman Kim Il Sung, and discussions continued.

The talks covered a very wide range: the international situation, the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, an anti-imperialist international united front, problems of the international communist movement, the situations in Korea and in Japan. Fundamental agreement was found in the views of both Parties.

On the socialist construction in Korea, Chairman Kim Il Sung told about the Seven-year plan, which embodied the fundamental task of industrialization of the country, the technological revolution and the cultural and ideological revolution, all of which were being implemented, and that the country was advancing in socialist construction, recovering from the ruins caused by the U.S. imperialist war of aggression, and overcoming big-powerist interference in the independent construction of the Korean national economy.

On ideological education within the Party, the principle was to oppose modern revisionism, dogmatism and flunkeyism. Chairman Kim Il Sung repeatedly stressed that the Workers' Party of Korea, refusing to yield to big-powerist interventions, had struggled against flunkeyism and factionalism and strengthened the struggle against modern revisionism and dogmatism, and that the WPK took the position of self-reliance and independence, observing the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

He also commended articles by the Japanese Party as being both logical and persuasive, and that the full text of the statement by General Secretary Miyamoto (answers to questions by an "Akahata" reporter, entitled "Perspectives of the New Year and Tasks of the Japanese People" in the January 1 issue of "Akahata" that year) was published by the WPK magazine "Party Life". The Soviet ambassador to Korea had protested the publication of the article, but the WPK had refused to conform, saying that they presented it because it contained many points that comrades in the WPK had to take into full consideration. It was also said that JCP articles on international affairs were used as texts in Party schools of the WPK.

Concerning support for the Vietnamese people, the Korean side said that though there were difficulties, they treated this as the most important international task, and responded to the requests of Vietnam as far as they possibly could. When the JCP delegation was in Vietnam, the Vietnam comrades had said that, besides China and the Soviet Union, Korea aided them more than any other country. Chairman Kim Il Sung and others said that, although some communist parties had recommended that they prepare only for war because the economic construction would be wasted if a war broke out, Korea would unyieldingly continue with socialist construction, and struggle to prevent the outbreak of war.

In the talks, General Secretary Miyamoto spoke about the situation in Japan, including the policy of U.S. imperialism toward Japan, and the problem of U.S. nuclear strategy, the policy of the Sato Cabinet's approach toward the Soviet Union, and the idea of sending Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas. He also explained the big-powerist interventions by the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the JCP's resolute position on self-reliance and independence, and the unification of the struggle against U.S. imperialism and the struggle against modern revisionism.

The JCP delegation ended their eleven-day visit to Korea, and the two Parties issued a joint statement on March 21. (For full text see Appendix.)

Saying that the delegation of the two Parties "unanimously emphasized that.....it is urgent above all to strengthen international joint action and a united front of anti-imperialist forces in checking the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam and assisting the Vietnamese people", the Joint Statement appealed for all anti-imperialist and peace forces of the world to make very positive efforts to carry out the pressing tasks, in spite of whatever difficulties.

The Joint Statement, stressing the important role of the international democratic movements, pointed out:

> "It is to be welcomed for stepping up anti-U.S. joint action that a number of recent meetings of international democratic organizations, which have condemned the aggressive machinations of U.S. imperialism and adopted measures to help the Vietnamese people in their struggle. Particularly the Asian, African and Latin American Peoples Solidarity Conference held in Havana in January this year, made important success in forming an anti-imperialist united front of the peoples of the three continents."

On March 21, the day of the publishing of the Joint Statement, the JCP delegation left Pyongyang by air, seen off by Kim Il Sung and other leaders of the WPK and some 2,000 people, and arrived in Beijing to take the way home.

On March 20, the previous day, in Japan the Central Executive Committee for Abrogation of the Security Treaty and Realization of Various Demands had organized nationwide "March 20 Great United Actions", raising slogans for defeat of the small constituency plan, to oppose the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, to prevent "port-calls" of U.S. nuclear warships, to stop the visit to Japan of Nguyen Cao Ky, and realize the people's demands.

225,000 people had gathered at Harumi Pier in Tokyo for the Central Rally. This showed a great upsurge in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and the Sato Cabinet.

"The Week of Solidarity with the Vietnamese People" that had been decided by the Tricontinental Peoples Solidarity Conference in Havana, was carried out simultaneously by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, from March 12 through 19.

WELCOME MASS RALLY AND JCP-CPC JOINT COMMUNIQUE

After completion of the "visit to three countries", the plan of the delegation was merely a stop-over in Beijing en route to Japan. Prior to leaving for Korea, we were informed that a meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong was scheduled on our way home.

UNEXPECTED PROPOSAL FROM CHINESE SIDE

But unexpectedly a proposal was made by Peng Zhen, Li Xiannian, Kang Sheng, Liao Chengzhi and Liu Ningyi, who met the delegation at Beijing Airport. On the way home the airport to the guest-house, Liu Ningyi, a member of the CC, told General Secretary Miyamoto that they wanted to hold a mass meeting of welcome to the JCP delegation and issue a joint communiqué of both Parties. The Chinese side took this as a third stage of the visit of the JCP delegation to China. From the arrival in Shanghai to the departure for Hanoi was stage 1, the talks between the two Parties was stage 2, and the mass welcome of the delegation and drawing up the joint communiqué and talks with Chairman Mao were to be stage 3.

It was rare in China for a mass rally to be held to welcome representatives of a foreign Party. The JCP delegation considered that although there were agreed points in the talks between the two Parties in Beijing, there were clear differences on major issues, and no proposal was made for a joint communiqué. Joint communiqués had not been issued with other foreign parties that had visited China around that time. As the JCP delegation had said in the Beijing talks, they thought that it had been useful to set out the position of the JCP, even if not all viewpoints were fully understood by the Chinese side. The Chinese side also recognized that mutual understanding had been improved.

But the Chinese attitude had changed, with a proposal to hold a mass meeting and issue a joint communiqué; we examined the proposal though it was made so suddenly, and decided to accept it.

Concerning the mass meeting, some of the Japanese mass media reported that because the JCP had decided not to send representatives to the 23rd CPSU Congress, the Chinese side had decided to hold a mass rally of welcome to the JCP delegation. The truth was, however, that the problem of attending the CPSU Congress had not been taken up at all in the Beijing talks. Since the CPSU leadership had launched open attacks on our Party, none of the JCP leadership had attended even a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. It was taken as a matter of course that the JCP would not attend the CPSU Congress. In late February, the JCP had received a telegram from the Central Committee of the CPSU as an invitation to the Congress, and before our return to China from Korea we had decided what step should be taken on this issue. Naturally, the JCP had not talked the matter over with any foreign Party, but had dealt with it quite independently.

On the morning of March 24 while we were in Beijing, First Secretary of VWP, Le Duan, stopped at Beijing on his way to Moscow, and visited Miyamoto at the guesthouse. Le Duan was leader of the VWP delegation to the CPSU Congress. Expressing his gratitude for taking up the task of supporting Vietnam in the Joint Statement with the WPK, Le Duan asked, "Is any comrade planning to attend the CPSU Congress?" If so, he would go to Moscow with our comrade; Miyamoto replied, "We are not attending", and explained the JCP position.

On March 25 in response to the invitation from the CPSU, the JCP officially cabled no representative would be sent ("Akahata", March 26, 1966). Then, after the proposal for a mass rally by the Chinese on March 21 we answered a question from the Chinese side on this subject. Liu Ningyi said, "We have also decided not to send our representatives. On this question, although we had not discussed it, the two Parties had taken the same attitude".

The mass welcome rally for the JCP delegation took place at the Workers' Gymnasium in Beijing on March 26, in parallel with the work of drawing up a joint communiqué.

16,000 workers and citizens filled the large meeting place. Lined up on the rostrum were Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Liao Chengzhi, Lin Feng, Liu Xiao, Liu Ningyi and many other leaders of China, and all the members of the JCP delegation. On behalf of the Chinese side, Peng Zhen, member of the Political Bureau, gave an address of welcome, after which General Secretary Miyamoto delivered a speech of about an hour. (For full text see Appendix.) The March 28 issue of "Akahata" reported the atmosphere of the meeting in the following words:

> "The speech by Miyamoto was received with thunderous applause at the end of each paragraph. As it ended, cheers rang out, shouting 'Long live Marxism-Leninism!' and cries of 'Long live friendship and solidarity between the Chinese people and the Japanese people!' came simultaneously from many places in the Gymnasium, even interrupting the procedure of the meeting."

General Secretary Miyamoto appealed with all his spirit on the importance and urgency of the international anti-imperialist united front, after giving a detailed explanation on the following point: "That the struggle against U.S. imperialism's aggression in Vietnam is a life or death struggle of the Vietnamese people; that it is the urgent task of the revolutionary forces, the anti-imperialist, national liberation and peace forces of the world to support and render every assistance to them in their struggle".

As they were leaving the Gymnasium side by side, Zhou Enlai said to Miyamoto, "You have made a speech of excellent content".

The full text of the speech by Miyamoto was carried by the "Renmin Ribao".

The welcoming speech by Peng Zhen, member of the Political Bureau of CC CPC, gave a high evaluation of the line of the JCP in every respect (For full text see Appendix). We even thought that the Chinese side had changed their attitude from the Beijing talks. Peng Zhen said, "Our two Parties are firmly opposed to modern revisionism, which is the main danger to the international communist movement, as well as against modern dogmatism"; he quoted as follows from Mao Zedong in the concluding part of his speech, which left a deep impression:

> "The Chinese and Japanese peoples should unite, the peoples of various Asian countries should unite, all oppressed peoples and nations of the world should unite, all peace-loving countries should unite, all countries and individuals subject to U.S. imperialist aggression, control, interference and bullying should unite and form a broad united front against U.S. imperialism to frustrate its plans for aggression and war and to safeguard world peace."

The mass meeting ended with the rendering of the Internationale by the Military Band of the People's Liberation Forces, following which, at the same place, the delegation, with Vice-Chairman Zhou Enlai, watched a performance of gymnastics, military arts and table tennis by top-ranking Chinese players. While watching the play by representative players, including Zhuang Zedong, who had taken part in the World Ping Pong Games, there were lively conversations between the delegation and Zhou Enlai and others, on how the Chinese leaders played this game, and so on. As Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Zhou also played table tennis, General Secretary Miyamoto asked about his "style", and received a humorous reply from Zhou Enlai.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO BE BASED ON AGREED POINTS

Work in preparation of the joint communiqué began on March 22, the day after the JCP delegation arrived in Beijing.

Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi, who had been the leader of the CPC delegation in the talks before our visit to Korea, had already left for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Burma, and General Secretary Deng Xiaoping was away inspecting the damage done by an earthquake, so the leader of the Chinese delegation was Vice-Chairman Zhou Enlai.

It was decided that the drafting of the communiqué should be done by a commission composed of four members from each delegation. Oka, Yonehara, Fuwa and Ueda comprised the Japanese four and from the Chinese side were Liu Ningyi, Wu Lengxi, Zhang Xiangshan and Zhao Anbo.

At the first meeting of the commission Liu Ningyi said, "We think that the JCP delegation now begins the third stage of its visit to China. The third stage consists mainly of drawing up the joint communiqué, talks with Chairman Mao, a mass welcome meeting and contact with the masses". Regarding the joint communiqué, he said, "First, we would like to draft it, taking into consideration that it may be an appeal to the Japanese people. It should not go into differences that became clear in the talks, but will give expression only to the points of agreement".

Stating the basic attitude of the JCP, Oka said, "We, too, have the same view, that we include the points of agreement only, but not the differences. We also agree with you that we should take into account that it will be an appeal to the Japanese people. We think that the content should be as brief as possible, and that there should be no attack by name on any other party".

Since points of both agreement and disagreement between the two Parties had been made clear in the four-rounds of talks, and so long as the Chinese side proposed publishing a joint communiqué, it was natural that both sides should draft the joint communiqué on the points of agreement.

The drafting of the communiqué was conducted in such a way that both sides could present the main points that they had in mind before a subcommittee discussed them concretely and got down to the writing.

At the first meeting of March 22, the Japanese side presented the following main points:

(1) Substance of the JCP visit to China (proceedings and factual details);
(2) U.S. imperialist policy of aggression, importance of condemning and struggling against the aggression in Vietnam;
(3) Support for the Vietnamese people, strengthening international help;
(4) Upholding the banner of an anti-imperialist united front and unity;
(5) Significance of the Tricontinantal Peoples' Solidarity Conference; strengthening anti-imperialist united action and a united front of international democratic movements;
(6) Problems of modern revisionism (as far as was agreed);
(7) Strengthening unity between the four Parties, Japan, China, Korea and Vietnam, invaded by the United States.

In reply Liu Ningyi said: "There are many similar points in our view. In my personal opinion, we would like to have it in the same form as the communiqué issued in Vietnam. I agree with Comrade Oka on this point. Both the Chinese and Japanese Parties are openly attacked by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. So I think it is important to take note of the struggle against revisionism". The Japanese side expressed its opinion, saying: "We agree with you, but we think we should not condemn by name". Liu said, "We are naturally of the opinion that it should be done by naming".

Wu Lengxi presented the Chinese main points as follows:

(1) Proceedings of the visit of JCP delegation;
(2) Oppose U.S. imperialism, among others, the U.S. aggression in Vietnam; form an international united front against U.S. imperialism and its agents;
(3) Struggle against revisionism;
(4) Japan's domestic problems;
(5) Mutual support between the two Parties and strengthened unity.

Oka said: "Both sides seem to be in agreement fundamentally. On anti-revisionism, we would like to examine this more specifically at a later stage".

The subcommittee was called into session from 4:30 p.m. that day. The Japanese members attending were Yonehara, Fuwa and Ueda, and the Chinese, Wu Lengxi, Zhang Xiangshan and Zhao Anbo.

Both sides expressed their opinions on the main points presented.

The Japanese side explained the reason why the CPSU should not be condemned by name.

> "The Japanese Party, as well as the Chinese Party, are openly disputing and polemizing with the CPSU by name. But if our two Parties did this in a joint communiqué, it would be a new form of attack, done of our own accord. We saw in the joint communiqué of China and Albania in December 1963, that the joint document did not condemn the Soviet Union, although the two parties were engaged in polemics with the Soviet Union by name."

In reply, the Chinese side stressed "The organ papers of the two Parties are openly criticizing the CPSU by name. When we condemn the betrayal of the Shiga-Kamiyama clique, we should name the Soviet Union. If we speak vaguely about modern revisionism, the point at issue would not be made clear". At the same time, they said, "Of course, we must continue to discuss this, since the Japanese Party says that the Soviet Union should not be named".

The question whether or not to criticize the CPSU by name was the most important point at issue in the drafting of the joint communiqué. The Japanese and Chinese Parties were making common criticisms about the CPSU leadership, but they differed on the assessment of the character of Soviet power, and its position in the international communist movement and international united actions. Criticizing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by name in a joint communiqué to be issued by the two Parties would mean a new form of attack against the CPSU, a kind of alliance. The Japanese side disagreed with the Chinese argument. The JCP's position of not criticizing a third party in a joint communiqué had been consistently maintained, not only as regards the Soviet Union, but as a principled attitude that the JCP takes in the international communist movement. The significance of this is clearer than ever today.

In this meeting, many opinions were expressed on the main points presented by both sides.

The Chinese side proposed, and it was agreed that the Japanese side should make the first draft of the joint communiqué.

At the second meeting of the subcommittee on the night of March 23, the Japanese draft was presented and explained.

The draft communiqué prepared by the Japanese delegation on March 23, 1966, with the first part, describing the proceedings of the visit deleted, reads as follows:

> "The delegations of the two Parties equally confirmed that U.S. imperialism, as the most brutal aggressor, attacks the causes of national liberation, peace, democracy and socialism, and that it is really the major common enemy of the peoples of the world. U.S. imperialism is now directing the spearhead of its policy of war and aggression against the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and in particular, presently devoting its major efforts to the war of aggression in Vietnam, and escalating it.
>
> "The Japanese Communist Party and the

Communist Party of China decisively condemn U.S. imperialism for trampling underfoot the 1954 Geneva Agreements, infringing the independence and sovereignty of the Vietnamese people, continuing the cruel war of aggression in South Vietnam, unjustifiably and illegally bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and trying to escalate further the war of aggression. In this way, U.S. imperialism plans to occupy South Vietnam permanently, suppress the national liberation movements of Asia, defeat one-by-one the socialist countries of Asia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam is an unpardonable crime against the Vietnamese people, a frontal challenge to the national liberation movements in Asia, and the socialist camp and constitutes a grave threat to world peace and the security of the peoples of all nations.

"The two Parties fully support the four-point stand of the Government of the DRV and the five-part statement of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and demand that U.S. imperialism immediately stop its aggression in South Vietnam and the bombing of the DRV, and withdraw all its armed forces and those of its satellite countries from South Vietnam.

"In the light of the recent moves of the U.S. aggressor in resorting to even more brutal measures, the delegations of the two Parties confirmed that it is increasingly important to strengthen international support of the just struggle of the heroic Vietnamese people against the United States and for national salvation.

"The delegations of the two Parties unanimously confirmed that it has become a very important international task for the anti-imperialist forces of the whole world to unite and organize an international united front against U.S. imperialism. The Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China are actively making every effort to carry this out. The delegations of the two Parties agreed that it is also important to strengthen, in the field of international democratic movements, the international united front against U.S. imperialism.

"Both sides confirmed that, to develop international struggles against U.S. imperialism, it is of the greatest importance to strengthen solidarity between the working classes and peoples of Asian countries, including Japan, China, Vietnam and Korea, whose territories are now directly invaded by U.S. imperialism.

"The delegations of the two Parties paid deep attention to policies of the Sato Cabinet in its subservience to the United States and the restoration of militarism. In cooperation with the U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam, the Sato Cabinet has made Japan into a stronghold of the U.S. aggression in Asia, and its policy of 'containment of China'. A 'Japan-ROK Treaty' would virtually bring about the formation of a 'Northeast Asia Military Alliance' linking up the United States, Japan, Pak Jung Hi and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), and become an important wing in the U.S. imperialist plans of aggression against Korea and China. The ruling strata of Japan and the United States, with U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers 'calling' at Japanese ports, are trying to draw Japan openly into the U.S. nuclear strategy in Asia. These intrigues not only are completely contrary to the wishes of the Japanese people for independence and peace, but also constitute a grave threat to peace and the independence of Asian nations.

"The delegations of the two Parties emphasized the significance of the struggle against modern revisionism, in waging the struggle against U.S. imperialism. Modern revisionists have pushed an opportunist line of prettifying and tailing after U.S. imperialism. As the argument for prettifying U.S. imperialism is now bankrupt, the attempt has begun to prettify the diplomatic lines of the Sato Cabinet to supplement the prettification of U.S. imperialism, thus doing harm not only to the Japanese people but also to all peoples of the world. In strengthening the struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggression and war, it is necessary to correctly advance the struggle, both in theory and practice, against every kind of opportunism which evades or obstructs the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

"As is stressed in the Declaration and Statement respectively of the conferences of representatives of brother Parties in 1957 and 1960, an essential task for the advancement and development of the international communist movement is to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism by opposing modern revisionism, which is a major danger, as well as by maintaining vigilance against dogmatism and sectarianism. To achieve the genuine unity of the international communist movement, it is necessary to make every effort to uphold the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

"Militant friendship between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China has been developed in the protracted common struggle of the two peoples and the joint struggle against the U.S. imperialism.

"The Japanese Communist Party and the politically conscious democratic forces of Japan support the right of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, which is occupied by U.S. imperialism; they oppose the U.S. imperialist policy of 'containment of China' and its intrigue for 'two Chinas', and demand that diplomatic relations between Japan and China be reestablished, and that China have its legitimate status in the United Nations restored.

"The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people support the demands and struggles of the Japanese people for the realization of an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan, including removal of U.S. military bases from Japan, the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara, abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and opposition to the restoration of Japanese militarism.

"This mutual support of the two peoples is a great encouragement to both, and has great significance for the common task of the Asian peoples to drive out U.S. imperialism from Asia and for the defense of world peace.

"The Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China will continue to strive to develop the traditional militant friendship between the two Parties and solidarity between the two peoples based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

Chinese amendments to the Japanese draft were submitted at the third meeting of the subcommittee on the evening of March 24.

Wu Lengxi said, "We examined the Japanese draft and found it very good. We agree on many points. On some points we have made modifications. Most of it is the same as originally drafted". But the amendments contain all the Chinese arguments, including the condemnation of the CPSU leadership by name.

On the question of condemning the Soviet Union by name, Wu Lengxi said:

> "The Parties of both countries have been criticizing the CPSU leadership by name. This has been done openly, not only in their articles but also in letters to the CPSU. If there is no criticism by name in the joint communiqué, it will give the members of the two Parties and peoples of the whole world the illusion that the two Parties may intend to change their attitude toward the leadership of the CPSU, won't it? Please take this into consideration......The joint statement with Albania did not name the Soviet Union because it was a statement by the delegation of the Party and the Government."

In addition, the issues of Vietnam and an international united front had substantially been rewritten in the Chinese amendments.

The text of the draft as amended by the Chinese delegation on March 24, 1966, with the deletion of the first part on the proceedings of the visit, reads as follows:

> "The delegations of the two Parties equally confirmed that U.S. imperialism, as the most brutal aggressor, attacks the causes of national liberation, peace, democracy and socialism, and that it is really the major common enemy of the peoples of the world. U.S. imperialism is now directing the spearhead of its policy of war and aggression against the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and in particular, is now devoting its major efforts to the war of aggression in Vietnam, and escalating it.
>
> "The Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China confirmed that an important step in the counter-revolutionary world strategy of U.S. imperialism is the brutal war of aggression in Vietnam, completely violating the Geneva Agreement. Today U.S. imperialism is constantly increasing its forces in Vietnam, carrying out cruel scorched-earth operations of 'burn all, destroy all and kill all' in South Vietnam, bombing fiercely the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by sending in its massive air forces, and trying to spread the war of aggression against Vietnam step by step to Laos, Cambodia and the whole region of Southeast Asia, and even to China. U.S. imperialism is also playing a trick of deceptive 'peace talks' to cover up its scheme to escalate the war of aggression. The U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam is an unpardonable crime against the Vietnamese people, a frontal challenge to national liberation movements in Asia and the socialist camp, and constitutes a grave threat to world peace and the security of the peoples of all nations.
>
> "The two Parties fully support the four-point stand of the Government of the DRV and the five-part statement of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation. The United States of America must stop the invasion of the

whole land of Vietnam, withdraw all its troops and those of its satellite countries from Vietnam, acknowledge the SVNFL as the only representative of South Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people settle their own problems for themselves. The Chinese and Japanese peoples firmly support the just struggle of the heroic Vietnamese people against the United States for national salvation, to liberate the South and to defend the North. The delegations of the two Parties are absolutely convinced that the U.S. aggressors will be totally defeated by the Vietnamese people, who stand united in holding fast to the struggle and fighting heroically with the support of the peoples all the world over.

"In conformity with the duty of proletarian internationalism, the delegations of the two Parties resolutely support the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggle against imperialism, old and new colonialism, and the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of all nations; and at the same time, will struggle to the very end to unite the peoples of all nations, and form the broadest united front against U.S. imperialism, and to defeat the U.S. imperialist plans of aggression and war.

"The delegations of the two Parties confirmed that in the field of international democratic movements, the banner of anti-U.S. imperialism must be upheld, supporting actively the movement for national liberation, opposing the U.S. plot for 'peace talks' on the Vietnam issue, and completely destroying the false line of capitulationism and splittism, which only serve U.S. imperialism, and that, on these bases, the international united front against U.S. imperialism should be expanded.

"The delegation of the two Parties paid deep attention to the policies of the Sato Cabinet in its subservience to the United States and the restoration of militarism. In cooperation with the U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam the Sato Cabinet has made Japan into a stronghold of the U.S. aggression in Asia and its policy of 'containment of China'. A 'Japan-ROK Treaty' would virtually bring about a 'Northeast Asia Military Alliance' linking up the United States, Japan, Pak Jung Hi and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), and become an important wing of the U.S. imperialist plan of aggression against Korea and China. The ruling strata of Japan and the United States, with U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers 'calling' at Japanese ports, are trying to draw Japan openly into its nuclear strategy for Asia. These intrigues not only are completely counter to the wishes of the Japanese people for independence and peace, but also constitute a grave threat to peace and the independence of Asian nations.

"The delegations of the two Parties stressed that, in order to oppose U.S. imperialism, it is necessary to oppose modern revisionism. Modern revisionists, headed by the CPSU leadership, have taken the line of capitulationism, prettifying and following U.S. imperialism. Recently they have begun to prettify the diplomatic line of the Sato government, to supplement the argument prettifying U.S. imperialism thus doing harm not only to the Japanese people but also to all peoples of the world. To strengthen the struggle against the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war, it is necessary to push the struggle, both in theory and practice, against modern revisionism, splittism and great-power chauvinism to the very end.

"As is stressed in the Declaration and Statement respectively of conferences of representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in the 1957 and 1960, an essential task for the advancement and development of the international communist movement is to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism by opposing modern revisionism, which is a major danger, as well as by maintaining vigilance against dogmatism and sectarianism. To achieve the genuine unity of the international communist movement it is necessary to make every effort to uphold the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

"Militant friendship between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China has been developed in the protracted common struggle of the two peoples against Japanese imperialism, and against U.S. imperialism and other reactionary forces.

"The Japanese Communist Party and the politically conscious democratic forces of Japan support the right of the Chinese people to liberate the Taiwan Province, which is occupied by U.S. imperialism; they oppose the U.S. imperialist policy of 'containment of China' and its intrigue for 'two Chinas', and demand that diplomatic relations between Japan and China be re-established, and that the latter's legitimate status in the United Nations restored.

"The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people support the demands and struggles of the Japanese people for the realization of an independent, democratic,

peaceful and neutral Japan, including the removal of U.S. military bases from Japan, the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara, abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the defeat of 'Japan-ROK Treaty', opposition to the Japanese Government's involvement of Japan in the U.S. war of aggression against Vietnam, and the restoration of Japanese militarism.

"This mutual support of the two peoples is a great encouragement for both, and has great significance for the common tasks of the Asian peoples to drive out U.S. imperialism from Asia, and for the defense of world peace.

"The Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China will continue to strive to develop the traditional militant friendship between the two Parties and solidarity between the two peoples, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

In the fourth meeting of the subcommittee on the evening of March 25, discussions were reduced to the Chinese amendments, including the formulations to be used.

Taking these discussions into consideration, the Japanese members handed the second draft to the Chinese side shortly after noon on March 27, and the subcommittee met for the fifth meeting that afternoon.

Wu Lengxi said: "We have examined your draft. It is revised very well in many points. We don't have many more opinions to offer. Now we would like to finalize the draft in the subcommittee, and report it to the leaders of the two delegations". Yonehara said: "That's O.K."

Further consideration was given to the finishing touches of the joint communiqé.

In this discussion Wu Lengxi withdrew the proposal to criticize the leadership of the CPSU by name, saying, "We agree to not naming the revisionists".

For five days the subcommittee had fully discussed the draft, during which six meetings took place. Although there were some hot discussions, the sustained efforts resulted in success in completing the joint communiqué, based on the agreed points. Thus, the "Joint Communiqué between the Delegations of the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China" was completed.

Then came the day before the JCP delegation was to leave for Shanghai.

The Joint Communiqué worked out by the subcommittee was undoubtedly the best possible in these circumstances. It seemed that the Chinese side thought it necessary to show their solidarity with the JCP.

In the evening that day, the final meeting with the CPC delegation headed by Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai took place, where the Joint Communiqué was confirmed by the two delegations, and officially adopted. Zhou Enlai welcomed the agreement reached on the Joint Communiqué and said that the text of the Communiqué had been transmitted by telegram to Chairman Mao Zedong and that the Chinese side thought that the Communiqué, in which the talks with Mao was referred to, could be made public at any time after the planned talks. "The time of announcement can be decided in accordance with the wishes of the JCP delegation", he said.

In celebration of the Joint Communiqué as adopted, Miyamoto and Zhou Enlai exchanged a vigorous handshake, and Zhou Enlai smilingly shook hands with every member of the JCP delegation.

A send-off party was held by the Central Committee of the CPC at the People's Congress Hall. Present at the farewell were Zhou Enlai, Zhu De,

Peng Zhen, Tan Zhenlin, Kang Sheng, Lin Feng, Liao Chengzhi and Liu Ningyi, and some 300 public figures, including some Japanese residents in Beijing. Zhou Enlai and Miyamoto gave greetings on behalf of their respective Parties.

Zhou Enlai proposed a toast to the Joint Communiqué, after making it known that the Communiqué had been completed. He emphasized the positive significance of the Communiqué by saying, "The announcement of the JCP-CPC Joint Communiqué will strike a heavy blow on U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism".

Miyamoto also praised the Joint Communiqué adopted, saying, "This Joint Communiqué will be a blow on our enemies, and give encouragement to our friends".

The drawing up of the Joint Communiqué was big news for the participants in the farewell party because they heard of it for the first time, and it was received with loud applause of approval and joy. Conversations continued in a cordial atmosphere, while Miyamoto and Zhou Enlai made a round of the tables, toasting the occasion. Every member of the JCP delegation was relaxed with the feeling that a great mission had been successfully accomplished.

All that remained to be done was to fix a date for the announcement of the Joint Communiqué. All members of the JCP delegation thought that the Joint Communiqué, which stated that they had met and talked cordially with Chairman Mao Zedong, could be announced immediately after the meeting with Mao Zedong in Shanghai, where they were to stop over. They also thought that all official talks with the Chinese delegation were over, and that the talks with Chairman Mao would be little more than a courtesy call.

The text of the officially adopted Joint Communiqué had already been printed both in Japanese and Chinese, except for the details of the days spent in China, and the date of the release of the Communiqué.

FULL TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The full text of the officially adopted Joint Communiqué is as follows:

"JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

"At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party led by Kenji Miyamoto, General Secretary of the JCP, made a friendly visit to the People's Republic of China. The delegation of the JCP stayed in the People's Republic from February 10 to April __, 1966, except for the periods of visits to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"The delegation of the Japanese Communist Party visited factories, electric power plants, people's communes, etc. in Shanghai City and Guangzhou City, where they talked cordially with Chinese workers and farmers engaged in socialist construction.

"The JCP delegation attended an enthusiastic rally held in Beijing to welcome the delegation, with the participation of some 16,000 people representing various fields. The delegation was also greeted warmly by the Party Committees of the Communist Party of China and the masses in the cities of Shanghai, Guangzhou and Nanning.

"During the friendly visit, all the comrades of the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party, including General Secretary Miyamoto, met and talked cordially with the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong.

"The delegation of the Japanese Communist Party held talks with the delegation of the Communist Party of China.

"Present at the talks on behalf of the Japanese Communist Party were Kenji Miyamoto, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the JCP, Masayoshi Oka, member of the Standing Presidium and the Secretariat of the CC, JCP, Korehito Kurahara and Itaru Yonehara, members of the Presidium of the CC, JCP, Ichiro Sunama, member of the Secretariat of the CC, JCP, and Koichiro Ueda, Tetsuzo Fuwa and Akira Kudo, alternate members of the CC, JCP.

"Present at the talks on behalf of the Communist Party of China were Liu Shaoqi, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC; Deng Xiaoping, General Secretary of the CC, CPC; Peng Zhen, member of the Political Bureau and Secretariat of the CC, CPC; Kang Sheng, alternate member of the Political Bureau and member of the Secretariat of the CC, CPC; and Liao Chengzhi and Liu Ningyi, members of the CC, CPC, and others.

"The talks proceeded in an atmosphere of amity and friendship. Both sides exchanged views on problems of the struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, an international united front against U.S. imperialism, the international communist movement and other matters of common concern.

"The delegations of the two Parties equally confirmed that U.S. imperialism, as the most brutal aggressor, attacks the causes of national liberation, peace, democracy and socialism, and that it is really the major common enemy of the peoples of the world. Based on its strategy aimed at dominating the world, U.S. imperialism is directing its spearhead of the policy of war and aggression mainly against the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and in particular, is now devoting its major efforts to the war of aggression in Vietnam, and escalating it.

"The Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China decisively condemn U.S. imperialism for trampling underfoot the 1954 Geneva Agreements, infringing the independence and sovereignty of the Vietnamese people, carrying on the cruel war of aggression in South Vietnam and illegally bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Now, constantly increasing its armed forces in Vietnam, U.S. imperialism is spreading the war of aggression against Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia step by step, and even trying to extend it to China and Korea. U.S. imperialism also has a hidden intrigue to permanently occupy South Vietnam and to escalate the war of aggression, even while advocating deceptive 'peace talks'. The U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam is an unpardonable crime against the Vietnamese people, a frontal challenge to the national liberation movements of Asia and the socialist camp, and constitutes a grave threat to world peace and the security of the peoples of all nations.

"The two Parties fully support the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-part statement of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation. The United States of America must immediately stop its aggression in South Vietnam and the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, completely withdraw its own armed forces and those of its satellite countries from South Vietnam, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation as the only representative of South Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people settle their own problems for themselves.

"In the light of recent moves of the U.S. aggressor in resorting to even more brutal means, it is increasingly important to strengthen international support for the just struggle of the heroic Vietnamese people against the United States and for the national salvation. The Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China resolutely support the struggles of the Vietnamese people to liberate the South, defend the North and achieve the peaceful reunification of their country, and will actively strengthen aid for them and struggle together with them till final victory.

"The delegations of the two Parties unanimously confirmed that, in defeating the U.S. imperialist plans for aggression and war, it is a very important international task for all the peoples and the anti-imperialist forces of the world to unite and form the broadest possible international united front against U.S. imperialism.

"Both sides also confirmed that, in strengthening the international united front against U.S. imperialism, it is necessary to strengthen activities in international democratic movements.

"Both sides agreed that solidarity between the working classes and peoples of Asian countries whose territories are now directly invaded by U.S. imperialism, is very important.

"The Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China firmly support the struggles of Asian, African and Latin American peoples against imperialism, and colonialism, old and new, and the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of all nations.

"The delegations of the two Parties emphasized the significance of the struggle against modern revisionism, in waging the struggle against U.S. imperialism. Modern revisionists have been carrying out a line of prettifying and tailing after U.S. imperialism. Recently they have begun to prettify the diplomatic lines of the Sato Cabinet to supplement the prettification of U.S. imperialism, thus doing harm not only to the Japanese people but also to all the peoples of the world. In strengthening the struggle against the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war, it is necessary to correctly advance the struggle, both in theory and practice, against modern revisionism, splittism and big-powerism, which evade or obstruct the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

"As is stressed in the Declaration and the Statement respectively of the conferences of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960, an essential task for the advancement and development of the international communist movement is to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism by opposing modern revisionism, which is a main danger, as well as by maintaining vigilance against dogmatism and sectarianism. To achieve the genuine unity of the international communist movement, it is necessary to make every effort to uphold the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

"Militant friendship and solidarity between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China have been developed in the protracted common struggle of the two peoples against Japanese imperialism and against U.S. imperialism.

"The Japanese Communist Party and politically conscious democratic forces of Japan support the struggle of the Chinese people to liberate the Taiwan Province, which is occupied by U.S. imperialism, resolutely oppose the U.S. imperialist policy of 'containment of China' and the intrigue for 'two Chinas', and demand that diplomatic relations between Japan and China be re-established, and that China have its legitimate status in the United Nations restored.

"The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people support the demands and struggles of the Japanese people for the realization of an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan, including the removal of U.S. military bases from Japan, the reversion of Okinawa and Ogasawara, the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. 'Security Treaty', the defeat of the 'Japan-ROK Treaty' and opposition to the cooperation of the Sato Government in the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the revival of Japanese militarism.

"Thus mutual support of the Communist Parties and the peoples of the two countries is a great encouragement to both, and has great significance for the common tasks of the Asian peoples to drive out U.S. imperialism from Asia, and for the defense of world peace.

"The Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China will continue to strive to develop the traditional militant friendship between the two Parties, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and strengthen solidarity between the two peoples against their common enemy.

_____, _____, 1966"

The JCP delegation left Beijing for Shanghai on board a specially reserved flight at 7:35 a.m. on March 28. Seeing them off the airport were many Chinese Party leaders, including Zhu De, Peng Zhen, Tan Zhenlin, Liao Chengzhi and Liu Ningyi. Some important participants in the Beijing meeting, including Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Liu Ningyi, for various reasons did not accompany the delegation to Shanghai. Only Kang Sheng, Zhao Yimin and Zhao Anbo accompanied them.

"Akahata" carried a report under the heading "The JCP Delegation off to Southern China".

Aboard the aircraft, Kang Sheng was busy correcting galley proofs of "Renmin Ribao". Asked by General Secretary Miyamoto, "What galley proofs are they?" Kang Sheng replied that they were a "Renmin Ribao" article that criticized "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office", the historical play; he was taking them to Mao for him to check, he said.

The delegation arrived Shanghai Airport at 9:25 a.m. under a murky sky; though it was late March, the airport lobby was rather cold. Saying that they had to have preliminary talks with Chairman Mao, Kang Sheng and Zhao Yimin left us there to wait for nearly an hour. We felt it strange that preliminary talks had to be held with Chairman Mao while the foreign Party delegation were kept waiting at the airport. We thought, surely the proceedings of the meetings of the two Parties and the substance of the communiqué worked out had been reported to Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, and we thought our visit was merely a courtesy call.

It was not until about 10:30 that a message came asking us to come to the residence of Mao, where we arrived shortly before 11:00. From the gate, guarded by a few Liberation Army soldiers, to the porch, we had to drive some distance through the spacious garden. It was a magnificent residence which used to be, as the Chinese side told us, the home of a big capitalist.

MAO'S PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

It was then arranged that members of the Presidium and the Secretariat of our Party would attend the meeting with Mao Zedong, and five members--Miyamoto, Oka, Kurahara, Yonehara and Sunama--entered the meeting hall.

Located in the innermost section of the residence, it was a spacious, rectangular room with a high ceiling, hardly any decorations, and a drawn curtain on the side. Upon entering, we found tables set out in a U shape at one end of the room; General Secretary Miyamoto and Chairman Mao were to sit at the head table, with interpreters behind them. On the window side of the room, the other Japanese delegates, Oka, Kurahara, Yonehara and Sunama, were to be seated; on the other side were the remaining Chinese delegates, Kang Sheng, Zhao Yimin, Zhao Anbo, and Hun Wenbo (Secretary of the Shanghai City Committee), rather routine seating arrangement.

In the absence of Chairman Mao and Kang Sheng, Zhao Yimin spoke first.

> "Chairman Mao has a few things to say about the communiqué. Though a rather good one, it does not clarify themes; it does not serve any useful purpose; one cannot see why a communiqué like this needs to be issued."

Zhao spoke about the amendments Mao wanted to be made to the communiqué.

In an article contributed to the June 24, 1977, issue of "Shukan Asahi", entitled "Our Last Discussions with Mao Zedong", Chairman Miyamoto describes the proposed amendments as follows:

> "As a matter of fact, Mao's proposed amendments amounted to a change in the keynote of the communiqué, raising new issues not considered in the Beijing discussions.
>
> "The first point of the amendments was to stress a united front based on the revolutionary line of 'unity of the revolutionary peoples of the whole world', whereas the original keynote was to emphasize a united front against U.S. imperialism; the second point was to add to the term modern revisionism in the original text the qualification centering around the leading group of the CPSU; and the third point was to propose an intra-party struggle to oppose dogmatism and sectarianism, and 'resolutely oppose the thoughts of modern revisionism' within the respective parties, in particular.
>
> "The first and second proposed amendments meant a revival of demands the Chinese side had made in the Beijing meeting, to wage a concerted struggle that should in the final analysis be limited to 'revolutionary parties' recognized as such, and thereby to exclude the Soviet Union by name from international united action; and the third proposed amendment, defining the character of an internal struggle in each of the two Parties, had not even been raised in the Beijing meeting."

To be more specific, what amendments did Mao proposed? We have notes of his proposed amendments as recorded in a copy of the original official text of the communiqué. In the following, the official text of the communique is shown in contrast with

Mao's proposed amendments, which are underlined.

- - -

The agreed text:

> "The delegations of the two Parties unanimously confirmed that, in defeating the U.S. imperialist plans for aggression and war, it is a very important international task for all the peoples and anti-imperialist forces of the world to unite and form the broadest possible international united front against U.S. imperialism."

The proposed amendment:

> "The delegations of the two Parties unanimously confirmed that in defeating the U.S. imperialist plans for aggression and war, it is a very important international task for the peoples and anti-imperialist forces of the world to unite and form the boradest possible (and not narrow) and most genuine (and not false) international united front, that, among all forms of unity, the unity of revolutionary peoples of the world is the broadest and the most genuine because they are calling for a genuine revolution, and that consequently, we must pay special attention in this respect."

- - -

The agreed text:

> "The two sides also confirmed that in strengthening the international united front against U.S. imperialism, it is necessary to strengthen activities in the international democratic movements."

The proposed amendment:

> "The two sides also confirmed that in strengthening the international united front against U.S. imperialism, it is necessary to strengthen activities in the international democratic movements and hold fast to the genuinely revolutionary line that reflects the aspiration of revolutionary peoples of the world."

- - -

The agreed text:

> "The delegations of the two Parties emphasized the significance of the struggle against modern revisionism in waging the struggle against U.S. imperialism. The modern revisionists have been carrying out a line of prettifying U.S. imperialism and tailing after it... In strengthening the struggle against the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war, it is necessary to correctly advance the struggle, both in theory and in practice, against modern revisionism, splittism, and big-powerism, which evade or obstruct the struggle against imperialism."

The proposed amendment:

> "The delegations of the two Parties stressed the important significance of the struggle against modern revisionism centering around the leading group of the CPSU. The modern revisionists centering around the Soviet leading group have been carrying out the line of prettifying U.S. imperialism and tailing after it... It is imperative to resolutely carry out the struggle, both in theory and in

practice, against modern revisionism, splittism, and big-power chauvinism, centering around the Soviet leadership group that evade or obstruct the struggle against U.S. imperialism, in order to strengthen the struggle against the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war."

* * *

The agreed text:

"As is stressed in the Declaration and the Statement respectively of the conferences of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960, an indispensable task for the advancement and development of international communist movement is to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism by opposing modern revisionism which is a main danger, as well as by maintaining vigilance against dogmatism and sectarianism. To achieve the genuine unity of the international communist movement..."

The proposed amendment:

"As is stressed in the Declaration and the Statement respectively of the conferences of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960, it is necessary to oppose modern revisionism which is a main danger and at the same time resolutely oppose dogmatism and sectarianism inside our two Parties, and thereby to overcome them. It is of utmost importance to resolutely oppose the thoughts of modern revisionism, which is a reflection of the anti-communist, anti-revolutionary and anti-popular thoughts of the bourgeoisie in and outside our countries. Unless one pays attention to it, takes

necessary steps and overcomes it, it is very dangerous. Modern revisionism headed by the Soviet leading group, in opposing us, does not describe us as revisionists but as dogmatists and sectarians; this description, however, refers to nothing but the unity of genuine Marxists, genuine international revolutionaries and revolutionary peoples. It is an indispensable task for the advancement and development of the international communist movement to fight in defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism. To achieve the genuine revolutionary unity of the international communist movement..."

* * *

The agreed text:

"The militant friendship and solidarity between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China have been developed through the protracted common struggle of the two peoples against Japanese imperialism and against U.S. imperialism."

The proposed amendment:

"Militant friendship and solidarity between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China have been developed through the protracted common struggle of the two peoples against Japanese imperialism and against U.S. imperialism and against modern revisionism."

* * *

The agreed text:

"The Communist Party of China and the

Chinese people support the demands and struggles of the Japanese people for the realization of an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan, including the removal of U.S. military bases in Japan, the reversion of Okinawa and Ogasawara, the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. 'Security Treaty', the defeat of the 'Japan-ROK Treaty', opposition to the cooperation of the Sato Cabinet in the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam, and the revival of Japanese militarism."

The proposed amendment:

"The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people support the demands and struggles of the Japanese people for the realization of an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan, including the removal of U.S. military bases in Japan, the reversion of Okinawa and Ogasawara, the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. 'Security Treaty', the defeat of the 'Japan-ROK Treaty', opposition to the cooperation of the Sato Cabinet in the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam, the collusion between the Sato Cabinet and modern revisionism and the revival of Japanese militarism."

"DON'T BE AFRAID OF ISOLATION", MAO SAID

Mao's draft amendments came quite as a surprise to us, for they were to be made to a joint communiqué that had been formally agreed upon and confirmed at the meeting of the two Parties with the top-ranking leaders of the respective Parties attending, and had even been celebrated at a send-off banquet held in honor of our delegation. This was indeed extraordinary in Party-to-Party relations. General Secretary Miyamoto then felt intuitively that some unusual development had been taking place inside the Chinese leadership.

Miyamoto started to speak to Zhao Yimin,

"The communique has been made not on the basis of full agreement between the two Parties, but in a circumstance in which there were points of disagreement between them. A subcommittee formed of representatives of the two Parties prepared the document after confirming the common viewpoints; (1) drafting should be done on the basis of points of agreement, (2) no mention should be made of points of disagreement, and (3) it should be as brief as possible."

While he was speaking, Chairman Mao, accompanied by Kang Sheng, came in. General Secretary Miyamoto introduced the members of the delegation to Mao. The meeting with Mao opened at once. Mao Zedong spoke first.

"One must not be afraid of isolation. One must not be afraid of war. It is no good to take a conciliatory attitude toward traitors. Do you take a conciliatory attitude toward Shiga and right-wing social-democrats?"

His look and tone were both very fierce; he sounded as if he thought our Party had been afraid of war and isolation; he even seemed to be reproaching those present at the meeting. He said:

"On many occasions, I was completely

isolated, going through quite hard experiences. The opportunists of both right and left wings, such as Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan and Wang Ming all ill-treated me. At one Party meeting, I was quite isolated, obtaining only one vote--my own. On one occasion, I was said to be lacking in any particle of Marxism-Leninism. I was once relieved of all duties at the Party center, being given the post of an Army division commander. I was once expelled from the Party, being relegated to the role of merely a democratic personage."

After describing his own experiences of being isolated in the past, Mao said, "So was Lenin". Mao stressed how Lenin had put up his fight from his minority position, saying, "Lenin, however, was never afraid of isolation". Mao then asked, "Have you ever had an experience of being isolated?"

Miyamoto replied, "Yes, I have".

Mao continued:

"We were isolated in Bucharest, too. China was all alone at that time. There was not a single party that supported China. Even comrades from Albania failed to support China.

"The United States threatens to escalate the Vietnam war and expand it to China. But we are not afraid of war. We are fully prepared to fight a war. In escalating the war and expanding it into China, the United States is likely to make air raids as well as blockade Shanghai, Qingdao, Guangzhou and other coastal areas of China. If the United States mounts an attack on China, the Soviet Union, too, will invade us. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union has two divisions stationed in Mongolia, bringing in atomic bombs as well. The Soviet Union aims to invade the Chinese Northeast from Chita and Khabarovsk and to attack the Xinqiang Province, too. Under their present plans, the United States will expand aggression from the South and the Soviet Union from the North, thus dividing China into two along the Yangzi River."

Kang Sheng intervened, saying: "India, too, is part of this plot".

Mao Zedong said, "The war may cost one hundred million or two hundred million lives, but that would matter little". He then asked, "What is the Japanese population?" Miyamoto replied, "Some ninety-eight million". Mao then said, "Lives twice as many as the Japanese population may be lost, but that would not matter much. One should not be afraid of the loss of lives in a war. Many lives were lost during the Korean war; but Korea has been reconstructed fully, being now better than ever". Mao went on to say that his eldest son was killed in the Korean war, while his wife, younger brother and younger sister were all killed at the hands of the Nationalist Party, adding, "But I am alive. I was engaged in the war for twenty-two years, but not a single shot hit me. I was possibly protected by Marx!"

Mao then noted, "Air raids on Vietnam do not matter much, either. We in China fought against air raids by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and by Japan; but we emerged victorious in the end. It is a good thing that the United States is making air raids; these air raids are uniting the Vietnamese people". He said he was grateful to Japan, on the grounds that Japan's aggression in China led the Chinese people to unite and fight.

Mao went on to ask, "What is your opinion about my proposed amendments?" General Secretary Miyamoto said, "We will study them later".

Then, Mao, his face flushed and his voice raised, denounced the joint communiqué with the words, "I was very displeased to read the communiqué".

> "It has failed to clarify the themes. It mentioned modern revisionism; but one cannot see who is being criticized. Both the Communist Party of China and the Japanese Communist Party criticize Soviet revisionism, so that it would be useless not to mention it by name. This communiqué is in a compromising tone. I must say this: This communiqué is lacking in courage: it is soft and powerless."

Miyamoto said, "The communiqué was first drafted by the Japanese side". Kang Sheng added, "Our proposals and views were put into it, too". Mao increasingly excited and speaking even louder, said, "Those in Beijing agreed to it, too, I presume. (They are) too soft. I do not want to impose my views, but the communiqué, as it now stands should not be made public". He concluded by saying, "This is the end of my statement. It is now your turn to attack me".

It was already near noon. As Mao was speaking in a very excited, angry tone, the atmosphere of the room was very tense. Mao was denouncing the joint communiqué which the leadership of his own party, whose chairman was none other than himself, had approved; Mao was denouncing the leadership of his own Party in front of the delegation of another Party, as being "soft". The Japanese delegation could not but recall a series of extraordinary events they had encountered since their arrival in Shanghai.

MIYAMOTO STRESSES THE JCP POSITION

General Secretary Miyamoto, after an introductory remark that "Comrade Mao Zedong had expressed his views quite frankly; we too are here to exchange views frankly", went on to elaborate the views of the Japanese Communist Party.

Miyamoto explained the resolute struggle of the JCP against various erroneous trends, and had it unanimously adopted its Program at the 8th Congress. Specifically mentioning the fact that the Party had been split at the time of the Korean War and suffered a very serious blow because of the line of ultra-left adventurism in the 1951 Program set out by Stalin, he emphasized that the Party, drawing correct lessons from this bitter experience, has established a position of self-reliance and independence and had independently made the present Program by itself. "This experience later enabled us to propose many draft amendments of our own without any fears whatever at the Meeting of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties, where we were in the minority from the outset. This we did without any instruction from any other party, including the Communist Party of China", he said.

As for the controversy with the CPSU, he stressed the Japanese Communist Party's independent position in conducting polemics. Reiterating the point made at the bilateral meeting in Beijing, he noted that the Japanese Party had not conducted open polemics with the Soviet Party by name, until they had openly attacked us; he added that Zhao Anbo, while in Japan for the world conference against atomic and hydrogen bombs, tried in vain to "incite" us to "climb on the bandwagon and quickly join in open polemics with the CPSU".

Miyamoto also indicated that the Japanese Party, at its 7th Congress (in 1958), has summed up the split in the Party in 1950. He specifically referred to the fact that when Shiga and Kurahara were in the Soviet Union in 1957, Khrushchev tried to dissuade the Japanese Party from summing up the problem of 1950 at the Congress (Kurahara turned down the suggestion while Shiga accepted it) and that on their way back, when they were in Beijing, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping likewise expressed opposition to the planned summing-up of the problem at the Congress. "In those days", Miyamoto said, "the Soviet and Chinese Parties were two major parties with considerable prestige throughout the world. But, unafraid of isolation, and turning down the opinion of Shiga who tailed along after Khrushchev and Liu Shaoqi, we summed up the problem of 1950 at our Congress, on our own judgment and responsibility".

Mao said, "I have never heard of this", and turning to Kang Sheng, he asked, "Do you know anything (about the issue involving Liu Shaoqi)?" Kang Sheng shook his head in denial.

Miyamoto went on:

> "At the Bucharest meeting, Comrade Yonehara here was present; he did not support Khrushchev's attack on China. This was done without any advance consultation with anyone else. Likewise, on the question of whether or not to attend the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, we made this decision ourselves, without consulting any other party. This was not an item on the agenda of the meeting in Beijing. So we have done what we believed right, without fearing isolation, using our own judgment, and in a courageous way.
>
> "We have taken quite a principled stand toward the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Embassy held a reception or a meeting commemorating the October Revolution, we refused to attend so long as the Shiga clique was allowed to be present. We are diehards, pure and simple, in this respect."

Mao intervened, saying:

> "That diehard attitude is good. We have trade relations and cultural exchanges with them; and we have some 200 students studying in the Soviet Union. But one must not take a conciliatory attitude toward traitors."

Mao Zedong now looked a little relaxed. Referring to the Japanese Communist Party's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on several issues, he even said, laughing, "In this respect, you are ahead of us".

Miyamoto went on to speak about Vietnam. The importance of the problem had been stressed time and again at the meeting of the two Parties in Beijing. He continued:

> "The Vietnamese comrades are carrying on the struggle superbly; but international assistance for them is not necessarily working very smoothly. We take a very serious view of air raids on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, one of the socialist countries. This should not be allowed to become a long-lasting phenomenon. The Statement of the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties mentions the superiority of the socialist camp, which, however, is not wielding its full strength with respect to the Vietnam problem."

Mao then intervened, saying: "The Soviet Union has no intention of seriously supporting Vietnam. Of all the Soviet weapons, it is only anti-aircraft guns that are useful. And even that assistance is being provided to the North only, not to the South". When Miyamoto said, "In recent months, the Soviets have provided aid to South Vietnam as well", Mao blurted out, "The Soviets brag about what little help they have offered. China offers help, but without bragging about it".

Mao apparently had not read the records of the bilateral Party talks in Beijing. The fact that the Soviet Union had begun to offer aid to South Vietnam had been made clear in the statements of our Party's delegation there.

Miyamoto went on:

> "It is a good thing that China should be prepared for the worst contingency. But one should, I must say, not only prepare for a bad possibility but do one's utmost to realize a good possibility. This does not stand in the way of preparing for a bad contingency. While making efforts to realize the good, we can rally the strength of the masses, enhance our strength, and thereby prepare for the worst. Needless to say, it is important to prepare for the eventuality of the war being expanded into China; it is more important, however, to strive to settle the Vietnam question in Vietnam and prevent the war from spreading to China. As Comrade Mao once said, one must encircle and isolate the enemy politically while preparing oneself militarily."

Mao intervened, saying: "Of course, one must prepare oneself politically".

Miyamoto said, "For that purpose, it is necessary to rally and unite all forces that are opposed to the United States. You say that the Soviet Union has become capitalist and that the Soviet Party has become fascist; but it is necessary to make various scientific studies before making such judgments".

Mao replied, "Yes. There is need to make studies".

Miyamoto then asked, "You have cooperated with the Soviet Union in transporting goods to assist Vietnam; can't this be described as a sort of joint action?" Mao answered, "This is done in accordance with a Vietnamese request. The Soviets have circulated malicious rumors about it, saying that China has been obstructing the transportation and charging exorbitant rates".

Miyamoto said, "De facto concerted action is being taken in the field of the international democratic movement. The Tricontinental Conference in Havana unanimously adopted a resolution expressing opposition to the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and support for Vietnam. It is important to put such a resolution into practice, without allowing it to end up as mere words". Mao, responding to Miyamoto's emphasis on the importance of the role of the international democratic movement, said:

> "The international democratic movement does not matter much, whether they adopt a good resolution or a bad one, because such a resolution is just a scrap of paper, without any power whatsoever.
>
> "In Indonesia, which is not a socialist country, democratic organizations had organized hundreds of thousands or even millions of people under their wing; but when the right wing mounted an assault they just vanished into thin air at one stroke. The strength of democratic organizations matters little."

After an exchange of views about the situation in Indonesia, Mao said, "The situation in Japan is dangerous, too. You must get ready; otherwise, you may possibly be subject to an annihilating blow..

Parliament, even if it still existed, would be of little use".

Miyamoto, in reply, said, "It is not as simple as that in Japan. There have been experiences in which we have successfully killed important reactionary bills". Mao noted, however, "but the enemies will do whatever they want to; once they get ready for war, parliament will be of no use".

Miyamoto, in response to such a remark, said, "We will in no way repeat the mistakes of ultra-left adventurism". He thus described the position of the Japanese Communist Party in an unequivocal way, citing recent developments in the situation and the people's struggle in Japan.

Mao Zedong, referring to the international democratic movement, indicated that he was in favor of participating in conferences along with revisionists. He said that the withdrawal of Zhao Yimin from the Editorial Board of "Problems of Peace and Socialism" was a mistake, which he said stemmed from lack of flexibility. "When A.N. Kosygin, the Soviet premier, was visiting China", Mao said, "he asked the Chinese side how long the open polemics would last", to which Mao replied that it would continue for ten thousand years, and when Kosygin objected, saying that that would be too long, Mao said one thousand years might be discounted to let the polemics last nine thousand years.

Mao also noted that when he last met Kurahara, he was asked, "Is it possible to realize communism in only one country?" and he replied, "Communism would not be possible in only one country as long as imperialism continues to exist". Mao went on to say, "I have since then given much thought to this matter; I am now not so sure about when communist society will come into being. The issue of the revival of capitalism will continue to arise. Two packets of cigarettes may be enough to bribe some people. There is the possibility of revisionism coming to the fore five, six or more times in the future. There is no knowing that revisionism may not prevail in China and in Japan at any time".

It was already past 2:00 p.m. At that moment, we were told that lunch was ready. Mao proposed, "Why not have a meal first, and then resume the discussion?" The Japanese side agreed. As the meeting was recessed all went to the dining room.

Mao was accompanied by a young lady in her 20s, who seemed to be a nurse. On the way to the dining room, he walked to a place where an arrangement had been made to take a commemorative photograph. A Chinese Party worker hurriedly approached and reminded him that "the photograph is supposed to be taken after the meal". Mao, coming back, said in a rather dissatisfied tone, "I am always supposed to do as others tell me".

At lunch we were joined by the other members of the Japanese delegation, including Fuwa, Ueda, Kudo, Tachiki, and Kojima.

AT THE LUNCHEON TABLE

Chairman Mao Zedong seemed to be rather relaxed at the table, eating and speaking a great deal; he also smoked heavily.

"The Chinese Party has intervened in the internal affairs of the Japanese Party too much", Mao said, referring to the Japanese Communist Party's split in 1950 in a reflective manner. Mao also said, "The matter of 1957 (Liu Shaoqi and others' opposition to the planned summing-up of the problem of 1950--ed.) was news to me". Zhao Anbo, in a rather apologetic remark, said, "Comrade Liu Shaoqi did not tell you to refrain from summing up the problem of 1950; he merely advised that internal

Party affairs could not be cleared up at once, so you had better take time, make a thoroughgoing inquiry, and make a summing-up at an appropriate time". This was immediately refuted by the Japanese side.

Miyamoto: "But by that time we had already arrived at a stage when a meaningful summing-up could be made."

Zhao: "Shiga was here, and I don't know how he reported back..."

Miyamoto: "Not only Shiga but Comrade Kurahara was also here then."

Kurahara: "Comrade Liu Shaoqi and others said that the problem of 1950, if brought to the Congress, would cause a split in the Party; I took exception to that remark, saying that the problem, if not brought to the Congress, would entail the greater danger of a split. With the 7th Party Congress (in July 1958), the Party succeeded in restoring unity."

Mao: "We were wrong, and the Japanese comrades were right, in this respect."

Miyamoto: "This is one of our historic experiences."

Mao: "That is very true; the lesson is that one should not intervene in the internal affairs of other Parties."

The conversation then turned to the two previous meetings between General Secretary Miyamoto and Chairman Mao Zedong.

General Secretary Miyamoto held his first talks with Chairman Mao in Zhengzhou in March 1959. After attending the 21st Congress of the CPSU, he was visiting China from February 23. The Japanese delegation consisted of General Secretary Miyamoto and Presidium member Shoichi Kasuga (a present member of the Presidium), with Tomio Nishizawa, then

deputy head of Research Division of the Central Committee (Vice-Chairman of the Presidium at present) as expert. The delegation held talks with the delegation of the Communist Party of China, consisting of General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, Political Bureau member Peng Zhen and Secretary Wang Jiaxiang, in Beijing. Later the delegation met leaders of the CPC leadership, including Vice-Chairmen Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai and General Secretary Deng Xiaoping. It was the first official talks between the two Parties after the end of the war; opinions were exchanged on a broad range of subjects, such as the current international situation and the Far East in particular, relations between Japan and China, and relations between the Japanese and Chinese Parties. Subsequently, on the afternoon of March 3 in Zhengzhou, the Japanese delegation met Mao Zedong, who was then accompanied by Vice-Chairman Liu, General Secretary Deng, and Politburo member Peng. The meeting was held in a railway carriage set aside for the exclusive use of Chairman Mao; at the end of the meeting, General Secretary Miyamoto and General Secretary Deng signed a joint communiqué on behalf of their respective Parties.

The second meeting between Miyamoto and Mao took place in Hangzhou on September 13, 1964; the Japanese delegation was visiting China on its way back from a visit to Indonesia. After having talks with Vice-Chairman Liu and others in Beijing, the delegation met Mao, who was then staying in Hangzhou. Present at the talks on the Chinese side apart from Mao were Political Bureau member Peng Zhen, Qiao Quanhua, Wang Li, and Zhao Anbo; and on the Japanese side, apart from Miyamoto, Jun-ichiro Ide (expelled from the Party later as an anti-Party element subservient to a foreign power) and Kojima, both as experts.

Mao Zedong, recollecting the two previous meetings with Miyamoto, said, "I met you, Comrade Miyamoto, first in Zhengzhou; I told you then that the CPC's intervention at the time of the 1950 affair was wrong. At the second meeting with you, which was in Hangzhou, the issue of the international conference of Communist and Workers' Parties was discussed". General Secretary Miyamoto, also recalling the meetings, said, "At that time, I told you that we had informed Comrade Liu Shaoqi about our plan to make a counter-proposal regarding the issue of the international conference; I also discussed various Japanese affairs, including the issue of the strike".

By the issue of the strike, Miyamoto meant an experience in which the Japanese Communist Party, at the time of the 1964 spring labor offensive, had made an error of leadership in opposing a strike scheduled by the trade unions for April 17 that year. While not a few leaders of the Party including General Secretary Miyamoto were abroad, part of the leadership at home replaced the official Party line with a statement made by Mao Zedong on January 27 of that year, calling on the Japanese people to organize an "Anti-U.S. patriotic united front"; the leading group, with respect to the spring labor offensive strike action plan, gave little attention to the important significance of the workers' economic struggle against monopoly capital, and, taking note of the presence of pro-American elements in the trade-union leadership, characterized the planned strike as a "provocative strike plotted by U.S. imperialism" and thus virtually gave top priority to averting the strike.

I was then remembering that Mao Zedong, at the second meeting with General Secretary Miyamoto, frankly apologized to him because his statement had caused trouble for the Japanese Party.

The conversation then shifted to the question of health.

Miyamoto said to Mao, "You have not changed at all since I last met you. You look very spry, indeed". Mao replied, "I have a cough from time to time; that annoys me". When Kurahara suggested, "I have quit smoking and got rid of my cough", Mao said, "I should try to heed your advice as much as I can". So, for a time, smoking was the topic, about which jokes passed to and fro at the table. Mao himself made a joke, saying, "Comrade Zhou Enlai, though a non-smoker, urges others to smoke, saying that if everybody quit smoking, state finances would go bankrupt".

Mao said: "Kongzi (Confucius) died at the age of 73. I am now 72, turning 73 later this year. Probably, sometime toward the end of this year, I may be able to go to meet Karl Marx". In response, Miyamoto said, "When I last met you, Comrade Mao, you said your five-year program included a plan for a visit to Marx; so I said I was opposed to the five-year program. I have not changed my mind about that". Kurahara joined him, saying, "I would like to ask you to seek the best possibility in this respect, too". But Mao said, "There are some people, both inside and outside the Party who would like me to die".

About the delayed publication of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Kurahara said, "I have heard that the next volume is not coming out because you have not looked over the manuscripts". But Kang Sheng hastened to correct him, saying, "The delay in publication is our responsibility; we have not yet edited the manuscripts, so it is not possible to ask the Chairman to look over them". Earlier in the day, while sharing a car with Kurahara, Kang Sheng had told him, "The publication of the next volume of the Selected Works is delayed because Chairman Mao has not looked over the manuscripts, though the editorial work was finished some five years ago". Kang Sheng was head of the editorial board of the

Selected Works of Mao Zedong; Mao, it appeared, was rewriting parts of his earlier writings that he now regarded as inappropriate for himself.

Conversation at lunch also took up the subject of the average life span, birth control, and limits on the use of Chinese characters, both in Japan and China. In the meantime, Mao, out of the blue, said, "I am away in provincial areas for half of every year, just to escape from the mountains of documents in Beijing". When Kang Sheng said, "Chairman Mao goes to provincial areas to talk with local Party leaders to get acquainted with the actual situation", Mao apparently wanted to demur, but simply said, "Well..." In another isolated remark, Mao said, "The world is now in great rebellion; the more rebellious, the better", which also left a deep impression on us.

At the end of the luncheon, Mao Zedong said, "What will we do with the meeting? I have nothing more to say". General Secretary Miyamoto, in reply, said, "We have something more to say; though not much". Mao concluded, "Then, let us resume the meeting tomorrow".

After that, everyone assembled for the commemorative picture. It was 3:50 p.m. when the Japanese delegation returned to their hotel, the Jinjiang.

That night, the delegation held a formal conference to discuss Mao's proposed amendments. In his article, "Our Last Discussions with Mao Zedong", Miyamoto described the proceedings of that conference as follows:

> "(The Mao proposal) involved a very serious matter of principle, which could not be dealt with by changing some words and phrases; every member of the delegation made a similar statement. A rupture of the talks would most probably create many difficulties in future relations between the Japanese and Chinese Parties, but we had to take a principled stand; otherwise it would have been a grave theoretical mistake and would have created serious confusion both at home and abroad; there was hardly any need for detailed discussions, because all were unanimous on this. In other words, there were no 'soft' members in the delegation on that matter."

THE SECOND-DAY MEETING WITH MAO

On the morning of the following day, March 29, the five members of the delegation, Miyamoto, Oka, Kurahara, Yonehara and Sunama, left for Chairman Mao's residence again to talk with him.

Upon arrival, they were first asked by Zhao Yimin, "Have you studied the communiqué?" General Secretary Miyamoto replied, "The proposed amendments are not based on the latest meeting between the two Parties; they are not revisions that are in keeping with the outcome of the meeting; they include some points that were not even raised in the meeting. In our opinion, the communiqué, if it can be worked out satisfactorily, should be something like the original". He again pointed out that it was the Chinese side that had proposed that a communiqué be issued; that the two sides had agreed to make it brief, and based on the points of agreement, excluding points of disagreement; and that the communiqué had thus finally been worked out by the efforts of the two sides. He also made a detailed explanation on the views of the Japanese Communist Party regarding the controversial points of the proposed amendments.

> "In conclusion, the communiqué is not lacking in courage at all. Rather, it displays courage by calling for unity in the present difficult circumstances. We believe the communiqué has real significance in that respect. If some differences have since developed and made it impossible to agree upon a mutually acceptable text, then that cannot be helped; after all, a communiqué should never be imposed by one Party on the other."

Zhao Yimin then asked, "Have you made any specific drafts to counter the proposed amendments?" Miyamoto replied, "No, we have not. Rather, we think today's meeting is a very good opportunity to talk with each other, without limiting the discussion to working on the communiqué. One cannot impose one's views on the other; but this is a good opportunity to talk".

Zhao Yimin left the room, saying, "I will go and report to Chairman Mao". Some time later, Chairman Mao came into the room, and asked, "Have you got anything more to say?"

General Secretary Miyamoto, replying, "We have a few things to say", supplemented his remarks made the previous day, with renewed explanations about the position and views of the Japanese Communist Party that had been elaborated earlier in the bilateral Party talks in Beijing.

Miyamoto first spoke about the assessment of the CPSU leadership and a revolutionary dual policy adhered to by the Japanese Communist Party.

> "They have undertaken activities that prettify U.S. imperialism; the erroneousness of such activities has been exposed by the realities, in the light of the U.S. war of aggression; this has led them to adopt a dual policy. With regard to Vietnam, they have more

> recently expressed support for the stand of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the statement of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and started sending assistance goods to South Vietnam as well. At any rate, they have started to speak about unity. In the face of this, one must follow a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary dual policy; on one hand upholding the banner of unity in the struggle against the United States; on the other criticizing any opportunist policy that compromises with imperialism; it is thus necessary to combine these two aspects.
>
> "As to Soviet assistance to Vietnam, it is a fact that Soviet anti-aircraft guns have helped to shoot down U.S. aircraft; if the Vietnamese people ask for them because they help defeat the United States, we should call for more of such aid, so that help for the Vietnamese people will be increased."

Miyamoto, emphasizing the existence of fundamental contradictions between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the Soviet social system and U.S. capitalism, and also the need for promotion of such contradictions, went on to discuss what attitude to take toward the Soviet and other East European parties in a united front against U.S. imperialism.

> "The important thing is what concrete attitude, what official position, they take toward the U.S. aggressive war in Vietnam; this should be the criteria on which to base our judgment.
>
> "They are trying to resolve the Vietnam question in keeping with their 'peaceful coexistence' line. They know at the same time that if they rejected the demands of the

> Vietnamese people, the demands of the world peoples in the struggle, they would be denounced and isolated."

He pointed out that the 82 countries that assembled in the Tricontinental solidarity conference in Havana had adopted a militant resolution against the United States.

Then addressing himself to the issue of joint action with the revisionist and non-Marxist-Leninist parties under certain circumstances, he spoke of the lessons drawn from the tactics Lenin employed for a united front between the Third International, on one hand, and the Second International and others. "Lenin" he said, "after having organized the Third International knew fully well that the parties belonging to the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals had formed an unstable bloc with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and even pointed out that their united-front slogans were aimed at duping the masses and winning them over to their side. Nevertheless, Lenin called on these parties to organize a united front on general demands, such as an eight-hour day, relief of the Soviet famine, and opposition to the Russian capitalists. This is worth studying". Miyamoto then proceeded to refer to united actions taken with the Socialist Party in Japan.

> "At the present moment, we are undertaking united actions in Japan with the Socialists, who do not have a truly Marxist-Leninist program. United actions are being undertaken on issues about which they cannot but fight against U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital. In doing this, we take care to preserve our own identity in terms of principle and theory, ready to criticize any erroneous trend and to advance the struggle against the enemies."

General Secretary Miyamoto, while criticizing the CPSU leadership, which calls for unity but collaborates with Shiga, and which pledges to struggle against U.S. imperialism over Vietnam but prettifies the foreign policy line of the Sato Cabinet, again emphasized: "It is necessary for us to take two attitudes at the one time in the international anti-imperialist struggle against the United States: One is to uphold the banner of struggle, the banner of unity, and the other is to criticize any inconsistent, ambiguous attitudes theoretically and practically, as well as in the mass movements".

Miyamoto went on to say, "To join them in international united action or in an international united front would not mean to prettify them as if they were taking a revolutionary stand". "A proverb that fits the present situation is 'nothing venture, nothing win' rather than 'A wise man never courts danger'", he said, adding: "Of course, one should ward off danger, depending on circumstances; but, in this case, one has to be activist enough to criticize them while engaged in practical actions".

While Miyamoto was talking, no one interrupted. Mao Zedong remained expressionless; Kang Sheng, Zhao Anbo and the others all made sour faces.

When Miyamoto said, "Broadly speaking, we made these same comments in the Beijing talks", Mao Zedong spoke for the first time, saying, "I have seen the records; similar points were made by Comrade Miyamoto yesterday".

THE U.S. AGGRESSION IS SURE TO FAIL

General Secretary Miyamoto went on to say:

"It is true that there are differences of opinion about the CPSU leadership; but in circumstances like these, the two sides, according to the points of agreement and excluding the points of disagreement, have prepared the joint communiqué. The communiqué would be unsatisfactory to anyone who wanted to state his position in full. But the two Parties, both struggling against imperialism and revisionism in their own ways, have agreed to work out a communiqué that confirms the two points in general terms. So the implication is not that we are lacking in ways and means, or in courage, to struggle against imperialism and revisionism; nor is it the product of such a position.

"We have a strong conviction in, and a clear perspective of the final triumph of Marxism-Leninism, although, it has to be admitted, the world communist movement is proceeding along various complicated ways. The U.S. imperialist war of aggression is going through a complicated process but will end in ultimate failure. The important question is how effectively we can promote this process.

"Our two Parties are in agreement on the fundamental direction, but disagree on specific ways of struggle. This among other things, is connected with objective conditions in which our Party exists in a capitalist country. But the masses of people who live in non-socialist countries account for two-thirds of the world's population and 80 percent of the total number of countries. These masses, who are showing an increasingly stronger tendency to struggle against U.S. imperialism, demand that anti-imperialist forces the world over should organize a united front in the struggle.

"The masses under capitalism have become ever more critical of the ambiguity of the diplomatic line of the Soviet Union; but they would refuse to accept any explanations that the Soviet Union, which they know is providing Vietnam with aid materials, such as missiles and anti-aircraft guns, is wholly unopposed, or not even partially opposed, to U.S. imperialism."

The correctness of General Secretary Miyamoto's prediction that "The U.S. imperialist war of aggression is going through a very complicated process but will ultimately end in failure", was fully demonstrated by the historic triumph of the Vietnamese people nine years later.

"In our opinion, it is in keeping with the realities in Japan to take the stand I have so far described. It is also our firm conviction that this is in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism", he said.

Miyamoto, before concluding, said, "Through the latest series of meetings, we have familiarized ourselves with various arguments of yours and their background, such as had escaped us in reading your articles. The Chinese comrades, I presume, have come to know some of our arguments that were not elaborated in our articles". He thus emphasized that the two Parties, while upholding the points of agreement, should study the points of disagreement further in the course of struggle, so as to allow practice to verify their respective stands. Miyamoto went on to stress that the Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese and Korean Parties--the four parties in Asia whose national territories are subject to U.S. aggression--should now cooperate with each other and strengthen their solidarity.

"It is my belief that the Parties that have courageously fought against U.S. imperialism under difficult circumstances, the Parties that have fought against Khrushchev splittism, are more than ever required to consolidate their points of agreement as much as possible, while studying their points of disagreement", he said.

"This is all I wanted to say", Miyamoto concluded.

"ACT AS THOUGH NO MEETING HAS TAKEN PLACE"

The meeting was drawing to a close. Final remarks were made.

Mao: "Thank you. I have nothing more to say, either, except one or two comments. A stand like yours will be welcomed by the CPSU leadership; this is the first thing I want to say. We cannot welcome such a stand; this is the second point. In my opinion, the communiqué cannot be published as it stands. Communiqués need not be published. We have not published communiqué with the Indonesian Communist Party and many other parties. Comrade Wilcox of New Zealand has paid a visit to Beijing; there was a meeting, with no communiqué issued, however. To issue a communiqué is a formalism. We once published a statement with the Socialist Party of Japan at their request. The statement, along with many others, amounts to a mere scrap of paper. The Socialists asked for the issuance of a joint communiqué with us simply for election purposes. It was a mistake for our side to have proposed issuing a communiqué, which you had not asked for. This one, if published, would only displease both sides."

Miyamoto: "We do not insist on the issuance of a communiqué. We firmly believe that our stand will be welcomed neither by the United States nor by the Soviet Union. Our opinion on this differs also."

Mao: "There are some common viewpoints, and also some points of disagreement, between the two sides. Which side is correct will be known after some years of experience. Each side holds itself to be truly Marxist-Leninist. Which side is so will be seen ultimately in the years ahead. Neither side should consider itself absolutely correct."

Miyamoto: "I agree with that."

Mao: "Which side is relatively correct can only be known in the future. Whether the Chinese points of view are relatively correct or not can only be corroborated by facts."

Miyamoto: "Settlement of a political problem requires not only an exchange of theoretical opinions but also verification in practice. This point was made during the meeting with respect to the points of disagreement."

Mao: "Ultimately, the heavens will not fall. Given opportunities, we can talk to each other in the future. Our present meeting, I presume, may be ended here."

Miyamoto: "We have no more to say."

So the meeting ended there.

Mao asked the Chinese participants in the meeting, "Did you make any announcement when you left Beijing?" This was most probably about the meeting with Mao in Shanghai. Zhao Anbo replied: "The announcement was made at a banquet". Mao said, "A news report about the departure for Guangdong is enough. Let it be assumed that there was no meeting with me. No announcement is to be made of the meeting or the remarks made; no mention of the visit to Shanghai, either".

As a result, the communiqué was not made public. Mao, in his one-sided remark, decreed that there had been neither a communiqué nor a meeting with Mao Zedong. The Japanese side made no promise on this, but, taking the Chinese wishes into consideration, it refrained from making it public.

Both sides rose. Mao, walking with the others, said, "Both sides now feel relieved; they both have put off the burdens on their shoulders".

Mao, who in the course of the previous day's meeting made many interventions while Miyamoto was speaking, hardly spoke during the meeting on the second day; he was expressionless, dour and silent throughout the session.

Yet, when the Japanese delegation was leaving, Mao accompanied us out to the porch. Members of both delegations walked down the long corridor in silence. To change the uncomfortable atmosphere, Kurahara said, "Comrade Mao, I hope you will take good care of yourself and be in good health"; he responded with, "Good health to you all, too". At the porch, Mao shook hands with General Secretary Miyamoto and the other Japanese delegates one by one; he watched them go until the cars were lost to view.

It was shortly past noon when the delegates returned to the Jinjiang Hotel. Mao's wife Jiang Qing failed to appear throughout the two days of meetings.

It seemed to come as a complete surprise to the Chinese side that the position of the JCP delegation did not accord with the views of Mao Zedong. After the JCP delegation had returned home, Zhao Anbo, while drunk, bitterly reproved Sunama, who had stayed on in China, saying: "Miyamoto was the first ever to say such wayward things in the presence of Chairman Mao".

As we were to learn later, the first day of the meeting between the JCP delegation and Mao, March 28, 1966, was the very day when Mao had sent out his directive to attack the Beijing group in the so-called "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution".

The directive said, among other things, "The devil should be overthrown and the youth liberated. I hereby call on the provinces to rise in rebellion and march on the center. Every locality should turn out a large number of Sun Wukong to enable them to storm the heavenly palace".

So it was on this March 28, when Mao's directive launched an outrageous civil war, called the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, making use of "Red Guards" as "Sun Wukong", the legendary monkey that appears in the Chinese classic, Xi You Ji.

It was not fortuitous that Mao had denounced the leadership of his own Party as "Those in Beijing are soft", and had proposed in one of his amendments adding a provision about an "intra-Party struggle". Giving vent to his feelings of crisis and irritation, Mao had time and again emphasized that "one should not be afraid of isolation". It is quite evident today that the real purpose of these remarks by Mao is to be found in his determination to bombard the Party leadership in Beijing--the "Beijing Headquarters".

TO GUANGZHOU; TAO ZHU ET AL.

On the afternoon of March 29, the closing day of our meeting with Mao Zedong, the delegation left Shanghai for Guangzhou by air, on its way home.

When the delegation flew into Baiyun Airport at Guangzhou at 7:00 o'clock, drizzling rain was falling. On hand at the airport to greet the delegation were Lin Liming (Secretary of the Guandong Provincial Committee), Zeng Sheng (Mayor of Guangzhou), and other Party leaders of the Guangdong Province and the City of Guangzhou.

The delegation proceeded from the airport to the guesthouse where it was lodged, and found many people assembled in a spacious room to welcome the delegation and discuss its schedule, which included a send-off party as well as plans for theater-going and sightseeing. It appeared that the leaders of the Guangdong Province had not been informed of the outcome of the meeting with Mao in Shanghai. But when members of the Japanese delegation changed from traveling suits to everyday dress in their rooms and returned to the hall, they found that all the people had gone; Zhao Anbo and others who accompanied the delegation had apparently informed them of the results of the meeting with Mao in Shanghai. The scheduled send-off party and other official events were not even discussed after that; in fact, they had been called off.

A report in the March 29 issue of "Akahata" was headlined "The JCP Delegation off to Southern China", and it was not until the first batch of delegates, including deputy leader Oka, returned on April 1 that "Akahata" published any reports about the delegation.

Members of the delegation stayed at Conghua Spa in the suburbs of Guangzhou from March 31 until leaving for home. It had been arranged during their earlier stay in Guangzhou that the delegates would rest at this spa following the long "visit to the three countries". The delegates, while taking a rest, undertook the summing up of the "visit to the three countries", which had taken two months.

The Chinese seemed rather perplexed in their attitude toward the delegation since its arrival in Guangzhou, and the atmosphere was rather uncomfortable. In these circumstances, however, there was one person who remained courteous, giving thoughtful consideration to the delegation, the unforgettable Tao Zhu.

In those days one could not visit China without going through Guangzhou. So the JCP leaders who had visited China had all got to know Tao Zhu, formerly the head of the Guandong Provincial Committee. Among his old Japanese acquaintainces was General Secretary Miyamoto, who had stayed in Guangzhou and Hainan Island in 1964 and 1965 while recuperating from illness.

At this time, Tao Zhu was First Secretary of the South-Central Bureau and Vice-Premier; undoubtedly, he had been informed of the substance of the delegation's meeting with Mao Zedong. But on March 31, when the Japanese delegates were leaving for Conghua Spa, he visited their lodgings to have talks with General Secretary Miyamoto. Tao Zhu also came to the spa to host a send-off party for the Japanese delegation. "Let's forget about politics for today", he said, making everything as comfortable as possible for the delegates.

Tao Zhu, in July that year, became Political Bureau permanent member and head of the Central Propaganda Department; but having been branded as an counter-revolutionary revisionist element associated with the line of Liu Shaoqi-Deng Xiaoping, he fell into disgrace in the next January. The "Red Guards" attacked Tao Zhu along with others, for his "petty-bourgeois" deviation that had allowed him to accept a present from General Secretary Miyamoto.

The Japanese Communist Party, in a visit to a foreign Party, makes it a rule to take some Japanese folk-art objects, phonograph records, or commemorative Party badges as gifts to leaders of the host Party. While recuperating in Guangzhou, Miyamoto presented Tao Zhu with some Japanese folk-song records and a tapestry, and the Guangdong Provincial

Committee with a set of public address devices, including a microhpone, for broadcasting and communication during farm-work and other purposes. They were official presents from the Central Committee of the JCP as an expression of thanks to their hosts for their hospitality, among other things; this has always been done in such an association with any foreign Party.

Tao Zhu had his honor restored in December 1978; but he had died long before. While under house arrest, he died in November 1969 from cancer of the pancreas; he was then 61.

"Renmin Ribao", in its issues dated December 10-11, 1978, published notes by Tao Siliang, daughter of Tao Zhu, a doctor by profession. The "Notes", published under the heading "A Letter Mailed at Long Last--To my father, Tao Zhu", described, realistically and yet with deep affection for her deceased father, how Tao Zhu met his tragic death.

According to the "Notes", Tao Zhu, in October 1968, had already complained of poor health; but he was subject to restrictions even for medical treatment. It was not until the next April, when jaundice had spread all through his body, that he was given hospital care; but it was then too late. He was suffering from cancer of the pancreas.

The "Notes" reads in part:

> "In mid-October (1969), you were already almost on the verge of death; but there came an instruction from above, ordering you to go to a far-off place. An officer in charge of special cases said to Mother, 'Tao Zhu must immediately leave Beijing for Hefei in Anhui Province. In our opinion, you had best go to Guangdong to join a production brigade there. If you want to go with Tao Zhu, you will have to give up contact with your daughter after arriving at Hefei. Since Tao Zhu's address must not be known to anyone, if you are not going to Hefei, you must then sever ties with Tao Zhu'.
>
> "On the day when Father and Mother were to be separated and Tao Zhu sent to the far-off place alone, the officer in charge of the special cases asked you if you had anything more to say. After thinking for a while, you said, with a pause between every word and phrase: 'I am like a fire that has almost burnt out; they can form any conclusion about me at their will. But I am a member of the Communist Party, with a right to reserve my opinion. I believe history will verify it all'. Father, you thus never gave in either to the power or to violence; until your very end, you never succumbed to Jiang Qing, Chen Bada, and others.
>
> "One day in December 1969, a man from the Guangzhou military region command, then under the domination of Lin Biao and his ilk, came to Mother without prior notice; he told her that you had died on the 43rd day after your arrival in Hefei, at 11:00 a.m. on November 30... We strongly demanded that we be allowed to go to Hefei to take necessary steps following your death. But the demand was refused. So, we do not even know where your remains are.
>
> "A veteran Communist Party member, who had fought for more than 40 years in the Party for the cause of the people's revolution, was thus cruelly persecuted and deprived of his life at the hands of Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four'. There is no telling how many other veteran revolutionaries like you have thus been driven into an agonizing position, in which all family members were separated. How many people shed their tears and even their blood in all these affairs?..."

Man and wife were separated; a man with a terminal illness was summarily sent to a far-off place under an order, and the remains of the dead can still not be located--all such cruel persecutions were carried out in the name of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". In the course of the three-year-long alleged "Cultural Revolution", about 400,000 Chinese people were reportedly killed, with a total of 100 million people persecuted in one way or another.

Tao Siliang's "Notes" form a document that constitutes a forceful indictment against the sinister "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". The "Notes" have been translated into Japanese; "Akahata", in a three-day serial from December 29, 1978, published the gist under the heading "The Letter of Former Vice-Premier Tao Zhu's Daughter", while "Sekai Seiji Shiryo" published it in full in its late-January 1979 issue.

THE DELEGATION RETURNS HOME; REPORT TO 4TH C.C. PLENUM

General Secretary Miyamoto and the others left Guangzhou on the morning of April 4, seen off by the leaders of the Party's Gaungdong Provincial Committee and Guangzhou City Committee, with Tao Zhu at their head. Two of the Japanese delegates, Oka and Tachiki, had already left for home; three others, Kurahara, Kudo and Kojima left for Shanghai by train to send the delegates' luggage by sea. Returning with General Secretary Miyamoto were the remaining three--Yonehara, Fuwa and Ueda.

On the return journey, the delegation, which had engaged in heated debate with Mao Zedong and refused to subscribe to his views, had a premonition that the Chinese side would attack and intervene in

the affairs of the Japanese Communist Party in due course. This feeling, among other things, arose from the responses of the Chinese side made in connection with any foreign Parties that failed to blindly follow the line of Mao Zedong. All comrade delegates, however, were firmly resolved to abide strictly by the policy of self-reliance and independence, and fight against any big-powerist intervention, although they could sense how severe the struggle against intervention by the two big powers would become, the leadership of the CPSU and the leadership of the CPC.

General Secretary Miyamoto and the others flew to Tokyo via Hongkong, arriving at Haneda Airport at 11:20 p.m. on that day, April 4. Though it was nearly midnight, about 1,000 people, including Chairman Nosaka and other leaders of the Party Center greeted them; a big welcome-home rally was held in honor of them in the airport lobby.

The next day, April 5, General Secretary Miyamoto held a press conference at Party headquarters, releasing a statement on the "visit to the three countries".

The statement reads as follows:

> "It has become a most urgent task for militant people and anti-imperialist democratic forces throughout the world to strengthen the international struggle and the international united front against U.S. imperialist aggression. In Hanoi, in Pyongyang, and in Beijing, as well as in the mass rallies held to forge solidarity between the peoples and Parties of the two countries concerned, we stressed the importance of this, along with the struggle against revisionism and opportunism, that evade the struggle against U.S. imperialism. Through this trip, we have sharpened our keen sense of the urgency of these tasks; we are determined

> to strive harder than ever to advance this cause."

Referring to various speculations being circulated by the press, the weeklies, the police and the Public Security Investigation Agency about the "visit to the three countries", General Secretary Miyamoto said to the assembled newsmen:

> "In many reports about our activities during this trip abroad, it has invariably been assumed that the Japanese Communist Party had in some way to be tied to the line of a foreign communist party; for example, the CPC or the CPSU. At one time, a speculative report was circulated that we were going to attend the 23rd Congress of the CPSU; when it was announced that our Party was not attending the Soviet Party Congress, then it was alleged that the Japanese Party was following the line of 'CPC'. For such speculations to be assumed is evidence of a very serious case of flunkeyism."

Miyamoto elaborating the unwavering stand of the Japanese Communist Party striving to maintain its autonomous line, in view of the bitter experience of 1950, said unequivocally, "Our actions in the three countries we have visited were therefore coherent... As a matter of principle, the Chinese leaders, citing the writings of Comrade Mao Zedong, among others, have spoken about the formation of an international united front against U.S. imperialism. This, however, in no way signifies that the Communist Party of China has sided with us or that we have sided with the Communist Party of China".

After the return of General Secretary Miyamoto and others, the Chinese changed their attitude toward Kurahara, Kudo and Kojima, who had left for Shanghai to clear up the remaining business. A Chinese Party officer accompanied the three as an interpreter, but his interpretation was hardly better than that of Kudo who had previously lived in China; he seemed to be more of watchman than an interpreter. During the long train trip to Shanghai, the radio speaker incessantly blared out speeches and songs censuring revisionism and lauding Mao, a reminder that the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was now fully under way.

The three, after sending the luggage by sea from Shanghai, returned to Japan on the evening of April 7.

At the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (9th Party Congress) held on April 28 and 29, General Secretary Miyamoto gave a detailed report about the "visit to the three countries" that covered two months. The report, with a couple of intermissions, took more than six hours.

In this report, General Secretary Miyamoto, realistically clarifying the substance of the talks with the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Korean Parties, the meeting with Mao Zedong, and the proceedings of how the JCP-CPC Joint Communiqué was scrapped, emphasized that the Japanese Communist Party, confident of its own correct line, and firmly abiding by its autonomous, independent stand, would struggle and march ahead, although many obstacles would lie in its path.

At the plenum, Takaji Nishizawa, who was subsequently expelled from the Party as an anti-Party element blindly subservient to a foreign power, said "I am partially in favor of the report and partially against it", making petty criticisms against the Party's policy relating to the anti-imperialist international united front as presented in the February 4 article; but as a result of pointed criticisms made by many comrades, he finally withdrew his dissenting opinion and expressed support for the report, saying "I now understand it perfectly well".

The plenum, having received the report of General Secretary Miyamoto with great enthusiasm, gave resounding applause to the JCP delegation, which had waged a strenuous struggle in keeping with the Party's stand of autonomy and independence. The plenum came out with a firmer resolve, that the Party would strive to rally the international anti-imperialist democratic forces against U.S. imperialism and struggle for the construction of a powerful Japanese Communist Party, never uncritically following any foreign Party, never permitting any foreign Party to intervene in its internal affairs, and abiding more firmly than ever by its principled, autonomous stand.

The report to the plenum was not made public. The communiqué of the Fourth CC Plenum, released on April 29, simply reported: "The plenum received a report of the Presidium delivered by General Secretary Miyamoto concerning the activities of the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party that visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It unanimously approved the report and the concluding remarks on it".

On May 11, an "Akahata" editorial, based on the Fourth CC Plenum decisions, was published under the heading "Let the Entire Party Study the Congress Decisions in Order to Consolidate the International United Front against U.S. Imperialism and for Genuine Solidarity of the International Communist Movement".

The editorial said, "The delegation of our Party, in pursuance of its activities, made strenuous efforts to advance the international struggle against U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism, and fulfilled its mission correctly and brilliantly in

accord with the line of the Party, clarified by the decisions of the 9th Congress concerning the position of autonomy and independence, based on the principles of proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism". The editorial also called on all Party members to renew deep studies of the Congress decisions and fully grasp the Party's international line, and firmly unite and strive for the strengthening of international united action and the international united front against U.S. imperialism, and for the genuine consolidation of the international communist movement, and for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism.

While emphasizing the need for a struggle to overcome modern revisionism, the editorial pointed out the "need to correctly struggle against dogmatism and sectarianism, that would try to resolve the effective struggle against U.S. imperialism into a one-sided emphasis upon the struggle against revisionism, and thus underestimate the importance of international cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces". The "struggle" on two fronts" decided by the 9th Congress, namely the struggle against modern revisionism and the struggle against dogmatism and sectarianism, would from then on be developed to the maximum as Party-wide movement.

Following the return of the delegation, the U.S. imperialist war of aggression entered an even more serious stage. On June 29, air attacks on Hanoi, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Haiphong, the important industrial city, began, and the bombing of the North spread throughout the land, centering around Hanoi and Haiphong.

The statement of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, released on June 29 in the face of the serious situation characterized by the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, said:

> "In the face of a most serious situation involving the bombing by U.S. imperialism of Hanoi and Haiphong, it has become a task of utmost urgency for the anti-imperialist democratic forces of the world to strengthen international united action and the united front against the aggression in Vietnam, and its expansion. The anti-imperialist forces all over the world with all their united strength are called on to deal an effective counterblow against the shameful expansion of U.S. imperialist aggression, and utterly defeat its wild ambitions. To enable this to be done, the international communist movement and the socialist camp must unite their actions and lead the anti-imperialist struggle and form the core of the international anti-imperialist united front.
>
> "This will be the most effective reply to U.S. imperialism's expansion of aggression against the Vietnamese people and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, to effectively meet this new U.S. imperialist challenge to the peace and the socialist forces in Asia.
>
> "This would also constitute a preemptive, effective counterattack on possible U.S. imperialist aggression against other socialist countries in Asia, and its steps that could possibly lead to a third world war."

On August 8, an article appear in "Akahata" entitled "Once again on Strengthening International United Actions and a United Front against U.S. Imperialism".

This article, following that of February 4, pointed to the urgent need for international united

action of the anti-imperialist democratic forces and the common responsibility of the international communist movement to oppose U.S. imperialism's aggression in Vietnam and support the Vietnamese people. Drawing lessons from historical experiences, the article made a full theoretical analysis of various issues standing in the way of such international united action, including the assessment of the CPSU leadership, and joint action with it, and the relationship between the struggle against imperialism and the struggle against revisionism. The article developed in detail the views of the Japanese Communist Party which had been presented on the points raised by the Chinese side in the talks between the Japanese and Chinese Parties, though without naming.

In addition to the theoretical contributions, the Party worked strenuously at the head of a broad range of democratic forces in the struggle to defeat the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, for which Japan had become a base, and in the movement to support the Vietnamese people in their struggle.

MAO FACTION INTENSIFIES ATTACKS ON JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

After the delegation had returned, the Japanese Communist Party, taking into consideration the words of Mao himself, "Let it be as though there was no meeting", decided not to make public the meeting with Mao Zedong and the complications that arose over the joint communiqué, but to treat it as an internal problem between the two Parties. The report to the Party was kept strictly within the Plenum of the Central Committee. Whatever the differences in opinion, the Party stood for developing the common struggle based on the points of agreement.

We maintained silence, although most of the mass media published various speculative articles, and anti-Party elements visiting China gave distorted pictures about the proceedings of the talks, utilizing them for new attacks on the JCP.

But the Mao faction went ahead in China with their "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, initiated and led by Chairman Mao himself", mobilizing the "Red Guards", and proclaiming that "Mao Zedong thought" was the "apex of Marxism-Leninism in our times". In the international arena, also, they began to demand openly that their theoretical and political leadership be accepted.

They claimed that "Chairman Mao, our leader, is the sun in the hearts of the 650 million Chinese people and is also the sun in the hearts of all revolutionary people in the world... Mao Zedong thought is not only an encyclopedia for the Chinese revolution but also for the world revolution. Mao Zedong thought is the highest peak of modern Marxism-Leninism, and is the most advanced and liveliest Marxism-Leninism" ("Renmin Ribao", June 1, 1966). They demanded that the movement in every country comply with the "Theory of the Anti-U.S., Anti-Soviet United Front" and the "Theory of the Omnipotence of People's War"; they attacked communist parties that would not follow them blindly, labeling them indiscriminately as "revisionist" and "anti-revolutionary".

Immediately after the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party returned, the Mao faction began attacking the JCP leadership. First, various Chinese delegations sent to Japan started branding the line of the Party "revisionist" both within and outside of the Party, secretly gathering together anti-Party elements.

Through April-June, 1966, in meetings with representatives of Japanese democratic organizations invited to their May Day celebrations, the Chinese leadership made criticisms against our Party's views, taking up disagreements in the two-Party talks, such as the evaluation of the situation in Vietnam, the CPSU leadership, and the Anti-U.S., Anti-Soviet United Front, and demanded that they agree with the Chinese views.

For example, Zhao Anbo told the first delegation for inspection from three prefectures in northeastern Japan, "Soviet revisionism is more vicious than U.S. imperialism. Due to the lack of understanding of its true nature, some people insist on forming a united front that includes the Soviet leadership. They are wrong". Zhang Xiangshan also told the delegation of the Japan Peace Committee, "Insisting on united action with the Soviet Union will virtually amount to using make up on its face, with powder and lip-stick, the result of which will be to deceive the people".

They also tried repeatedly to force the movement for friendship between Japan and China to accept Mao Zedong thought as the base of its activities. The Guangdong Province delegation and the delegation of the Beijing Broadcasting Agency which paid visits to Japan in May and June put out propaganda at various places to the effect that "the determining factor in whether one is a real revolutionary or not is support for Mao Zedong thought".

Then in July, in a meeting with representatives of Japanese democratic organizations visiting China, Zhao Anbo attacked the JCP as "revisionist", even naming General Secretary Miyamoto. "Renmin Ribao" had made unjust attacks on the JCP and the politically conscious democratic forces from around the 12th World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, with the label "new and old followers of Soviet revisionism".

Direct intervention, and subversive activities by gathering in pro-Chinese flunkyist blind-followers and organizing through them anti-Party and factional activities within the Japanese Communist Party, were first exposed in Yamaguchi Prefecture. Anti-Party elements such as Masayoshi Fukuda and Choji Harada had been engaged in factional activities since the end of June 1966, within the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee of the JCP, without this being known to the Party. On August 22, on the occasion of the welcoming rally for the Chinese Youth Cultural Delegation to Yamaguchi, an anti-Party faction named "Left Wing of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee of the Japanese Communist Party" was announced as having been formed. Subversive activities against the Party, both in and out of the Party were going on openly, echoing every word of the CPC and Mao Zedong, through "Choshu Shimbun", as their de facto organ paper.

The Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee of the Party, on September 3, made a decision to expell Masayoshi Fukuda, Takayuki Anasako, Takaharu Sumioka, Kiyomi Obayashi and Soichiro Furutani from the Party for their factional activities in violation of Party rules. The Prefectural Committee, on September 10, also made a decision to expell Choji Harada who had joined the Fukuda faction in its factional activities. These disciplinary measures were approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee.

These attacks of the CPC on the JCP were based on a Chinese theory of "Four Enemies" the JCP being included as one of the main enemies; it was none other than Mao Zedong who formulated the theory of "Four Enemies" just four months after he had ruptured the talks with the JCP delegation. In an informal statement on July 21, 1966, Mao Zedong said, "Who are against the Great Cultural Revolution? They are American imperialism, Soviet revisionism, the JCP revisionism and reaction" ("Educational Revolution", 16th issue, August 11, 1967).

Attacks by the CPC leadership were concentrated on our Party line, dealing with the Japanese revolution. In an attempt to force the line of armed struggle upon the Japanese people, Liao Chengzhi, then Chairman of the China-Japan Friendship Association, had already told a delegation visiting China in August 1966 for inspection of the educational situation, "Some Japanese people are saying it is impermissible for China to force an armed struggle upon the Japanese people. The reason why we recommend the armed struggle for the Japanese people... is that we are convinced that an armed uprising is the only proper tactics for the Japanese people".

COUNTERING MANEUVERS BY PRO-CHINESE ANTI-PARTY BLIND-FOLLOWERS

Unbeknown to the Party, Takaji Nishizawa (pen name, Hiroshi Nuyama) though a member of the Central Committee of the JCP, had been in touch with the Mao faction from an early date, discussing even ways and means of attacking the Japanese Communist Party. In October 1966, Nishizawa openly launched subversive activities against the Party, publishing an anti-Party magazine, "Study on Mao Zedong Thought", attacking the line of the JCP, its international line and the organizational principles of the Party, in particular.

In addition to Takaji Nishizawa, Kuraji Anzai, also a member of the Central Committee, had been engaged in anti-Party activities blindly following China; he began anti-Party activities openly in the following year, 1967, when, on January 27 he issued an anti-Party article entitled "I Strongly Oppose the Revisionist Line on the Bourgeois Diet which Runs through the Program of the Party".

The Mao faction, in an attempt to strike a blow against the Party, brought disunity and subversion into the Japanese democratic movements, openly demanding that the democratic mass organizations stand against the JCP; when they refused to yield, the Mao faction forced pro-Chinese blind followers break away from those organizations and form separate splinter organizations, increasing their splitting maneuvers. A so-called "Japan-China Friendship Association Orthodox Headquarters" was formed in October 1966, also one of their splinter organizations. The maneuver affected many mass organizations, such as the Association for the Promotion of Trade between Japan and China, the Japan Congress of Journalists, the Japan Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and others.

Amidst the intensification of subversive activities of the Mao leadership against the JCP and Japanese democratic movements, the 10th JCP Congress in October 1966 had to clarify the Party attitude toward them. The Report of the Central Committee to the 10th Party Congress says,

> "At the 9th Congress the Party emphasized the importance of the struggle to overcome modern revisionism, while it also offered principled criticisms of the trend toward dogmatism-sectarianism, evident in part of the Party on the question of the April 17 strike, and the trend toward flunkeyism and modern dogmatism that demand that the Party unconditionally follow the line of a particular party. Since the 9th Party Congress, ... the Party has never neglected the vigilance necessary to guard against the trend of dogmatism-sectarianism, but has resolutely fought to overcome the recent maneuvers of the 'Choshu Shimbun' group of Fukuda and Harada, Takaji Nishizawa, and other anti-Party elements.
>
> "In this respect, it is necessary to pay special attention to the fact that, in collusion with certain foreign forces, the anti-Party elements in this country are interfering in and disrupting the work of our Party and the democratic movements in Japan."

As set out above, at that time the Party went no further in advocating the struggle against the Mao Zedong faction than to speak against "dogmatism, sectarianism and flunkeyism". This is because the Chinese subversive activities had not been made public at that time. Our Party, while openly counterattacking any public attack, took the attitude of not initiating attacks from our side. This same attitude was taken toward the interference by the CPSU leadership.

The 10th Party Congress approved the decision to expel Takaji Nishizawa and others who had embarked on factional activities within the Party.

> "It is an important duty of our Party as a revolutionary party to thoroughly destroy the subversive activities of these traitorous anti-Party elements. This is also essential as a positive contribution to the genuine unity of the international communist movement." (Report of the Central Committee to the 10th Party Congress)

In this way, the 10th Party Congress, in making clear that "left-wing" opportunism was a great danger to the international communist movement as a whole, stressed the need to develop a "struggle on two fronts" in a correct way. It also emphasized the importance of the autonomous and independent position the Party had held to consistently since the 7th Party Congress; it condemned the big-powerist intervention of certain foreign forces linked with opportunism of both "left" and right wings, as a "most shameful act against the spirit of socialism and proletarian internationalism".

But the Mao Zedong faction, despite the reasonable and moderate attitude of the Japanese Communist Party only increased maneuvers of intervention and attack.

DISTORTION OF MEETING WITH MAO ZEDONG AND OPEN ATTACKS ON JCP

It was in January 1967, the year after the visit to China, that the Japanese Communist Party broke its silence, and made public the process and problems of the meeting with Mao Zedong and the joint communiqué. The Party found it necessary this to do, because China denounced the JCP in a long article on a wall paper entitled the "Chronicle of Sayings and Doings of Deng Xiaoping", done by the "Red Guards of the People's University" in Beijing. It said:

> "In 1966, a delegation of the Japanese Communist Party visited China. Mainly Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping held talks with the delegation and worked out a draft statement. Its tone was very low, and no mention was made of Soviet revisionism. Chairman Mao Zedong sharply criticized it and proposed important amendments, but the revisionist JCP refused to accept them."

To counter this distortion of the facts, the Party published an unattributed article entitled "Refutation of the Unreasonable Charge of the Red Guards" ("Akahata", January 24, 1967), which read, in part: "Now that one of the organizations of 'Red Guards' which Comrade Mao Zedong actively supports, in a wall paper unilaterally made public part of the contents in an extremely distorted form of the meeting which he himself said should be kept off the record,... Our Party has no further obligation to maintain the attitude of silence it has so far observed on this matter". This was the first time for the JCP to speak publicly about the talks between the JCP and the CPC and the story of the conclusion of the joint communiqué. The article then said:

> "It is true that Comrade Mao Zedong made a demand for amendments to the joint communiqué. But his demand was submitted not to the 'draft' of the joint communiqué, but to the official text of the joint communiqué on which the official delegations of both Parties had reached agreement through discussions, when it was ready for publication. It is true that the

joint communiqué was not released to the public after all, but the JCP delegation was not responsible for this. The full responsibility must rest on the side that again brought out the points of disagreement after official agreement had been reached, in an attempt to unilaterally impose them on the other, and abrogated the already agreed joint communiqué, when the attempt to amend it failed.

"When the final agreement was reached on the joint communiqué at the official talks between the two Parties in Beijing, and arrangements had been decided on as to its publication, our Party delegation was, of course, of the opinion that the official opinion of the CPC leadership was embodied in the text, and never thought that the points of disagreement would be rehashed later. In particular, in accordance with the proposal made by the Chinese side that he wanted to meet our delegation on its way home, the schedule of the meeting with Comrade Mao Zedong was arranged before our delegation's visit to Korea. Therefore the very nature of the meeting was not a continuation of the talks between the delegations of the two Parties, nor talks for re-examination of the already agreed official joint communiqué.

"To the great surprise of our delegation, however, at the beginning of the meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong declared his intention to change the joint communiqué, which had been fully confirmed in the official talks between the two Parties, and was already in final form, stating that he 'could not consent to its publication' as formulated, and raised a demand for substantial changes in its contents.

"The demand for alterations raised by Comrade Mao Zedong not only rehashed the

questions on which it had become clear that there were points of disagreement on principle, but also added new points which had not been discussed at all in the talks.

"It goes without saying that, while rejecting this unilateral demand for alteration, our delegation frankly stated the Party's views. As a matter of course, in order to develop genuine friendship between the JCP and CPC as autonomous and equal Parties, our Party delegation could not take any other attitude.

"In reply, Comrade Mao Zedong stated that it was then not necessary to issue a joint communiqué, and that it was a mistake on the part of Chinese side to have proposed issuing a joint communiqué. The meeting was closed when he added, 'Let it be assumed that no meeting took place with me'.

"It is very clear who really shelved the joint communiqué."

ATTACKS ON LIU SHAOQI AND DENG XIAOPING ON THE GROUNDS OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The distortion of the JCP-CPC talks continued unremittingly in various forms.

At the end of 1966, one month before the open attack was made on the Party by the "Red Guards of the People's University", Zhao Anbo, who was also present at the two-Party talks, told Michio Iwamura and other anti-Party blind-followers on a visit to China, "The draft (of the joint communiqué) was drawn up by the Miyamoto delegation. And our side informed them in advance that a final decision would be made by Chairman Mao. In their meeting with Chairman Mao he proposed some amendments, which

Mr. Miyamoto didn't accept. Consequently, the communiqué failed to be issued... If the Miyamoto delegation had been from a Party really opposed to imperialism and revisionism, they would have accepted them".

Being flunkyist, as they were, the anti-Party elements echoed every word of the attacks made on the Party through the wall paper of the "Red Guards of the People's University". On January 27, 1967, acting as a cat's paw of the "Red Guards of the People's University", ten anti-Party elements living in Beijing issued a "statement", said to be a counter-argument to the unattributed article of our Party, "Refutation of the Unreasonable Charge by the Red Guards". Takaji Nishizawa, who had become an anti-Party blind follower, also inserted distortions of the process of the two-Party talks in an article entitled "In Order to Defend the Correct Political Line to the End" carried in their organ magazine, "Study on Mao Zedong Thought", February issue, which, by using the name of Mao Zedong, tried to justify his own anti-working class betrayal of the Party. The "Choshu Shimbun" faction of Yamaguchi Prefecture also published a statement which praised the wall paper of the "Red Guards". The statement was reported by Xinhua News Agency, on January 31.

In February 1971, Vice-Chairman Zhou Enlai, who was head of the Chinese delegation when the joint communiqué was drafted, distorted the facts and made such astonishing remarks as:

> "When they came in 1966, a joint communiqué was to be published; but Chairman Mao rejected it, and we supported his refusal. But Nosaka and others are setting a false rumor afloat. They are using my name, because they can't use the names of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen. But I was at that time having talks with Comrade Le Duan of Vietnam, so I was not concerned with this at all" ("Report of interview with Premier Zhou Enlai" published by Ichizo Kimura and other anti-Party elements).

When Chairman Miyamoto's article, "Last Discussions with Mao Zedong" was published in "Shukan Asahi" in June 1977, the faction of Takaharu Sumioka, anti-Party elements, although they were of a third party which had nothing to do with the talks, carried an article in their newspaper "The Jimmin Shimpo" (dated June 29, July 6, 1977), attacking our Party, entitled "Revisionism Seen through the Last Meeting with Chairman Mao" in which they claimed irresponsibly, "The 'Japan-China Joint Communiqué' is the production of a conspiracy by Miyamoto and Liu Shaoqi", and, "The Chinese side had insisted that they needed the ratification of the Party Chairman at the final stage".

Zhang Xiangshan, Vice-Chairman of the China-Japan Friendship Association, who attended the two-Party talks, told the delegation of the Socialist Party of Japan visiting China in July of the same year, "What we had said in advance was, 'Although our discussions have reached that point, we must go to Shanghai to ask the opinion of Chairman Mao before making a final decision'. But they are talking as if everything had been completed in Beijing".

No doubt such distortions never succeeded. The developments of the facts recorded here provides the evidence of this.

The joint communiqué was not a "draft", but beyond any doubt was an accepted official text. The joint communiqué had been officially printed, and no word was said by the Chinese side about, "we need ratification by Mao Zedong" or "A final decision will be made in Shanghai". Judging from known international practice, where can one find such an action as to make public the conclusion of an "uncompleted" communiqué, and exchange toasts to celebrate it?

It is to be noted that the then-Chinese leadership described the joint communiqué as the production of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others, in collusion with the JCP delegation. They distorted the facts as if Zhou Enlai, the main person concerned, had had nothing to do with it. What they meant is clear. By distortion of the facts they tried to utilize this as a means of attacking Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others, who were the targets of the "Great Cultural Revolution". The JCP, as a matter of course, set out clearly their forgeries of history point by point on the basis of facts and refuted them as far as was deemed necessary.

Among the articles published by the Party dealing explicitly with this question, the following are the main ones: "Against the Mean Anti-Party Statements of J. Ide and J. Yokokawa who have Blindly Followed the 'Red Guards'" ("Akahata", February 9, 1967), "Faith and Fiction of a Blind Follower--How Takaji Nishizawa and Others Distort the Proceedings of the Talks between the JCP and the CPC" ("Akahata", February 14, 1967) and "Distortions in the So-called 'Zhao Anbo Talks'" ("Akahata", May 19, 1967). In these articles, the Japanese CommuCommunist Party made clear to the public the complications of the JCP-CPC talks based on facts, refuting the unjustifiable slanders and abuses which they used to call our Party "revisionist".

INSTIGATION OF "REVOLT" TO SUBVERT JCP LEADERSHIP ON THE PRETEXT, "THERE IS A REASON FOR REBELLION"

But interference and attacks from the Chinese side grew and were intensified as the outrageous "Great Cultural Revolution" recklessly rampaged.

In February 1967, they raided the headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, going so far as to attempt to destroy the democratic movement by direct violence.

Chinese students in Japan living in the Zenrin-Gakusei-Kaikan Hall in Tokyo, where the headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association are located, after the blind-followers broke away from the Japan-China Friendship Association at the end of 1966, hurled abuse at the Japan-China Friendship Association, calling it the "false Japan-China Friendship Association", "anti-China" or "dog's head" and so on; they put up many wall papers saying, "Get out at once, affiliated association of the anti-China Miyamoto group", and so on. For three days from February 28, 1967, they repeated violent attacks on the headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association along with other blind-followers; they tried to force the Association out of the Zenrin-Gakusei-Kaikan Hall by violent weight of numbers, by collective assaults with iron bars and clubs, the illegal confinement of the staff for long hours, and by blockading the headquarters and the front porch of the Hall, and so on.

Under direct instructions from the Mao faction, their attempts to split the democratic movement of Japan became more and more intense, mobilizing various other blind followers. The circumstances made it necessary for the politically-aware democratic forces to defend the independence of the democratic movement in Japan, guarantee the lives and security of members of the secretariat and members of the Association who had been illegally confined, in order to carry on normal business; it became necessary to exercise the right of legitimate self-defense and remove the barricades and defend themselves against the violent attacks.

But "Renmin Ribao", without mentioning anything about the gangsterism of the Chinese students in Japan, called this incident "anti-China gangsterism by the revisionist elements of the JCP", and abused the Party as "counter-revolutionary", "the vanguard of anti-China" and "fascist rioters".

The theory of "Four Enemies", in which they called the JCP the "common enemy" of the peoples of both Japan and China, was also cited in the joint communiqué between the Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade and the visiting delegation from Western Japan to China for the Promotion of Foreign Trade in April 1967. Thereafter, the Chinese leadership went so far as to refuse trade with anyone who would not express readiness to fight against the JCP, calling this a "principle" of friendly trade.

The then Chinese leadership praised such traitors as Takaji Nishizawa and others, who had been expelled from the Party, as "genuine revolutionaries", inviting them to China one after the other to talk on "friendship"; they carried their "articles" and "statements" attacking the JCP in "Renmin Ribao" and other newspapers, giving them every means of support and encouragement in their subversive activities against the Party.

On June 16, 1967, "Renmin Ribao" put out comments on international politics, entitled "This Revolt is Wonderful".

They openly called for a "revolt" to subvert the JCP leadership armed with "Mao Zedong thought", quoting his words, "There is a reason for rebellion". We can find nowhere another example of this; that a communist party in power, in its official newspaper so openly calls for the subversion of the leadership of the Communist Party of another country, leaders who have been officially elected by the Party Congress.

The "Comments" went as follows:

> "The handful of revisionists of the Japanese Communist Party are persisting in the revisionist line of anti-Marxism-Leninism, anti-revolution, anti-people and anti-China, which has caused strong dissatisfaction and opposition of wide-ranging Marxist-Leninists and the revolutionary masses of Japan day by day. Some lower organizations of the Japanese Communist Party are rising up one by one, in active revolt against these revisionists, putting up the flag of revolution armed by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. These revolts are very wonderful and stand to reason.
>
> "Genuine Marxist-Leninists and proletarian revolutionary militants of Japan are revolting boldly, showing the great spirit of revolutionaries, without fear of atrocities, without flinching from difficulties, and protecting truth to the end. They are the hope of the Japanese people and will shoulder the future of Japan. The Marxist-Leninist forces of Japan, depending on the proletariat and wide-ranging masses, will go forward and become powerful without fail, through complicated and varying struggles filled with difficulties, while the revisionists are sure to be thrown into the trash-box of history."

These methods reveal very clearly the character of the "Great Cultural Revolution" launched by Mao Zedong.

The enmity that the CPC leadership hugs to itself against the JCP and the politically-aware democratic forces of Japan went to the extent of instigating direct terrorism. Typical of their attitude was their violence used against the representative of our Party and the correspondent of "Akahata" residing in Beijing.

JCP REPRESENTATIVES SUFFER BRUTAL VIOLENCE-- BEIJING UNDER "GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

Ichiro Sunama, an alternate member of the Presidium (now member-emeritus of the Presidium) was in Beijing as the representative of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, invited by the Central Committee of the CPC, and Jun-ichi Konno, "Akahata" correspondent (now member of the Presidium), was there at the invitation of "Renmin Ribao".

Sunama and his wife took up his new post in August 1965, in compliance with a proposal by the Chinese side in the then existing circumstances, for a JCP representative to stay in Beijing. There were no diplomatic relations between Japan and China at that time. He also took part as a member of the JCP delegation when the talks between the JCP and the CPC were held in March 1966. Up until the talks, the Chinese attitude toward him had been careful and considerate, but after the talks in Shanghai in late March between Miyamoto and Mao Zedong the treatment accorded him became cold and unfriendly, and even turned hostile.

The Sunamas lived at a guesthouse called "Shibasuo" in the western suburbs of Beijing, set aside for leaders of foreign communist parties. Tetsuo Kuniya, Sunama's interpreter and secretary, who was born and raised in China, lived with them. Everywhere they went, guards provided by the Department of Foreign Relations of the CPC Center accompanied them, and when the nationwide storm of the "Great Cultural Revolution" swept over the land with mammoth rallies by the Red Guards in Beijing from August 1966, as though on signal, the Chinese

stopped inviting Sunama to receptions. Although invited to the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, he was not invited as a JCP representative. Hisao Kuroda of the Socialist Party stood with Mao Zedong on the platform of Tiananmen, but Sunama had to sit where ordinary foreign visitors were placed.

From March 1966, the Chinese side increased activities against JCP members living in Beijing, and the following persons engaged in anti-JCP actions one after another: Kinkazu Saionji, who was given special treatment by China as a so-called "private ambassador"; Hiromi Takano and others, working at that time for the Beijing Broadcasting Station; Toshitaka Kawagoe and others working for the Foreign Language Publishing House; Shigezo Suzuki and others, then at Beijing University; students studying in the People's University, Beijing University, Beijing Languages College, and Beijing Physical Education College; and Masatada Isa and others. While on the one hand Sunama and Konno took disciplinary measures against these anti-Party elements, on the other, they took steps, on the instructions of the Party Center, to send Party members struggling against the violence of the anti-Party elements back to Japan before the end of 1966.

After May 1967, only Sunama and Konno were living in Beijing as JCP members.

Mrs. Sunama returned to Japan in late April 1967, and when Sunama returned to Beijing after visiting Pyongyang to attend the May Day celebrations there at the invitation of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kuniya, Sunama's interpreter, had disappeared from Sunama's residence. Unable to communicate with the Chinese, Sunama had to live alone at "Shibasuo".

In August 1966, when relations between the JCP and the CPC were worsened by the unilateral actions of the Chinese side, Konno went to Beijing to take over from Yoshihisa Takano as the "Akahata" correspondent. Within the JCP organization in Beijing, anti-Party elements, later expelled from the Party, had already begun Party subversion activities. As the "Great Cultural Revolution" deepened, their anti-Party activities escalated, with slanders of the JCP Center as revisionist, and they even used violence on comrades who persisting in the Party line. Because these moves were especially evident among students, Sunama instructed Konno to take steps to counter their errors.

With the help of "Renmin Ribao", Konno took up residence in "Beijing Fandian", a first-class hotel in Beijing. But one month after he went to Beijing, on the night of September 19, he was victim of a surprise attack by four Japanese anti-Party students, including Manabu Kikunami, while working in his room on the fifth floor of the hotel. Kikunami and others punched and kicked him for more than two hours, shouting "To acknowledge Mao Zedong thought or not is the touchstone by which to test whether you are a revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary", "A revolution is violence", "Kill revisionists", and so on. His right eye was infused with blood, with general bruises and a deep laceration on his right leg. While this was going on, Zhao Anbo, Chinese, and Hiromi Takano, an anti-Party element, were waiting on call in the ground-floor lobby in the same hotel. The four of them went back on Takano's car, revealing clearly that the violence was done with consent of the Chinese side. Konno demanded "Renmin Ribao" to take measures against these violence perpetrators. But all that was done was to send a doctor to treat his wound, and he was instructed to change his residence from "Beijing Fandian", which was used chiefly by foreigners, to "Heping Binguan", mainly for Chinese.

A reception was held at the People's Congress

Hall on October 3 to mark the third anniversary of the founding of the China-Japan Friendship Association, to which Japanese (including reporters of commercial newspapers) living in Beijing were invited; but Sunama and Konno were not invited. Before the reception ended, Liao Chengzhi proposed a "toast to kick out those who were undermining friendship between Japan and China". In the bus carrying people back to "Youyi Binguan", where many Japanese in Beijing were living, comrades who persisted in the Party line were subjected to violence by the group of anti-Party elements, including Koji Takahira, who said "We are told to kick you".

This was the situation in which the JCP Center instructed JCP members living in China to return to Japan.

The Chinese side not only tried to force JCP members in China to become anti-Party elements; they also invited nine JCP members then living in Berlin, including Yukio Kanazawa, to Beijing, just before the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, without advising or getting approval from the JCP. Without notice, these nine people, who wore "people's uniforms", on September 28 came to "Shibasuo", where Sunama was then living, and left, crying out, "The JCP is revisionist; we resolutely fight against it". Nobody could have had access to "Shibasuo" without permission of the CPC Center, and of course the JCP members who had been living in Berlin, could not have obtained any information about Sunama's residence in Beijing.

The mammoth rallies of the Red Guards at Tiananmen continued from August until the eighth rally on November 25, to treat Red Guards flooding into Beijing from all over China. A close-up picture on a TV program showed Takaji Nishizawa, who had been expelled from the Party, had been invited to the last rally and appeared on the platform of

Tiananmen, shaking hands with Mao Zedong.

The "Great Cultural Revolution" took on more and more of the character of a struggle for power, and toward the end of 1966, wall papers criticizing Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping appeared. In 1967, it developed into a struggle to take over power in the organizations and machinery of the Party and Government throughout the country. It then developed into a nationwide armed struggle involving not only Red Guards but workers and soldiers, in which "rebel groups" fought a bloody struggle, cuasing many casualties, dead and wounded.

As a correspondent, Konno covered the expansion of the stormy "Great Cultural Revolution" and cabled his reports (to Tokyo). But "Akahata" dealt with the struggle very carefully, regarding it as an internal affair of China, and made neither a positive nor negative appraisal. But the criticisms of anti-Party blind followers were severe, and resolute measures were taken against them in accordance with the Party line of independence and self-reliance, and the Constitution of the Party.

At the same time, as I have said, the JCP made a timely and reasonable refutation based on facts; for example, a wall paper of the "People's University Red Guards" appeared in Beijing on January 22, attacking the JCP with distortion of the facts about the talks between the JCP and the CPC. On February 13, "Hongqi", a mini-paper of the "Beijing Aviation College Red Flag Fighting Unit", carried an article entitled "Kenji Miyamoto at the height of folly", which said, "Stretching our fist as far as Tokyo, we will give you a hard-dealt blow on your dog head"; and "Someday, we, together with real revolutionaries within the JCP, will parade you in the daytime, with a big nameplate reading, 'a counter-revolutionary revisionist' hanging from your shoulder, and with a high tricorn hat on your head". (Many CPC members were made victims of such a "parade" in the "Great Cultural Revolution".) In an article, "On shameless attacks by 'Red Guards' on our Party", "Akahata" on February 17, 1967 said sternly that "such old-time outlaw acts" "are nothing less than counter-revolutionary fascist acts having nothing to do with a revolutionary movement"; and that these Red Guards "are subversives of the international communist movement" and "counter-revolutionary obstructors to the revolutionary movement in Japan".

Sunama or Konno had no way of knowing that they would become victims six months later of this anachronistic fascist-like "parade" in mass-terrorism against them.

After February 25, a paper that said "Get out, Sunama" was put on the wall of Sunama's house in "Shibasuo"; big-letter wall-papers saying "Down with Kenji Miyamoto", "Defeat JCP revisionists", etc. appeared on the wall of Dengan market in Wangfujing, the market place of Beijing, and screens, "Down with JCP revisionists" were put up on the bodies of buses. The situation became more serious everyday.

Without an interpreter, Sunama had been placed under semi-confinment in "Shibasuo" from May. Anti-Party elements came there to shout slogans and put up wall-papers. His sole contact was Konno, who came there by taxi for communication and report.

On July 7, 1967, "Akahata" carried an article "Call of History for Genuine Japan-China Solidarity". It marked the 30th anniversary of the July-Seventh Lugouqiao Incident. Looking back over the prewar Japanese imperialist aggression in China and the postwar policies of Japanese reactionary circles against China, and the solidarity between the Japanese and Chinese peoples, especially the Communist Parties of the two countries and the struggle of the Japanese Communist Party, the article drew true lessons for solidarity between

Japan and China and set this out in clear perspective.

On that day, Sunama and Konno went to the Lugouqiao Bridge in the suburbs of Beijing, the starting place for Japan's predatory imperialist military actions 30 years earlier, aimed at the conquest of the whole of China. There the two men vowed that they would work in the same spirit as the article emphasized--though neither had received by then a copy of the article--and that on July 15, one week later, they would celebrate the anniversary of the founding of the JCP, with Konno visiting "Shibasuo". But when Konno visited "Shibasuo" on July 15, Chinese soldiers guarding the gate, and the "Shibasuo" manager, refused to allow Konno to enter, saying "You are forbidden to call on Sunama again". In this way they determined to break contact between the two remaining JCP representatives in China.

It was after this incident that the JCP Center instructed them to "come back to Japan by way of Korea". On receiving this instruction, Sunama submitted a written document to the Foreign Relations Department of the CPC Central Committee, stating that, on instructions from the JCP Center, he would return home. Konno took the same steps with "Renmin Ribao", and they made preparations to return to Japan, and went to the Foreign Ministry to take the necessary procedures. But the Chinese Foreign Ministry refused them visas, saying "Come again tomorrow", "We are not yet authorized", etc. So they had to visit the Foreign Ministry almost everyday.

Around July 22, leaflets reading, "Anti-Chinese element and Kurohata (black flag) correspondent, Jun-ichi Konno, get out at once", were distributed in Wangfujing. Wall-papers calling for their expulsion were found all over the walls of "Shibasuo" and "Heping Binguan". Although told to "get out", still no visas were issued to them.

On July 31, Sunama was called by the Foreign Relations Department of the CPC Center, and Konno by "Renmin Ribao". They both received a notice from the Chinese side saying, "The leading group of the Japanese Communist Party have become revisionist. You must leave Beijing by noon of August 3. Until you leave China, you will be under the control of CPC authorities".

On August 3, if they were to leave for Korea, they had the choice of going by plane or train. Because of the bad weather, they took steps to keep the choice open, but visas issued by the Chinese side restricted them to use only a "plane scheduled to leave Beijing Airport at 1:50 p.m. on August 3".

PERSECUTION OF SUNAMA AND KONNO

For transportation to the head office of Chinese Civil Aviation, Sunama's and Konno's books and other heavy goods were brought to "Heping Binguan" on August 2, and they waited for a truck. When it came in the afternoon they carried their heavy luggage down from Konno's room on the third floor and loaded them on the truck, with no help offered by the workers of the hotel or Sunama's guards. The job of unloading their luggage at the Chinese Civil Aviation Head-office and taking them inside also had to be done by Sunama and Konno alone. After reading out "Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong", Civil Aviation customs officials ordered the two Japanese to open all their luggage and spread everything on the floor, and then began to examine every book page by page.

The examination by the customs officials continued until night. Around that time a worker of "Renmin Ribao" came at last to the Chinese Civil

Aviation Office to contact Konno. They would need a car for the following day, which, if not sent by "Renmin Ribao", they would have to get a taxi for themselves. The "Renmin Ribao" reply was that a car would be sent to "Heping Binguan" by 11:50 a.m. on August 3. Konno had some Chinese money; it was agreed that the balance would be returned to "Renmin Ribao" after he had finished paying all his bills. It was also arranged that the following day Sunama would leave "Shibasuo" and come to "Heping Binguan" in time for the "Renmin Ribao" car, to go to the airport.

It was learned afterwards that a "Rally to Defeat the JCP Miyamoto Revisionist Group" had been held by Japanese and Chinese Red Guards in Beijing on the evening of July 28. Together with the "Haguruma-za (anti-Party small theatrical company of blind followers of China in Yamaguchi Prefecture) mission to China", the "Beijing Aviation College Red Flag Fighting Unit", the "Chinese People's University Three Reds", the "Foreign Affairs College Revolutionary Rebels", the "Beijing Foreign Languages College Red Flag Battalion", and others had adopted a resolution, "Chinese and Japanese Red Guards rise in unison and declare war against the JCP Miyamoto revisionist group". The "declaration of war" was made by the "Chinese and Japanese Red Guards". Preparations were made for organized and systematic mass terrorism.

This was the preparation for the August 3-4 two days of organized and systematic mass terrorism by thousands of Japanese and anti-Party blind followers of China, and Chinese Red Guards, at Beijing Airport.

August 3

In the morning, Konno was packing his luggage to carry it to the airport, and called Sunama to confirm what time they would meet. But at 10:00 a.m., knocking on the door, five or six Japanese rushed into Konno's room, shouting "Konno, get out of the room". They grabbed Konno, who was dressed only in his undershirt, knee pants and slippers, and pushed him out of his room on the third floor and took him to the dining room near the entrance on the ground floor. Hotel workers in the corridors and dining room just stood looking at Konno, some with a contemptuous half-smile, and others looking threatening. Bringing his shoes, clothes, and luggage from his room, these gangsters got him ready, pushed him into a mini-bus which they had placed outside the hotel, and started.

When Konno got off the bus in front of Beijing Airport, he found some 100 Japanese anti-Party elements waiting there for him. All the anti-Party blind China-followers living in Beijing, old and young, men and women, had been mobilized. Behind them, to the left of the entrance, were a group of Chinese Red Guards. Over their heads were flags of Red Guard groups, including "Beijing Aviation Red Flag" and "People's University Three Reds". These were the main forces of Red Guards that did whatever they liked in Beijing.

As Konno got off the bus, the violent Japanese elements crowded around him, twisted his arms, pushed him into a room in the office building on the left, and confined him there. They then waited for Sunama to arrive, but finding the time getting near, they pulled Konno out of the room saying, "Konno, you have much luggage; you should clear customs examination first".

Konno went to the front entrance, surrounded by a large number of Chinese Red Guards crowded in fan shape facing the entrance. He had to go and come many times until he finished carrying his luggage piled up before the entrance on the counter of the customs house placed on the left inside the entrance. Slogan-covered posters were all over the airport; on the concrete of the airport square, in porches, on buildings, and on the steps.

Before his luggage was examined by the customs officials, who kept stiff faces before the anti-Party elements surrounding Konno, the Red Guards behind them, shouted, "Let us study the supreme instruction of Chairman Mao"; so quotations from Chairman Mao were read out in chorus in Japanese and Chinese. While the examination of Konno's luggage was going on, someone shouted, "He (Sunama) comes at last!"

That day, sixty-four-year-old Sunama left "Shibasuo" just after 11:00 a.m. by a car sent by the CPC Center, after having loaded his own luggage into the car, while twenty or thirty workers of "Shibasuo" shouted slogans and watched him. As he passed through the gate, 15 or 16 anti-Party elements waiting for him surrounded the car, shouting "Sunama, get out of the car. You cannot go back to Japan safely". They unlocked and opened the car doors, with a hand put through the window, and four of them got into the car. Sunama's car was then "escorted" by these gangsters' cars before and behind. All the way to the airport, Sunama was poked with a fan, spat at, pulled by his hair, and insulted by these anti-Party elements.

On arrival at the airport, a crowd waiting for him dragged him out of the car, pulling him about by his arms, and grabbing him by his necktie. They dragged him up the stone steps at the entrance, using violence on him, striking and kicking him, and took him to the customs counter.

Mobs around the customs counter had already reached the height of excitement.

Anti-Party elements unpacked Sunama's luggage without permission, scattering things about, while Konno's head was pulled down by his hair. Before the customs examination was finished, these violent

elements cried, "Stop. We haven't enough time". Forced into "jet lane style" (arms twisted by two men, his head forced to stick out with his hairs grapped), Sunama and Konno were dragged about the ground-floor hall again and again, struck, kicked, spat at, and trampled on, being unable to move. If they fell down, they were pulled up by their hair, and struck again. When at last they were taken by the stairs to the first floor, Sunama was too exhausted to walk up. So he was dragged up the stairs by his hands by these violent gangsters.

Usually chairs are set in rows on the first floor for passengers, but on that day they had been completely removed. A big paper screen had been hung from the ceiling, saying, "Sunama and Konno, get out of China. The anti-imperialist, anti-revisionist united actions committee of Japanese living in Beijing". All had been made ready for a "Rally for Struggle" against the two men. The big hall was crowded with people, and the central part of the hall had been set with two microphones. A movie camera was in place for a Chinese cameraman to record the scene, and then the rally began.

Sunama and Konno were forced to stand among the violent elements; heavy placards reading "There will be no promise of a good fate for anti-Chinese elements" were hung from the shoulders of each. They were forced to lower their heads, and floodlights were focused on them. Jun-ichiro Ide, who had fled from Hanoi to Beijing when the war in Vietnam was intensifying and had joined the anti-Party group, presided over the rally; anti-Party elements living in Beijing took the floor one after another to denounce Sunama and Konno. After some people had made speeches in a "Chairman Mao said..." manner, Kuniya (interpreter for Sunama) who had fled from the residence of Sunama, took the floor, and talked about "crimes committed by Konno". A Chinese Red Guard standing on the left side of the hall read out an "expulsion declaration" against both Sunama and Konno.

On that day, the airport had been placed under the complete command of violent elements until the rally ended, and the hall on the first floor was closed to other people. No planes seemed to arrive or leave. Everything revealed that this "Rally for Struggle" was an event planned and organized under the "control of the CPC Center", in which even the mobilized Red Guards, airport officials and workers, and customs officials cried "Japanese revisionists must be defeated".

Putting a portable microphone at Sunama's mouth, and shouting "Speak, speak, Sunama. Have you lost your voice?" "Konno, you are arrogant and haughty", the "rally" proceeded in this contemptuous way. J. Ide who presided over the rally, suddenly cried, "It is decided the plane will not fly today because of bad weather. A gift from Heaven. Let us go on with the rally". This kind of kangaroo court went on for over two hours.

The sweat dripped from the clothes of the two men, and spread on the floor like sprinkled water, and the rally, the "jet plane style" parade was repeated.

August 4

On the night of August 3, Sunama and Konno were taken separately to rooms in a rest house, and watched by guards. The rest house was on the left, facing the front of the airport, about 300 meters away. Among the two, Konno was subjected to threats and torture by anti-Party blind followers of China all night. They forcibly searched him and pulled out his mini-memo-note, address book, and his Chinese yuan, which was to have been returned to "Renmin Ribao". They said accusingly, "You are taking out Chinese yuan illegally". When they found a list of anti-Party elements kept in Konno's innermost pocket, they cried, "What is this?" No sooner had Konno declared, "I noted them down so that I could report your anti-Party acts to the Party Center", than they jumped on him all together.

"A revolution is violence. If we don't kill you, you will kill us. This is the instruction of Chairman Mao". Saying this, they hit Konno in the pit of his stomach, and making him sit down, stamped on his thighs. When he bent down to the floor, they gripped his throat, the tortures going on till dawn.

On the morning of August 4, the two men were hauled upstairs in the rest house. A Chinese customs official was waiting there. Saying that Konno had had some Chinese yuan the night before, the customs official made a false charge that he had attempted to smuggle it out. "You had it (Chinese yuan) besides the goods I examined yesterday". When Konno made a protest, saying "I was subjected to violence yesterday before the customs examination finished, an unlawful and unreasonable matter. The cash was not returned to 'Renmin Ribao' because I was not able to meet the man from the paper", anti-Party elements surrounding him cried out, "Do you blame it on us?" Then, as if they were customs officials, they confiscated Sunama's diary and list of Party members they found in his bag, saying "These are anti-China documents".

When Sunama protested, violent elements cried out, urging the customs officials, "All right, you have no time now", and with this cry as a signal, they lunged at the two. Konno was tripped on the steps and thrown down to the ground floor, where he was gripped by the throat, trampled on and kicked.

Outside the rest house, some 100 Japanese blind followers of China were waiting for the two men. Looking about, the two men saw a large crowd of Chinese Red Guards who had gathered behind the Japanese, all the way from the rest house to the entrance of the airport and beyond. The number of mobilized Red Guards was far greater than the day before.

Shortly the two men were marched in "jet plane style" between the lines of Red Guards shouting "Strike them, strike them". Crying "Down with Sunama", "Down with Konno", "Down with Japanese revisionists", etc., the massed Red Guards kicked them, and struck them on their sides.

The mass of people stretched from the rest house to the airport square, the airport entrance, the ground floor, the stairs, the first-floor big hall, where people had crowded in zig-zag lines, to the backstairs, and to the ropes at the entrance to the airfield.

The terrorist violence was so fierce that Sunama said afterwards, "Several tens or several hundreds of fists in a minute struck at me". Many times the two fell to the ground, were tripped, and gripped by the throat. "Kill them, kill them", some people cried out, but others said, "To kill them is not good. Do it thoroughly, but don't kill them". When they came to the entrance to the airfield, extending at the rear of the airport, both were too exhausted to walk; they were forced to get down on all fours, and held by the throat. The gangsters shouted, "Don't let them get on the plane yet. Now, a vortex march!" Dragging the two men in a gyration march, they put the two men through the finale of their cruel terrorism.

People from CPC related bodies were present all through the two days of torture. On the night of August 3, amid the violence in the rest house, Konno heard an anti-Party element saying on the telephone, "Beijing Fandian, room-number...", "Zhao Anbo", etc.

This kind of mass-terrorism committed against Sunama and Konno had never happened before in the history of the international communist movement. It was reported afterwards that a member of the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing and a correspondent of "Nhan Dan" had come to the airport to see the two Japanese off, and saw the terrorism against them from nearby, with tears in their eyes.

When Sunama and Konno arrived at last at the plane of Korean Civil Aviation waiting on the runway, they were more dead than alive. Nevertheless, some anti-Party elements ran after them on to the airfield and kicked at Sunama again, though ordinarily visitors are not allowed there. A Chinese woman ticket inspector standing by the ramp ordered the two to show their tickets, and when they tried to go up the ramp with groggy steps, she shouted, "Don't go up yet!" and glared at them.

But when they entered the plane, the Korean Civil Aviation staff let them sink down on broad sofas placed on the right of the center of the plane, and wiped off the sweat with moistened towels. They were thoroughly exhausted, and even found it difficult to breathe.

There were several Japanese passengers in the plane, employees of Japanese trading companies with business relations with China and Korea (such trading companies were then called "friendly trading companies"). From their window seats, they must have observed the last scenes of terrorism against the two, and now, inside the Korean plane, they saw the two being treated kindly by the stewardesses of Korean Civil Aviation. But they tried to ignore the two men until the plane arrived at Pyongyang. These "friendly trading company employees" seemed to have no mind to ask about the injuries of the two or to speak any words of comfort to them.

Some time after the plane took off, Konno felt nausea and went to lavatory, and a member of the Korean crew came to him and warmly clasped his hands to convey his feelings.

Sunama and Konno were too hoarse to speak, so they carried on a conversation by notes. "My head buzzes" said Sunama, complaining of a headache.

Both had received many bangs on their heads, and the stewardesses cooled Sunama's head many times with cold compresses.

To inform the Akahata head office of the collective terrorism against them, Konno soon began to write a news report. His first report on the mass terrorism, as well as on the kind care given by the Koreans on arrival at Pyongyang, was cabled by the "Akahata" correspondent in Pyongyang, Takasugi. It said:

> "Pyongyang, August 4, from Correspondent Jun-ichi Konno--Ichiro Sunama, alternate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, and Jun-ichi Konno, 'Akahata' correspondent, on August 4 left China and arrived in Korea. In spite of the attempt to prevent their return to Japan for many days, and in spite of the occupation of Beijing Airport by several thousand fanatical rioters of ultra-leftist opportunism and Trotskyism, supported by the authorities, who inflicted on them shameless terrorist violence for two days, worse than the tortures of Tennoism or the barbarism of the Nazis, and physically abused them, they failed to crush the revolutionary will of our two Japanese Communist Party members. Sunama and Konno are now staying in Pyongyang to recuperate. Their morale is perfect." ("Akahata", August 6)

Subsequent reports from Pyongyang gave the full details of the mass terrorism.

The Korean side said later that on August 3, the Chinese had informed them that the weather would become too bad for the Korean plane to fly, but the Koreans could find no sign that the weather would become bad. This indicates that the terrorism at the airport had been planned and organized.

While the two were on the plane, their health conditions were reported in detail from the plane to Pyongyang, and on arrival at Pyongyang Airport, Korean doctors and nurses, as well as officials of the Workers' Party of Korea and "Akahata" correspondent Takasugi, all of whom had been waiting for the arrival of the two men, rushed to the plane, and the two men were carried by the arms of Koreans to a government hospital at once.

At the hospital, they were quickly examined and placed under treatment. Their bodies were bruised all over, and they underwent X-ray and other internal examinations. One of Sunama's front teeth was broken, and one of his right molars had been split, and a one-centimeter piece of the broken tooth was embedded in the gum. Bruised all over, he suffered much pain just lying in bed. Konno had great pain also, his sixth, ninth, and eleventh right ribs being broken, and the doctors decided that his heavy injuries would take one month to heal completely. As the liver and other important organs lie behind the ribs, his injuries could have proved fatal.

On August 5, the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party issued a statement, "On mass terrorism at Beijing Airport against Comrades Sunama and Konno".

The statement said, "ultra-leftist opportunists and big powerists in the Communist Party of China violated both the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism", and "have shown themselves to have taken the shameful road of obstruction and subversion of international communist movement". It said too, "they resorted to shameless abuses, slanders, terrorism and violence in reply to just arguments advanced by the JCP, is clear evidence of the low level of their theoretical and ideological understanding and effectiveness". The determination to defeat these shameless attacks on the JCP was made clear.

Immediately after these happenings, "Renmin Ribao" on August 6 carried a commentator's article entitled "Betrayal by Miyamoto Revisionist Group", which charged that Sunama and Konno had engaged in "anti-Chinese activities", and that the two men's return to Japan was "another anti-Chinese deliberate attempt made in strict response to the call of U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the reactionary Sato Government". Any Japanese reading the article at that time would no doubt burst into laughter at the absurd charge.

Without evidence, the paper slanderously said, "Miyamoto and Nosaka have taken the lead in delivering anti-Chinese speeches, slandering and attacking Chairman Mao, 'Mao Zedong thought', and the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' of China". In trying to encourage the "rebellion" by anti-Party elements, it said, "revolutionary forces in Japan, who believe in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, have risen up in a full-scale rebellion against the Miyamoto group. Their strength is rapidly developing and increasing. The Japanese people place their great hopes on these forces".

FRIENDLY TREATMENT BY WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA

In the face of the mass terrorism used against the JCP representatives by the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong, an event unprecedented in the history of international relations, the JCP published a lengthy "Akahata" editorial on August 21 entitled "Resolute Reply to Disruptors--Smash the Party-subverting activities of the ultra-leftist, opportunist Mao Zedong clique, and its submissive anti-Party traitorous elements".

The editorial took it very seriously that the Chinese leadership had made an open call for the "overthrow" of the JCP, that it listed the JCP as one of the "four enemies", along with "U.S. imperialism, Japanese reactionaries, and Soviet revisionism", and that it joined hands openly with the Trotskyites, professional counter-revolutionary violent groups. The editorial said severely that they "had gone so far as to make a shameless and wicked attack by every possible means".

The editorial went on, "As the modern revisionist line and action of N.S. Khrushchev and the Shiga clique has come to an ignoble end, it is certain that the ultra-left opportunist line and activities of the Mao Zedong clique and its blind followers, who have completely abandoned Marxism-Leninism, will also fail". Expressing the conviction, it said, "Whatever complicated zig-zag course it may take in the future, the present current of ultra-leftist opportunism and big-powerism will eventually be overcome in the victory of Marxism-Leninism".

The Korean party were very kind in their inquiries and treatment.

Just before ten o'clock on the night of August 4, when the two arrived, Kim Il, then member of the Standing Political Bureau and Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and First Vice-Premier (Party and Government posts mentioned below were those in effect at that time--tr.), and Pak Yong Kuk, WPK Secretary, visited the two in the hospital; at about 8:30 a.m. on August 5, Pak Sun Chul, member of WPK Political Bureau, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, and then Suk San, WPK Secretary, and Minister of Social Security, and Kim Yung Ju, WPK Secretary, visited them; on August 6, Secretary Pak Yong Kuk and Kim Yu Jong, Vice-Department-Chief, came to the hospital. All extended heartfelt sympathy to the two.

This careful treatment and care by the Koreans was given at the direction of General Secretary Kim Il Sung.

After about three weeks of medical treatment and care in the government hospital, they went to recuperate at a guesthouse with a beautiful view, set on a hill beside the Taedong River in an eastern suburb of Pyongyang. A doctor and a nurse accompanied them. A massager who had returned from Japan treated them regularly. Morning and evening they were able to walk in the broad garden where soldiers of the Korean People's Army stood on guard at the gate, and recovered their health.

In late August, while they were there, Pyongyang and its neighboring districts along the Taedong River had unprecedentedly heavy rain. Three Japanese prefectures, Niigata, Yamagata and Fukushima also suffered seriously from this heavy rain. It rained for three days in Pyongyang and the surrounding districts, and the water level of the Taedong River rose so high that a park being constructed by university students during their summer vacation on a tiny island in the river, with a bank around it, was quickly flooded. Houses and animals even floated down from upstream of the river. They were told that General Secretary Kim Il Sung took the initiative in the campaign for flood relief and rehabilitation. Taking out one of those precious days, General Secretary Kim Il Sung visited the guesthouse on September 6 to reassure them. "Local inspection tours and the flood relief campaign have prevented me from visiting you", he said in his frank conversation. He spent three hours there, including lunch. Immediately before they went back to Japan, they again met General Secretary Kim Il Sung where he worked in the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. General Secretary Kim Il Sung sent his best regards to General Secretary Miyamoto and other JCP leaders with them.

In September, a Japan-Korea people's friendship mission led by JCP Diet member Hyakuro Hayashi and Socialist Diet member Togo Yoneda visited Korea by sea. Sunama and Konno, having recovered their health after about 50 days of medical care in Korea, on September 22 joined the people's mission, and then left from Heungnam Port in East Korea for home by the Shoto-maru, a 1,600-ton cargo ship.

At Pyongyang station, Pak Sung Chul, member of the WPK Political Bureau, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, and other WPK leaders, gave a warm send off to the two comrades, and at Heungnam Port, Kim Yung Ju, Vice-Chief of the WPK Department and Foreign Vice-Minister, along with local Party leaders, saw them off.

MANY RALLIES HELD TO WELCOME SUNAMA AND KONNO

After three days on the sea trip, the Shoto-maru arrived at Osaka on September 25 via the Inland Sea of Japan.

To welcome the two returnees, Chairman Sanzo Nosaka and Presidium member Tomio Nishizawa from the JCP Central Committee, and the acting Chairman of the local Osaka Prefectural Committee Hiromu Murakami, and about 2,000 other people gathered at the open ground before the central pier; waving banners read, "Long live independent and autonomous Japanese Communist Party!", "We resolutely denounce the opportunist Mao Zedong clique for their violence", and so on, and a welcome rally was held on the spot.

On the evening of the next day, September 26, a "Grand Welcome Rally" was held at the Central Public Hall at Nakanoshima, Osaka City, crowded with some 3,500 people, including representatives from the JCP organizations of six western Japan prefectures, and

Aichi Prefecture, with democratic organizations and JCP supporters. Recalling that he had fought shoulder to shoulder with Mao Zedong and others in Yanan against the barbarous aggression of Japanese militarism committed against China, Chairman Nosaka severely denounced the Mao Zedong clique for its present errors of ultra-leftist opportunism and big-powerism; he appealed to the participants to build a strong and great JCP of several hundred thousand members, thereby to resolutely defeat the attack launched by the Mao Zedong clique.

The two comrades arrived back in Tokyo on the afternoon of September 27. Some 700 people, including General Secretary Miyamoto and other Party leaders, JCP Diet members, and Party representatives from Tokyo and Saitama Prefectures, assembled at the station to welcome the two. At Party headquarters, a welcome meeting was also held, co-sponsored by the JCP Central Committee and the JCP Tokyo Prefectural Committee.

On the safe return of Sunama and Konno to Japan, the JCP Central Committee that same day sent a cable of cordial and sincere thanks to the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.

As soon as they learned about Beijing Airport incidents of August 3 and 4, all levels of Party organizations and Party branches adopted a succession of resolutions denouncing the anti-JCP violence of the Mao Zedong clique committed because of its big-powerist interference and ultra-leftist opportunism. Indignation swept through the whole Party and all democratic organizations. In face of this further big-powerist interference following that by N.S. Khrushchev, all Party organizations resolved to consolidate their unity in the struggle against the Mao Zedong clique.

On the evening of October 3, a "Grand Welcome Rally for Comrades Sunama and Konno" was held in the Tokyo Taito Gymnasium, sponsored by the Party

Central Committee, Tokyo Prefectural Committee, and committees of other East-Japan prefectures, plus Shizuoka Prefecture, in which some 7,000 people participated, made up of Party members, Party supporters, and people belonging to democratic organizations. After a welcome speech by Chairman Nosaka, a report on the collective terrorism at Beijing Airport was given with full details by Sunama and Konno; they also reported on what they had seen and heard in Beijing about the "Great Cultural Revolution" led by Mao Zedong, emphasizing how correct was the JCP line and how proud they were of it.

ARTICLE PUBLISHED: "MAO ZEDONG LINE TODAY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT"

About one week later, on October 10, the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party published an article in "Akahata", entitled, "Mao Zedong Line Today and the International Communist Movement", based on discussions and unanimous agreement at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee. This six-page "Akahata" article analyzed in detail and systematically criticized the Mao Zedong line and "Mao Zedong thought" under the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution".

Published subsequent to the "Akahata" editorial of August 21, 1967, "Resolute Reply to the Disruptors", the article was a comprehensive counter to the big-powerist interference by the Communist Party of China, and made a full analysis in particular of the errors in principle in the thought and line which lay behind it. This was necessary for the JCP in defense of its survival, as well as the

independence of the revolutionary and democratic movements in Japan.

On the nature of the "Great Cultural Revolution", the article said:

> "The main objective of the overthrow of the so-called 'power-circles' is not a struggle to safeguard the cause of socialism from the anti-Party counter-revolutionary elements who attempt to revive capitalism, but to eliminate the forces which do not unconditionally align themselves with the deification of Mao Zedong and the words of the Mao Zedong faction, and those who for some reason or other, refuse to give obsequious praise to the Mao Zedong faction; they are regarded as class enemies and bourgeois counter-revolutionary elements, so that the unrestricted despotism of the Mao Zedong faction can be established."

The article made a deep theoretical analysis to show that the "Great Cultural Revolution" had nothing in common with the principles of scientific socialism, but was associated with ultra-left opportunism, Party liquidationism, and big-powerism; it also made it clear that the "Mao Zedong thought" of today was nothing more than big-powerism, playing a disruptive role of splittism and subversion in the international communist movement. It denounced the Mao Zedong group for attacking and interfering in the Japanese Communist Party, using the slogan "There is a reason for rebellion". This was "Party liquidationism and anarchism", the article said.

Foretelling the eventual failure of the Mao Zedong faction's maneuvers, the article said that even if the Mao Zedong faction "is able temporarily to exercise a superficial leadership in the country, it simply represents one phase of the zigzags in the history of communist movement". Now, a little more than ten years later, events have proved that our Party's analysis and judgment were correctly foresighted.

When the JCP published the series of articles and commetaries presenting a calm and factual criticism of the interference by the Chinese leadership, there was no reasonable refutation forthcoming, only demagoguery on their part.

For example, when Zhou Enlai met Hisao Ishino from the Socialist Party of Japan in January, 1968, he took up the murder on October 12, 1960, of Socialist Chairman Inejiro Asanuma, who was stabbed to death. Zhou Enlai said, "Today, JCP revisionists have betrayed the Japanese people. They are inferior to your Asanuma. It was not Nosaka but Asanuma who was stabbed, although both were on the same platform. This is not without reason. Japanese reactionaries are well aware that not only Miyamoto but Nosaka has betrayed the Japanese people" ("Sekai" *[The World]*, March, 1968). The rally when Asanuma was stabbed was held by the Liberal-Democratic, Socialist, and Democratic-Socialist Parties, with the Japanese Communist Party excluded, and the heads of these three Parties made speeches there. So Chairman Nosaka, of course, was not on "the same platform", and it can be added that the man who stabbed Chairman Asanuma confessed that he was also planning to kill Chairman Nosaka.

When Zhou Enlai met a mission to China led by Socialist Kozo Sasaki in August 1970, he added a new note of demagogy by saying, "Nosaka has been afraid of the United States since he was sent back to Tokyo by a U.S. plane". But it is very well known that Chairman Nosaka arrived at Hakata port from Pusan on board an evacuation boat in January 1946.

CHINESE LEADERSHIP ATTEMPTS TO FORCE LINE OF ARMED STRUGGLE ON JAPAN

It was a fixed aim of the Chinese leadership to set up in Japan a party of those who would blindly follow the Mao group in every way, and to overthrow the Japanese Communist Party.

"Renmin Ribao", on September 18, 1968, carried an editorial entitled "Compass for the Victory of the Revolutionary People of All Countries": it called the JCP "shameless traitors to Marxism-Leninism", and appealed to anti-Party blind followers to gather and form a "genuine revolutionary party". The editorial said:

> "The Miyamoto revisionist renegade group in the Japanese Communist Party uses the pretext of different 'internal and external conditions' in Japan to advertise its so-called 'independence and self-reliance'. This is complete nonsense.
>
> "Today, the revolutionary struggle of the Japanese people is going forward with verve and vigor. The revolutionary consciousness of the Japanese people is rising all the time, and the ranks of the genuine Marxist-Leninist Left are growing and gathering strength with each passing day. In rallying against the Miyamoto revisionist group in a big way, Japan's proletarian revolutionaries and the great mass of revolutionary people wield the powerful weapon of genuine Marxism-Leninism in their fight against U.S. imperialism, Japan's monopoly capitalist class and modern revisionism.
>
> "It is our firm conviction that a truly revolutionary Japanese party armed with Marxism-Leninism is sure to come into being in

> the flames of the revolutionary struggle. After going through a protracted and tortuous struggle and overcoming all difficulties and perils, this Party will lead the Japanese proletariat and broad masses of the people to final victory in the revolution."

The aim of the Chinese leadership was both to overthrow the JCP and to force an armed struggle line on Japan. It condemned the JCP Program for attaching importance to the struggle in the Diet, calling it a "parliamentary cretin", and ridiculed the elections by calling them "farces".

> "A thing worthy of note in the recent election was the extreme glorification of the bourgeois parliamentary election system by old and new followers of Soviet modern revisionism. These parliamentary cretins shouted everywhere in their speeches that 'the fate of Japan hinges on the result of the election'." (Commentary of Xinhua News Agency on the House of Representative election; February 2, 1967)
>
> "The curtain has fallen on the farce of the 'election' for the House of Councilors of the Japanese Diet, held once every three years... The Miyamoto group did everything it could to make itself useful to the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries through the capitalist-controlled radio and television." ("Renmin Ribao", July 14, 1968)

Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership praised the violence and provocations by the pseudo-leftist violent groups--Haneda Airport case in November, 1967, and the Shinjuku case in October 1968 calling them examples of an "anti-U.S. patriotic struggle of the Japanese people"; it "advised the Japanese people to follow "the road of violent revolution", the way of power growing out of the barrel of a gun. The Xinhua News Agency said in December 1968:

> "The Japanese people went beyond the confines of legalism to fight their enemy with sticks, stones and hooks. Through their struggle, the Japanese people have reached a better understanding that they must repudiate the 'parliamentary road' advocated by the Miyamoto revisionist group, and persist in the Marxist-Leninist road of violent revolution. The truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun', takes root in the minds of workers, farmers, and the revolutionary masses in Japan deeper and deeper with each passing day." ("Surging Anti-U.S. Patriotic Struggle of Japanese People", December 12)

The inner-group mass murder committed by the "United Red Army", which took place in 1972, revealed dramatically where the Mao Zedong group's violent-revolution-only theory, or the theory "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" would lead us.

Originally the "United Red Army" was formed with the Mao Zedong blind followers' group "Keihin-Anpo-Kyoto" (Anti-Security Joint Struggle in Tokyo and Yokohama Area) and the "Red Army", which "evolved" into a Mao Zedong-blind followers' group from a faction in the Trotskyite group, "Bund". It called itself an "army armed with Mao Zedong thought". Following the strategy of Mao Zedong, its members built a "stronghold" in the mountains, regarding themselves as a combat unit for a "people's war", but the result was a series of brutal murders among themselves.

But when Zhou Enlai met Socialist Haruo Okada on March 29, 1972, he called the "New Left in Japan" "admirable", but "poor in policies", painting a rosy picture of these counter-revolutionary violent groups.

China consistently praised and encouraged the violent groups. One example is that when the "Red Army" hijacked the JAL plane, "Yodo", in April 1970, holding the passengers hostage, Zhou Enlai praised the deed, calling it "admirable". He also criticized the JCP for denouncing the violence of the "Red Army", saying "Japanese revisionists are speaking ill of them as Trotskyites, but to these revisionists, all things that go to excess are Trotskyite or anarchist". (Statement to representatives of seven organizations in Japanese friendly trading circles, April 15, 1970; "Economist", June 23, 1970)

THE NIXON VISIT TO CHINA AND REVERSAL OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

During this period, the Sino-Soviet confrontation was greatly intensified, leading to armed clashes in the years 1969-1970 along the Usuri and Amur Rivers, and on the border near Urumqi, the capital of Xinqiang Uigur Autonomous District. At this time, while U.S. imperialism was floundering in the quagmire of the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people, the Nixon Administration made a switch in its policy to make utmost use of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, in concentrating its attacks on Vietnam. The Nixon Administration first sent Kissinger secretly to Beijing in 1971, to reach an agreement, and then, like a bolt out of the blue, came the announcement that Nixon himself would visit China. His plan to visit the Soviet Union was also made known.

AMID THE INCREASED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

Eulogies of Nixon and the exoneration of U.S. imperialism appeared again from both the Soviet and Chinese sides. It was similar to the eulogies of Kennedy in the early 1960s, but now they came from both the Soviet Union and China. It was argued emphatically that "detente has come" and "the era of tri-polar diplomacy has begun". "War mongering" Nixon turned out overnight to be a different Nixon--a "messenger of peace". The U.S. writer, Edgar Snow, had said that Mao Zedong "prefers persons like President Nixon rather than social democrats and revisionists who are apt to take very different actions after assuming power" ("Mainichi", August 6, 1971). The Chinese leadership actually made a 180-degree turnabout in its foreign policy line in the course of the Nixon visit to China in February 1972, and Kakuei Tanaka's visit to China following Nixon--an about-face from the line of anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front to cooperation with U.S. imperialism against the No. 1 enemy, the Soviet Union, even expressing approval of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the build-up of the Japanese Self-Defnese Forces.

Nixon's visits to China and the Soviet Union in 1972 were made with the aim of creating conditions favorable for the United States to carry on its war of aggression against Vietnam, free from worry about the possible worsening of relations with China or the Soviet Union. This made it possible for the United States to carry out more cunningly and more brazenly its imperialist strategy of defeat-one-by-one in the major Asian arena.

Nixon, whose arrival in China was to the accompaniment of the roar of intensified bombing of North Vietnam, was warmly received in Beijing. The whole event was relayed by satellite and telecast all over the world. The U.S. imperialists spread masses of leaflets all over the battlefields in Vietnam as intensified propaganda, with photos of Nixon and the Chinese leaders chatting in the banquet hall, and claiming that the Vietnamese forces for liberation were isolated.

Nixon went to the Soviet Union after his China visit, with the bombing of North Vietnam again escalated, and the mining of all Vietnamese ports, contrary to international law. In Moscow, he appeared on television with a speech, in which he had the effrontery to express sympathy for Tanya, a girl who died in World War II in Leningrad at the age of 12, using this as a basis for talking about peace. On this too, the U.S. imperialists scattered leaflets all over the battlefields of Vietnam, showing Nixon shaking hands with the Soviet leaders.

The U.S. authorities boasted in these circumstances that they were able to carry out the bombing of North Vietnam free from fear of China or the Soviet Union. A report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that "restrictions had once been placed on the bombing of North Vietnam because of the fear of China and the Soviet Union but no such restrictions now existed, and so damage to North Vietnam had increased".

The U.S. policy of defeat-one-by-one was then carried over in a new form to the Ford and Carter Administrations.

The Japanese Communist Party has persisted in its exposure of the reality of the defeat-one-by-one policy, as the true aim of U.S. imperialism, and has continued the struggle against it. It exposed the danger of Nixon's plans to visit China and the Soviet Union, criticized in clear-cut terms a series of arguments put forward in praise of Nixon, used to coincide with that maneuver. The JCP had stressed the urgency and importance of strengthening support for the peoples of Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries as a whole, as an imperative international duty.

At this time, in September 1971, a Japanese Communist Party delegation (led by Presidium Chairman Miyamoto) visited Vietnam. This was of great significance not only for cementing friendship and solidarity between the Parties and the peoples of the two countries, but also for the strengthening of international anti-imperialist united actions.

In Japan, the Liberal-Democratic Party Government declared its support of the new Nixon strategy, and gave a positive response to the U.S. demand for an increased share of responsibility by Japan, in line with the Nixon doctrine. Except for the Japanese Communist Party, the opposition parties failed to see the dangerous content of the Nixon strategy, suffering as they were from the illusions about Nixon, and lured by the erroneous "Post Vietnam" arguments about Nixon departing from "Cold War diplomacy" or "promoting peace diplomacy". Only the Japanese Communist Party gave a correct analysis of the meaning of the new Nixon strategy, calling for heightened vigilance, and showing the way of struggle against the U.S. policy of aggression. The Japanese Communist Party was the major force promoting joint struggles by wide-ranging democratic forces, including the struggle against the transportation of ammunition by the U.S. forces in Japan, plus all other forms of the campaign in support of the Vietnamese people. Internationally, the Japanese Communist Party was active in developing international united actions by the anti-imperialist forces.

The task of international united actions, which was the main aim of the (JCP delegation's) "three-country-visit", and for which the Japanese Communist Party had made maximum efforts, moved ahead in spite of the intensified Sino-Soviet confrontation. In February 1972, a "World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Countries of Indochina" was held at Versailles, near Paris, in which delegates from 84 countries, including delegates from the three countries of Indochina, took part. That world assembly adopted an appeal and a resolution, condemning the war of aggression by U.S. imperialism against the peoples of Indochina, demanding the unconditional and complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Indochina, and an end to all its military actions. In order to achieve these goals, the meeting called on the anti-imperialist democratic forces to develop fuller and more effective united actions. The world meeting was a great success. The Japanese Communist Party had been insisting on the need to call an international conference, which in spite of the serious disaccord in views within the international movement, would unite the anti-imperialist democratic forces of the five continents. The conference proved to be an effective and realistic way to organize and develop urgently needed united actions, including support for the Vietnamese people.

In fact, through a complicated process, the socialist countries, anti-imperialist and democratic forces, and all Communist and Workers' Parties, expressed their support for the Vietnamese people in their struggle; and as a result of the great, independent struggle by the Vietnamese people, Vietnamese liberation won its world historic victory in 1975.

"CHINA'S INTERESTS ARE IDENTICAL WITH THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES"--NIXON

Here, we go back again to the question of the 180-degree turn in China's policy toward the United States.

In the first place, the Sino-Soviet dispute, which surfaced at the end of the 1950s through the beginning of the '60s, included various issues, the core of which was what attitude should be taken to deal with the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression. At that time, U.S. imperialism was not only promoting its policy of aggression and domination on a global scale, but it also occupied Taiwan, and sent its Pacific Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait in order to put political and military pressure on the People's Republic of China following the revolution. In this situation, Mao Zedong held aloft the banner of an anti-U.S. united front, calling for unity of the anti-imperialist democratic forces all over the world. But Khrushchev went so far in his response to the remarks made by Eisenhower as to say, "If the two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, have mutual trust in each other, the agreement and peace as a whole will never be affected by whatever disputes may arise among other countries" (Khrushchev on September 24, 1959, during his visit to the United States). It is well known that Khrushchev praised Kennedy as a "messenger of peace". The Chinese were critical of these Soviet moves, for which the Chinese certainly had reasonable grounds.

But the Sino-Soviet dispute later changed from theoretical or political debate into a confrontation between states. The armed clashes that took place on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 were symbolic of the change, the background of which was the big-power hegemonism of both sides, which had been growing step by step.

The military intervention by the Soviet Union and four other countries in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan at the end of last year, are both unjustifiable encroachments on the national sovereignty of other countries, and an expression of big-power hegemonism. But China's refusal to negotiate with Vietnam, and its aggression against Vietnam in what it termed "sanctions" cannot be explained but as an unjustifiable encroachment on the sovereign rights of Vietnam, and an expression of big-power hegemonism.

What must be noted seriously is that the Chinese leadership has come to the position of support for imperialist military blocs and military alliances, while waving the banner of opposition to Soviet hegemonism. This is completely contrary to the cause of socialism, and to the international common cause of national independence, world peace, and social progress.

The big foreign policy change made by the Chinese leadership was related to the Nixon visit to China. On the talks with the Chinese leaders, the "Memoirs of Richard Nixon" contain these statements.

> "I went on... 'We... must ask ourselves why the Soviets have more forces on the border facing you than they do on the border facing Western Europe? We must ask ourselves, what is the future of Japan? Is it better--and here I know we have disagreements--from China's standpoint for Japan to be neutral and totally defenseless, or is it better for Japan to have some mutual defense relations with the United States?... The question is, which danger does the People's Republic of China face? Is it the danger of American aggression--or of Soviet aggression? These are hard questions, but we have to discuss them'." ("The Memoirs of Richard Nixon").

On the talks held on the next afternoon, Nixon says:

> "'I believe the interests of China ss well as the interests of the United States urgently require that we maintain our military establishment at approximately its present levels', I said. 'And with certain exceptions which we can discuss later, I believe that we should maintain a military presence in Europe, in Japan, and also maintain our naval forces in the Pacific. I believe that the interests of China are just as great as those of the United States on that point'.
>
> "As I had intended, this statement created a slight stir on the Chinese side of the table... I continued... 'In terms of the nuclear power balance, the Soviet Union has

> been moving ahead at a very alarming rate over the past four years. I have determined that the United States must not fall behind. If we did, our shield of protection for Europe, and for the nations of the Pacific with which we have treaties, would be worthless'.
>
> "Applying this approach to the question of America's relationship with Japan... they (the Chinese) called for the withdrawal of American troops from Japan and the abrogation of our treaty of mutual defense, thus leaving Japan neutral and unarmed...
>
> "'The United States can get out of Japanese waters, but others will still fish there. If we were to leave Japan naked and defenseless, they would have to turn to others for help or build the capability to defend themselves'.
>
> "'If the United States is gone from Asia, gone from Japan', I said, 'our protests, no matter how loud, would be like firing an empty cannon... Now, I realize that I have painted here a picture which makes me sound like an old cold warrior', I continued, and Chou (Zhou Enlai--tr.) laughed softly." (R. Nixon, ibid.)

NORMALIZATION OF JAPAN-CHINA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Later on, the big change in the Chinese attitude became clearer than ever.

In September 1972, a half year after the Nixon visit to China, Japan-China diplomatic relations were restored.

It was the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Governments that had pursued the policy of hostility to China for 27 years after the end of the war, having followed U.S. policy toward China, and having stuck to the fiction that China should be represented by the Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) regime in Taiwan. It was the Chinese Government that had denounced the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as a dangerous military alliance directed against China, and had been warning about the revival of Japanese militarism. Top leaders of the two Governments met in Beijing in September 1972, and agreed to normalize diplomatic relations. Here we can see that the Japanese Government was making haste to follow suit with the changed U.S. policy toward China, and the Chinese Government was reversing its attitude not only toward the United States but also toward the Japan-U.S. military alliance. In the Tanaka-Nixon talks held in Hawaii just before the Japan-China talks, it was confirmed that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would be maintained. But China made no comment on those talks.

In the Japan-China summit talks in Beijing, Kakuei Tanaka declared that "the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is the major prerequisite"... "on which no compromise can be made" in restoring Japan-China diplomatic relations. "That's all right", replied Premier Zhou Enlai at once. He went on to say, "How Japan deals with the relations with the United States is a matter between Japan and the United States. We have nothing to do with it. For Japan, however, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty must be a matter of extreme importance. It is natural to maintain the Treaty, isn't it?" ("'Security Treaty' in the Turning Period", "Mainichi Shimbun"). This was an official declaration made by the Chinese leadership in support of the Japan-U.S. military alliance.

It was taken as a matter of course that the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations should be based on the five principles of peace, to ensure the development of relationships of genuine peace and friendship between the two peoples. The Japanese Communist Party was a pioneer in consistently standing for that since the end of the war. But the restoration of diplomatic relations now carried with it a more serious meaning, in that it was achieved on the precondition of approving the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Furthermore, at the request of the Chinese side, a so-called anti-hegemony clause was included in the Japan-China Joint Statement issued at that time. No mention was made at all at that time from either side (neighter from the Japanese side nor the Chinese side) of the hegemonist activities then being carried on by the United States, which was still engaged in brutal aggression and destruction in Indochina.

On the occasion of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, the Japanese Communist Party issued a statement on September 29, 1972, welcoming it, as the Party had consistently demanded ever since the very establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The Party had claimed that diplomatic relations be restored with the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government. In fact, only the Japanese Communist Party among all political parties in Japan had demanded recognition of the People's Republic of China and the establishment of friendly relations from the day of victory of the revolution in China and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. It is undeniable that the Liberal-Democratic Party forces had followed the United States in its hostility toward China, and in persistently defending the Jiang Jieshi regime till the last moment, i.e., by signing the "Japan-Republic of China Treaty". Even in the Socialist Party, the largest opposition party, the view of the influential majority was at first a Dulles-like view, that regarded the Chinese revolution as a threat to Japan's security. At a later stage, for some time, the Socialist Party had stood for the restoration of Japan-China diplomatic relations while at the same time maintaining support for "two Chinas", by continuing diplomatic relations with the Jiang regime and maintaining the "Japan-Republic of China Treaty". In the SPJ congress held in January 1957, the party for the first time formally decided to renounce its "two Chinas" position, and to stand for "one China". The Komeito and the Democratic-Socialist Party had both also adopted the "two Chinas" position as their basic policy toward China. It was as late as 1971, one year before the restoration of diplomatic relations, that these parties changed their policy, stating that they were ready to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a prerequisite for the restoration of diplomatic relations with China.

Thus, the contribution made by the Japanese Communist Party, as the pioneer, is crystal clear as seen in the mirror of history.

At the same time, in a statement issued on the occasion of the normalization of diplomatic relations, the Japanese Communist Party pointed out that interference in the Japanese revolutionary and democratic movements, of which some forces in China had been guilty, ran counter to the five principles of peace, and that these had to be ended at once. The Party also affirmed, that in order to truly contribute to peace in Asia, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would have to be abolished, as, under it, Japan had been forced to cooperate with the United States in its aggression against Vietnam.

But both the Chinese leadership and the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Government took the opposite course. The Chinese leadership has still not ended its interferences in the Japanese

Communist Party, and the Japanese reactionary forces have tried to make use of the Communist Party of China's hostility to the Japanese Communist Party to serve the interests of the LDP's partisan politics. Kakuei Tanaka was the most outspoken. Just after his return from Beijing after winding up the Japan-China summit talks, where agreement was reached on the normalization of diplomatic relations, in his report to the Plenary Meeting of Liberal-Democratic Party Members of Both Houses, Tanaka himself said that in the talks he had requested the Chinese side "not to shake hands with the Japanese Communist Party"; this was in addition to such other requests as "not to call Japan militarist" and "not to take it (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) as a threat to China" ("Asahi Shimbun", October 1, 1972).

No sooner had he revealed this attitude than the Japanese Communist Party lodged a strong protest, saying: "This is a misuse of negotiations for the restoration of Japan-China diplomatic relations, which is a national task, to serve the interests of anti-communist partisan politics" (Presidium Chairman Miyamoto at a press conference on October 2, 1972).

The development of matters since then has shown clearly that the Chinese attitude toward the Japan-U.S. military alliance and Japanese militarism and interference in the Japanese Communist Party, it can be said, have been just as Tanaka desired.

SUPPORT OF JAPAN-U.S. MILITARY ALLIANCE BECOMES MORE BRAZEN

The Chinese attitude toward the Japan-U.S. military alliance has developed from mere acquiescence to positive approval, support and encouragement.

In January 1973, Premier Zhou Enlai said to Takeo Kimura (LDP), "Japan cannot but have... the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty... as Japan needs the U.S. umbrella ("Mainichi", January 18, 1973).

In March 1973, Liao Chengzhi, President of the China-Japan Friendship Association, said in Beijing to the visiting press corps of Yomiuri Shimbun, "Japan cannot but depend on the U.S. umbrella for a while" ("Yomiuri", March 12, 1973), giving unqualified praise to the Japan-U.S. military alliance, including the U.S. "nuclear umbrella".

Since 1977, China has frequently invited experts on military questions to China, such as former high officers of the Self-Defense Forces, and not only expressed approval of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty but also expressed support for strengthening the Self-Defense Forces. For example, at the end of June 1977, President of the China-Japan Friendship Association, Liao Chengzhi, told Osamu Kaibara, visiting former Secretary General of the National Defense Council, that "the matter of top priority for Japan is its relations with the United States, and the second is those with our country" ("Mainichi", July 25, 1977).

On September 14, 1977, Deng Xiaoping said to Yohei Kono, Representative of the New Liberal Club, "I agree on strengthened self defense forces of Japan. I also agree on the improvement of Japan's relations with the United States. I can understand that the matter of first importance (for Japan) is Japan-U.S. relations, and second is relations between Japan and China" ("Mainichi", September 15, 1977).

It is thus clear that the basic lines of foreign policy of the Chinese leadership have undergone a drastic about-face from the anti-U.S. international united front to an anti-U.S.-and-anti-Soviet international united front; and further, from that to a sort of coalition with the imperialist forces, on the pretext of opposition to Soviet hegemonism.

The Chinese leadership once held the view that Japanese militarism had completed its revival, and opposed the view held by the Japanese Communist Party that Japanese militarism is in the process of revival and strengthening. It was at that time that the Chinese leadership launched attacks on the Japanese Communist Party, calling it one of four enemies, together with U.S. imperialism and the Japanese reactionary forces. But now U.S. imperialism and the Japanese reactionaries have been raised to the status of friends. The Chinese leadership has taken the side of support for the Japan-U.S. military alliance, shutting its eyes to the fact that this alliance violates Japanese sovereignty, and is hostile to the Japanese people, who seek Japan's independence, non-alignment and neutrality. It is natural for such a change in the Chinese leadership position to have been warmly welcomed by the Japanese reactionary forces, which are promoting the Japan-U.S. military alliance and accelerating the revival and strengthening of militarism under the Japan-U.S. military alliance. Furthermore, it provides a rare excuse for the anti-communist centrist parties to move further right and prop up the present ruling system, just at the time when contradictions in U.S.-subordinated monopoly capitalism are deepening sharply, with the crisis in LDP politics of plutocracy, corruption and betrayal of the people becoming critical. The adverse effect upon the Socialist Party caused by the drastic turn in the attitude of the Chinese leadership toward U.S. imperialism and the Japanese reactionary forces cannot be overlooked, as seen in the big change in the SPJ attitude toward the Japan-U.S. military alliance and the Self-Defense Forces.

The about-face of the Chinese leadership in favor of the Japan-U.S. military alliance and Japanese militarism has had sharp negative effects that cannot be taken lightly on the movements of the Japanese working class, working people and democratic forces striving for social progress in our country.

EXCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS FROM DIET AND LOCAL ASSEMBLY MEMBER DELEGATIONS VISITING CHINA

Even after the normalization of Japan-China relations, the Chinese leadership did not basically correct its attitude on interference in the Japanese Communist Party. The words and deeds of the "delegation of the China-Japan Friendship Association" that visited Japan in 1973, led by Liao Chengzhi, provided an example of this.

Before the visit to Japan, in an interview with "Yomiuri Shimbun" reporters visiting China, Liao Chengzhi said "We do not export revolution. But it is our duty to expose such fellows as are wearing another's feathers, disguising themselves as a communist party, when in fact they are quite different. 'My Dear Mr. Kenji Miyamoto' says it is interference in (Japan's) internal affairs for China to criticize the JCP, but in fact we will carry through this criticism to the end" ("Yomiuri", March 12). What was done by the Liao Chengzhi delegation over one month was fully in line with that policy, calling openly for sabotage and subversion of the Japanese Communist Party. In Osaka, Yamaguchi and other places, they made contacts with the anti-JCP groups of Reizo Amamiya, Masayoshi Fukuda and Soichiro Furutani, who were carrying on subversive activities against the Japanese Communist Party, and encouraged the groups, telling them that they should be united to fight the Japanese Communist Party. On May 6, Han Xiya, a member of the delegation, at a forum in Nagasaki, spoke ill of the Japanese Communist Party, calling it a "Miyamoto revisionist group". He said, "the basic confrontation between the Communist Party of China and the Miyamoto revisionist group is that the latter has degenerated into a revisionist guerrilla group. But they are only a handful, I suppose. Wide-ranging party members are deceived by the Miyamoto group, but they will soon see it" ("Sankei", May 7). He actually called on "wide ranging party members" to break away from the Party leadership. "The mission and performance of the Liao Chengzhi delegation... leave no room for question that the real aim of their so-called 'Japan-China friendship' is to isolate the Japanese Communist Party" ("Akahata", May 23).

The Chinese leadership has not yet renounced its wild ambition of big-powerist interference and attack on the Japanese Communist Party. Zhang Xiangshan, Vice-President of the China-Japan Friendship Association, when a Japanese group of blind followers visited China in 1976, called on them to amalgamate and unite with the odds and ends of anti-Communist Party groups of the same kind for the purpose of fighting against the JCP. He made remarks of obvious interference, saying:

> "It is eleven years... since Marxist-Leninists of your country... broke away from the Miyamoto revisionists. That was in 1966. But, as of now, no united Marxist-Leninist party has yet been founded in your country.
>
> "There are differences of courses among factions. How about going on joint actions on the most important issues on which agreement can be reached?
>
> "To oppose Soviet social imperialism, to oppose U.S. imperialism, to oppose exploitation and oppression of the people by (Japanese) monopoly capital, to oppose collusion with the Soviet Union and the United States by certain parts of monopoly capital, and to oppose the Japanese revisionists. If you carry on united actions on these common tasks, I suppose understanding among you will be deepened. Therefore, we hope that the left organizations will be united step by step, so that not so many left organizations may be set up. If one united Marxist-Leninist party appears, then the Japanese revolution will be hopeful."

The maneuver to exclude JCP Diet-members or local assembly members from such delegations visiting China was another expression of the attitude of interference taken by the Chinese leadership.

Since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, mutual visits of Diet-member delegations and local-assembly-member delegations have become more frequent. In this situation, the Chinese side at first refused to give entry permits to JCP Diet or local assembly members. In some cases, the Japanese authorities played an active role in excluding JCP members, in order to curry favor with the Chinese authorities.

In April 1974, when inviting the so-called "friendship China-visit delegation of Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly", the Chinese side excluded the JCP members, though they were the majority group in the assembly among the ruling parties of the Tokyo Metropolitan Administration. The Chinese side even nominated an anti-Communist Party person who had nothing to do with the Metropolitan Assembly to join the visiting group. In April of the same year, the Kyoto City Administration excluded the representative of the Japanese Communist Party from the list of the "friendship China-visit delegation of Kyoto City", on the grounds of a "touch" they had gotten during their call at the Chinese Embassy.

In September that year, the Chinese authorities rejected the entry of Masaru Umeda, Communist member of the House of Representatives, who had been scheduled to visit China as a member of a Diet-member delegation on the first flight to China to celebrate the opening of the Tokyo-Beijing air route.

In spring 1978, a JCP member was excluded, on direction from the Chinese authorities, from a delegation to China made up of members of the Osaka Prefectural Assembly.

This is not only discrimination against JCP Diet and local assembly members, but is an obvious violation of the independence of the Japanese Diet and local assemblies. The Communist Party has repeatedly demanded that the Japanese Government, or the Diet and local assembly authorities, should maintain an independent stand.

PEACE, FRIENDSHIP, AND ANTI-"HEGEMONY" TREATY

In August 1978, a Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed, and ratified by the Japanese Diet in October. Prior to its ratification, during deliberations on the Treaty both in and out of the Diet, the JCP called for principled debates for the establishment of genuine good relations between Japan and China, based on mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. There was a big response to this.

In the negotiations for the signing of the Treaty, the Chinese side insisted to the end that an anti-'hegemony" clause must be included in the Treaty. It was quite obvious that the prime motive was to have Japan align itself with the unique foreign policy of building a world-wide common front against a specific country, with an antagonistic attitude to that country. Taking into consideration the complicated historical development and relations of the two countries, the JCP stressed the need to thoroughly clarify the precise meaning and role of the Treaty as it related to the establishment of correct relations between the two countries, based on the five principles of peace, and said that the Party would decide its final position after the Treaty was completed.

Through deliberations in the Diet, especially as the result of questioning by the Communist Party, the Government made clear the following three points as its official interpretation of the Treaty.

First, on the most critical issue of the anti-"hegemony" clause, it was made clear that anti-"hegemony" is not pointed at a specific third country, and the identification of a hegemonist act is to be made by Japan or China independently, on the responsibility of either, and that this treaty imposes no obligation on either Japan or China for common action.

For example, replying to a Communist Diet-member who asked if it means that the Japanese Government supports anti-"hegemony" in the same sense as China does, the Government said: "(China) uses the term anti-hegemony, by pointing at the Soviet Union, as has been its policy from the past. It has already been made clear that Japan is not obliged to follow that line by reason of the signing of the Treaty" (Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda, October 14, 1978, in the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee). "We have told them in clear-cut terms that the Japan-China Treaty does not mean joint action against a third country, by which is meant, frankly, the Soviet Union" (Foreign Minister Sonoda, October 17, in the House of Councilors Foreign Affairs Committee).

The second point that the Government made clear was that any political coercion or interference to impose one's will on another country is a hegemonist action. In this respect, the Government will not approve the imposition of a specific line, and unjustifiable discrimination in entry into China.

In the Diet session when the Treaty was ratified, Communist Diet-members took up the fact that Zhou Enlai had praised the "United Red Army", and that the Beijing Broadcasting Station, in its broadcast to Japan (July 11, 1977), tried to impose on Japan its own concept of violent revolution, saying, "You must prepare for a violent revolution". They also took up the fact of the Chinese side's interference in the composition of the China-visit delegations of the Diet and local assemblies, and demanded that the Japanese Government take a clear-cut attitude against such interference. Answering these questions, the Japanese Government said:

> "If such issues as have been referred to remain, no relations of genuine friendship can be created. The prerequisite for the signing of the Treaty will be lost. I told them they should not do such things, and they made no refutation. I don't think that such things will be repeated in future. If such a case takes place in the future, though it seems unlikely, we will let them know our strict attitude." (Foreign Minister Sonoda, October 14, in the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee)
>
> "From now on, each side should seriously keep in mind non-interference in the other's internal affairs. We have put forward our strong request to the Chinese side." (Prime Minister Fukuda, October 16, in the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee)
>
> "As the Foreign Minister in charge of diplomacy, I am displeased to see a Japanese person refused entry by another country. It is unpleasant for me to see a member of the Communist Party, which is established in compliance with the provision (of freedom of association) in the Constitution, refused entry. I will try to convey this to them, so that such trouble may not happen." (Foreign Minister Sonoda, October 16, House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee)

Thirdly, the Government asserted that it will maintain the right stand, that the Senkaku Islands are historically the territory of Japan.

For example, Prime Minister Fukuda said, "The Senkaku Islands are inherently the territory of Japan. No room is left for questioning this, either historically or in the light of international law" (September 30, in the House of Councilors Plenary Session).

The Japanese Communist Party confirmed these official interpretations by the Japanese Government, and with these as preconditions, supported the ratification of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship by the Diet. At the same time, the Communist Party demanded that the Government should strictly implement these declarations as public pledges to the Japanese people and to the world.

When the other parties avoided penetrating deliberations on these points, there is great significance in the fact that the JCP took a firm attitude, such as has been stated, in order to defend the sovereign rights of Japan and to assume responsibility for the future course of Japan.

When a Delegation of the House of Councilors visited China in January 1979, Atsushi Hashimoto was a member of the delegation. Since then, some local assembly member delegations visiting China were joined by JCP members of local assemblies.

This process reveals how reasonable the demand of the Japanese Communist Party and the democratic forces is--the demand for genuine relations of friendship based on the five principles of peace, free from any interference. This demand is too reasonable to be rejected. The Japanese Government cannot but admit this; and the Chinese leadership can no longer persist in unjustifiable discrimination against JCP Diet or local assembly members in the interchanges of delegations between the two countries.

FORESIGHTEDNESS OF THE JCP SHOWN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFFAIRS

1

After the article, "Mao Zedong Line of Today and the International Communist Movement" (October 10, 1967) was published, the JCP followed with many articles that gave detailed refutations of the interventions and attacks on the JCP made by the Chinese leadership, and thoroughly examined their errors by the principles of scientific socialism.

Now the deification of Mao Zedong has been rejected, and the explanation given is that such deification was an intrigue by Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four". It has also been confirmed that the "Great Cultural Revolution" was an atrocious aberration caused by certain individuals and groups contrary to the socialist cause.

The communiqué of the 5th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, published on February 29 this year, officially rehabilitated Liu Shaoqi, the late Head of State, who died a tragic death resulting from the persecution during the "Cultural Revolution". A big mass meeting was held in Beijing to honor his memory. Time has shown that the leading members so unreasonably eliminated and persecuted by the Mao Zedong leadership have all been rehabilitated, Liu Shaoqi being the last to have his honor restored.

The errors in the domestic policy of China since 1958 have been confirmed, as well as the great mistakes of the "Great Cultural Revolution". The 8th Convention held in 1956 has also been "rehabilitated".

An article entitled "Nobody Should Mistake Marxism for Revisionism", written by a special commentator, was published on April 3 this year in "Renmin Ribao". On the subject of the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, the article states that the false accusations made against him derived from "repeated criticisms that confused Marxism with revisionism". It admits that at that time, even the CPC "committed the mistake of confusing Marxist standpoints with revisionism", and that, "before 1966 (when the Cultural Revolution started) there was no danger of right-wing revisionism appearing in the Party". Nevertheless, the author tries to shift the responsibility from Mao Zedong and place it on Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four". He says, "On the contrary, it was 'left-wing' trend that damaged the Party and the revolutionary cause for a long time". His argument was that during the "Great Cultural Revolution", "the real and most serious danger within the Party was revised and falsified Marxism by the extreme-left, in the process rejecting genuine Marxism as revisionism or right-wing opportunism, and allowing their extreme-left line (Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four') to prevail in China for ten years". Now, in China, at least so far as domestic issues are concerned, this is the stage that has been reached.

Noting these recent moves in China, nobody can deny that the JCP analysis and evaluations were farsighted, as Mao Zedong thought and the "Great Cultural Revolution" were analyzed in articles by the JCP, including the October 10, 1967 article, "Mao Zedong Line of Today and the International Communist Movement".

HOW SOME FACTIONS HAVE GIVEN BLIND OBEDIENCE TO MAO AND HIS FOLLOWERS

Now that the CPC has itself fully acknowledged the errors of the "Cultural Revolution", and rehabilitated Liu Shaoqi and others, it is necessary to examine again the role and responsibility of those blind followers who gave unconditional praise to Mao Zedong thought and the "Cultural Revolution", and willingly became cat's paws in the attempt by the Chinese leadership to impose all this on Japan.

It is well known, that, as the CPC leadership interfered increasingly in the JCP, no small number of flunkeyists who lost both their wits and their integrity, deified Mao Zedong and praised the "Great Cultural Revolution". They included Kiyoshi Inoue, Seimin Miyazaki, Torao Miyagawa, Norio Shirato, Kinkazu Saionji, Hikotaro Ando, Haruo Okada, Hisao Kuroda, Tokumatsu Sakamoto, Kenzo Nakajima, and others.

It is no wasted effort on our part but a necessary task for social progress in the future of Japan to recall again their speeches and actions, to show how blind their allegiance was to the Mao group.

For example, Norio Shirato, General Secretary of an organization called the "Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange", visited China in January 1967 at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations and Friendship with Foreign Countries. A document was signed by Shirato, called a "Memorandum on Cultural Exchange between Chinese and Japanese Peoples", which was an attempt to impose the "Cultural Revolution" on Japan ("Japan-China Cultural Exchange", March 1, 1967 issue). The Memorandum lavished praise on the Mao group, which had taken over the state power and made it their own property. The document claimed that the "Chinese people, being armed with great Mao Zedong thought, are enthusiastically pushing ahead with the historically unprecedented Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, initiated by and under the leadership of Chairman Mao himself"; that "they have taken over power from a handful of power-circles within the Party who follow the capitalist way". The document echoed the "Cultural Revolution" in the name of cultural exchange, claiming that it would "open a new aspect in cultural relations between the Japanese and Chinese peoples as well".

Kiyoshi Inoue, a former Professor of Kyoto University, making use of the opportunity provided by the attack on the headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association by Chinese students and merchants living in Japan, began anti-Party activities openly, and was expelled by the JCP. Then, in June 1967, he lauded the "Cultural Revolution" as a "great achievement unprecedented in human history" and attacked the JCP, charging that the "Japanese revisionists like those in the U.S.S.R. and other countries have been thrown into consternation, and are doing their utmost to slander the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'" ("Japan-China Cultural Exchange", August 1, 1967 issue).

Then Kenzo Nakajima, the Director General of the "Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange", came out with fervent praise of the "Cultural Revolution", asserting, "As for the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution, everywhere outside China there have appeared vulgar opinions that foresee and wish its failure" ("Japan-China Cultural Exchange", April 1, 1967 issue).

Then too, Hikotaro Ando, Professor of Waseda University, gave unreserved praise to the "Cultural Revolution", claiming that the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China will be a great commemorative event of the latter half of the 20th century, because", he said, "it is not merely an event of China but poses to the world a question related to the essentials of revolution" (Postscript of "Proletarian Cultural Revolution", 1967).

All these statements in praise of the "Cultural Revolution", combined with the uncritical trend in the Japanese press as a whole to flatter China, would have been a disservice to public opinion in Japan, leading to errors of judgment, if nothing had been done about it. Here is a carry-over from the deep-rooted flunkyism that has characterized Japanese intellectuals and the press since Meiji times.

What we need to recall now is that these people gave excessive praise not only to Mao Zedong but even to those who deified Mao, including Lin Biao, and that they joined a chorus of slander against those who have now been rehabilitated and restored to leading posts, such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

In flattery of the "Political Report" which Lin Biao made at the 9th Congress of the CPC in April 1969, Torao Miyagawa wrote, "It is a valuable document to ensure the victory of the world peoples, including the Japanese people, in the struggle against the Liu Shaoqi clique in their respective countries" ("Japan-China Cultural Exchange", October 1, 1969 issue).

Kinkazu Saionji wrote in praise of Lin Biao, "It was in the autumn of 1959 that Peng Dehuai, who was against the military teaching of Mao Zedong, and was responsible for the 'arms only' argument that attached importance to armaments rather than to human beings, was removed from the position of Secretary of Defense, and Lin Biao was appointed instead. When Lin appeared on the platform he was called a doctor to cure the People's Liberation Army and to make it a genuine people's army... Lin Biao had a specific medicine. The specific medicine was nothing but Mao Zedong thought" ("Twelve Years in Beijing", 1970).

Under the leadership of the "Gang of Four", Kiyoshi Inoue supported the criticisms raised against Deng Xiaoping. He charged that Deng Xiaoping presented anti-revolutionary policy by distorting and misusing the words of Chairman Mao, and "Whether to develop further agricultural production, ...learning lessons from Dazhai, or to destroy the collective economy by arousing the consciousness of farmers as small land owners, and making them work for their own interests and desires, as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had done. Which way should they take? It was obvious to the Chinese Party and people who had experienced the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the criticism against Lin Biao and Kongzi (Confucius) and against Deng Xiaoping" ("Japan-China Cultural Exchange", September 30, 1976 issue).

Thus, those who always blindly obeyed Mao faction and extolled to the skies the "Great Cultural Revolution", now pretend to have forgotten their own past speeches and acts, or they take the attitude of following and glorifying uncritically the line of the Chinese leadership as it changed. They show not even a particle of independence or integrity. It must be said that their flunkyism reached an extreme point at this stage.

LDP, SPJ, KOMEITO AND DSP JOIN IN CHORUS OF PRAISE OF "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

Amongst the political parties in Japan, only the JCP refused to join in the chorus of praise of Mao Zedong and the "Cultural Revolution". It must not be forgotten that instead of explicitly rejecting the big-powerist intervention in the Japanese democratic movements by the leadership of China, the attitude of the Parties was an expression of their subservience and lack of independence toward the Chinese intervention.

The Socialist Party of Japan quickly spoke out

in praise of the "Cultural Revolution", admiring it as "an unprecedented historical event both for mankind and for socialism". Komeito did an about-face to praise the "Cultural Revolution" in 1971, when Komeito President Takeiri visited China. He said fawningly, "Komeito would like to offer its respect and affection to Chairman Mao Zedong".

At about the same time, the Democratic-Socialist Party also did an about-turn on policy, saying, "Expressions of the people who abide by Mao Zedong thought are not necessarily dark".

The so-called "pro-Chinese faction" in the Liberal-Democratic Party also repeatedly came out with observations affirming the "Cultural Revolution".

In open support of the "Cultural Revolution" and the overthrow of the "Liu Shaoqi-Deng Xiaoping factions" by the Mao faction, in October 1967 Haruo Okada of the SPJ wrote:

> ".....Over this past more than one year, responding to the appeal of Chairman Mao, the 'Fire on the headquarters!', revolutionary groups and a wide range of people arose and delivered fierce attacks on the biggest power-circle within the Party, who had become capitalist-roaders, and completely foiled a series of anti-revolutionary revisionist lines;--The biggest power-circle within the Party, called the 'Liu Shaoqi-Deng Xiaoping factions', which have taken the capitalist way, have totally been driven from power over this last year, and there is no possibility for them to rise again..... The productive power, which had been suppressed under the influence of the bourgeois faction in power, has been liberated by the Great Cultural Revolution, with obstacles removed, and will increase remarkably from now on. In this

> aspect, too, the expectation of reactionary scholars in Japan as well as 'theoreticians' in 'Yoyogi' (JCP headquarters--tr.) for 'economic confusion caused by the Cultural Revolution' has failed utterly." ("Japan-China Cultural Exchange", December 1, 1967 issue)

Fawning on the leadership of China, many leaders of the SPJ and Komeito put forward the absurd argument that the independent stand taken by the JCP was actually an obstacle to Japan-China relationships.

The former President of the SPJ, Kozo Sasaki, at a meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai during his visit to China as head of an SPJ delegation in August 1970, said, "I sincerely wish a long life for Chairman Mao, and further development of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution. I ask his favor to guide socialism in the world" (Hideo Den, "The Essentials of Zhou Enlai"). Further, when asked by Zhou Enlai whether the SPJ will include the JCP in what was called the Plan for a "Great Coalition for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China", Sasaki replied:

> "For the time being, we do not think of the JCP as a partner in the coalition, because the JCP is in a dispute with your country, charging that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is counter-revolutionary. We cannot include the JCP, which refuses to recognize the other country with which we want to have diplomatic relations." ("Digest of the Meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai")

President Takeiri of Komtito was equally outspoken:

> "The Communist Party of China is inseparable from the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it is a fact that both of them exist with Chairman Mao Zedong as the center. As the JCP speaks ill of Chairman Mao Zedong, and asserts that 'The Great Cultural Revolution is counter-revolution', it is natural that China would have difficulty in accepting the JCP... If the JCP sincerely wants the restoration of diplomatic relation between Japan and China, I feel strongly that the JCP should reconsider such an immoderate and wrong attitude." (Interview with President Takeiri of Komeito in the magazine, "Ushio" [Current], September 1971)

It is clear to everyone whose attitude towards China should now be reconsidered. But to our surprise, those who have been so lavish in praise of the "Cultural Revolution" are now bowing in unabashed praise of present China, which has totally rejected the "Cultural Revolution", as if they forgot their former utterances.

GENERAL TREND OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENT REJECTS HEGEMONISM

The anti-Party maneuvers of the blind followers, whom the Chinese leadership fostered to use to defeat and destroy the Japanese Communist Party, have failed under the resolute counterattacks made by the Party. Such groups split up again and again, till they were no more than a number of small scattered groups which repeatedly fought amongst themselves. The Masayoshi Fukuda faction, one among other factions that had been cultivated and backed by the Chinese leadership with special care, in 1977 switched from blindly backing China to a line that blindly followed Albania. The saying, "One who loves too much hates in like extreme", applies to this Fukuda faction. The faction asserted that, "Yielding to U.S. imperialism, the Chinese leadership has begun an aggressive war against the Vietnamese people and become an enemy of socialism", and openly called for a struggle against Chinese revisionism.

But the attacks against the JCP have continued, not only by the Fukuda faction which switched to a "pro-Albania" stand, but also by the Takaharu Sumioka, Choji Harada, and the Kuraji Anzai factions and other anti-Party groups, who blindly follow the Chinese line without qualification. When the bankruptcy of the "Great Cultural Revolution" became clear, the attacks and interventions by the Chinese leadership in the JCP were not so blatant as before, but big-powerist intervention in various forms, such as support and encouragement to anti-Party factions and groups, have continued.

The Chinese leadership, for example, still gives support to the Tetsuji Okuma faction, a counterpart of the extreme leftist gangster group, "United Red Army", notorious for the genocidal

murders of its own members. The Okuma faction calls itself "Japan Labor Party", its Constitution claiming Mao Zedong thought as its guiding doctrine. The Chinese leadership invited the Okuma faction to Beijing at the end of 1978 and encouraged them. Tetsuji Okuma proudly stated, "We had an opportunity to discuss the Communist Party of China for ten days at the end of last year (1978). In Beijing, our delegation talked with them on various matters and deepened mutual understanding" ("Rodo Shimbun", January 15, 1979).

In reporting cables and messages of congratulations received from pro-Chinese factions in various countries on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, in October 1979, "Renmin Ribao" (October 11, 1979) includes the Shosaku Itai faction, which calls itself the "Japan Workers' Party".

It is to be noted especially that when the Sumioka faction and the Choji Harada faction merged at the beginning of January this year, to form a new anti-JCP organization, "Renmin Ribao" (January 25, 1980) gave it a positive report, first of all newspapers. The "Beijing Review" (February 5), Chinese publicity magazine, also reported it in its Japanese edition. Clearly, the formation of this organization is in line with what Zhang Xiangshan had said, "We do not wish to see formation of more leftist organizations, but wish to see them united gradually into one".

The Chinese leadership has not yet desisted in calling the JCP the "Miyamoto group" although this is less frequent. "Renmin Ribao" of February 29, 1980 used the expression, "JCP Miyamoto group", in a report on the meeting of Diet Members Federation for Japan-China Friendship on February 28, from which members of the JCP were excluded.

The resolution of the 15th Congress of the JCP held in February-March this year states explicitly that still now "big powerist intervention has been continued by the Chinese side against the JCP in various forms, such as support and encouragement of anti-Party factional groups... Our Party is resolved to fight all acts of big powerist intervention, until such interference is ended".

The resolution also set out the fundamental viewpoint of the Party. It said:

> "We must note at the same time that the Chinese leadership has changed its lines in the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' problem and foreign policies, which nullifies previous charges of 'revisionism', and the 'four enemies' theory, all as the basis of attacking the Japanese Communist Party and intervening in Japan's internal affairs from 1966; all of which throws into sharper relief the lawlessness and illogicality of its big-powerist intervention.
>
> "One main trend in the postwar world communist movement has been the big strides made against allowing such hegemonism to prevail. Considering that hegemonism is the biggest factor in bringing about the serious, protracted and uncompromising antagonism in the international communist movement, our Party sincerely desires that the officially recognized norms of independence, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and solidarity on proper points of agreement, will now be strictly respected and observed without exception, both nominally and actually. As a member of the world revolutionary movement, our Party will continue to strive for this."

In turning over the history of relationships between the JCP and the CPC for more than fifty years, we see that about two thirds is a period of friendship and solidarity, and one third is an unhappy breach in the relationship.

Chairman Miyamoto, in the speech at the welcome meeting in Beijing at the time of the 1966 talks, said that a deep traditional friendship between the JCP and the CPC had been steeled in the fire of the long struggle. During Japanese imperialism's aggression in China, members of both Parties were firmly united in the common struggle against the common enemy, and supported each other's struggles. Tens of thousands of JCP members and supporters were arrested and imprisoned by the Japanese Tenno-system power, and not a few even sacrificed their lives. The early members of the JCP, including Chairman Miyamoto, were thrust into jail for a long time, simply because they opposed the aggressive war of Japanese militarism, and unyieldingly defended the essential interests of the working class and working people of Japan.

Chairman Sanzo Nosaka, at that time in China as the JCP representative, organized the Japanese living there and joined up with the Chinese to put an end to the aggressive war. Take, for example, the case of Sukeo Ida, a JCP member. When sent to the battlefield as a soldier in the Kanto Corps, he opposed the unjustifiable aggression, and having failed to make contact with a guerrilla unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, he killed himself, leaving one hundred thousand bullets as a tribute to the Liberation Army.

Ever since the end of the War, the JCP has stood for the restoration of diplomatic relations and the establishment of friendly relations with China, right from the founding of the People's

Republic of China; but the Japanese Government and many other political forces, as well as U.S. imperialism, took a hostile attitude to the newly-born China. When the LDP Government concluded the "Japan-China Treaty" with the Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) Administration, the JCP demanded persistently that this unjustifiable and unlawful treaty be abolished. The JCP and the CPC stood united against the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war, but the relationship between the two Parties has been broken off since 1966, due to the big powerist and hegemonistic intervention by the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong in the JCP.

The JCP has consistently taken the stand that, even though there are differences of opinion on important issues, unless such differences are imposed on our Party, friendly relations can be developed in accordance with the principle of independence, equality and non-interference in internal affairs. Any disagreement on opinions between the JCP and the CPC does not necessarily mean discontinuation of relations between the two Parties. At the talks between the Parties in Beijing, it was agreed to "continue the talks on the points of disagreement", and Mao Zedong himself said, "Let us talk again when we have an opportunity". It was the unreasonable attacks and interventions by the Chinese side that caused the breakdown in relations between the two Parties, a situation that has not been fundamentally corrected even now.

Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, all directly concerned with the talks between the two Parties, have passed on. There has been re-evaluation of Mao Zedong and the "Great Cultural Revolution", and Liu Shaoqi, "defeated" as the "biggest power-circle taking the capitalist road", has been rehabilitated.

The flow of history over these fourteen years has been a convulsive process, filled with stormy events and changes. In whatever direction the future develops, the proceedings of the talks between the JCP and the CPC and the historical developments that followed, show the importance of not yielding to any intervention, and struggling against attacks from any big power, firmly maintaining the correct position of scientific socialism and the line of independence and autonomy. This lesson of history is to be consistently studied in the past, present and future.

Republic of China, but the Japanese Government and many other political forces, as well as U.S. imperialism, took a hostile attitude to the newly-born China. When the LDP Government concluded the "Japan-China Treaty" with the Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) Administration, the JCP demanded persistently that this unjustifiable and unlawful treaty be abolished. The JCP and the CPC stood united against the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war, but the relationship between the two Parties has been broken off since 1966, due to the big powerist and hegemonistic intervention by the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong in the JCP.

The JCP has consistently taken the stand that, even though there are differences of opinion on important issues, unless such differences are imposed on our Party, friendly relations can be developed in accordance with the principle of independence, equality and non-interference in internal affairs. Any disagreement on opinions between the JCP and the CPC does not necessarily mean discontinuation of relations between the two Parties. At the talks between the Parties in Beijing, it was agreed to "continue the talks on the points of disagreement", and Mao Zedong himself said, "Let us talk again when we have an opportunity". It was the unreasonable attacks and interventions by the Chinese side that caused the breakdown in relations between the two Parties, a situation that has not been fundamentally corrected even now.

Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, all directly concerned with the talks between the two Parties, have passed on. There has been re-evaluation of Mao Zedong and the "Great Cultural Revolution", and Liu Shaoqi, "defeated" as the "biggest power-circle taking the capitalist road", has been rehabilitated.

The flow of history over these fourteen years has been a convulsive process, filled with stormy

APPENDIX I

JOINT COMMUNIQUE
OF
THE DELEGATION OF
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
AND
THE DELEGATION OF
THE VIETNAM WORKERS' PARTY
ON THE FORMER'S VISIT TO VIETNAM

FEBRUARY 27, 1966

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP), the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party led by Kenji Miyamoto, Secretary General and Standing Member of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee, made a friendship visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from February 17 to 27, 1966.

APPENDIX

During its stay in Vietnam the delegation was received by President Ho Chi Minh, who had cordial talks with its members.

The delegation visited the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee and had a cordial meeting with the delegation of heroes and model fighter of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces then on visit to North Vietnam.

The delegation visited the Vietnam Revolution Museum, met workers of the "March 8" Textile Plant who are engaged in an emulation drive to carry out the state plan and prepare themselves for the fight against U.S. imperialism. It also visited the people in Thanh Hoa Province who are boosting

APPENDIX I

JOINT COMMUNIQUE
OF
THE DELEGATION OF
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
AND
THE DELEGATION OF
THE VIETNAM WORKERS' PARTY
ON THE FORMER'S VISIT TO VIETNAM

FEBRUARY 27, 1966

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP), the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party led by Kenji Miyamoto, Secretary General and Standing Member of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee, made a friendship visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from February 17 to 27, 1966.

During its stay in Vietnam the delegation was received by President Ho Chi Minh, who had cordial talks with its members.

The delegation visited the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee and had a cordial meeting with the delegation of heroes and model fighter of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces then on visit to North Vietnam.

The delegation visited the Vietnam Revolution Museum, met workers of the "March 8" Textile Plant who are engaged in an emulation drive to carry out the state plan and prepare themselves for the fight against U.S. imperialism. It also visited the people in Thanh Hoa Province who are boosting production and valiantly fighting against U.S. imperialism for national salvation.

The delegation attended the grand welcome meeting of the Hanoi citizens sponsored by the VWP Hanoi Committee in its honor.

During this meeting and these visits the delegation was accorded a most hearty welcome. This clearly proves the warm friendship and militant solidarity of the Vietnamese working class and people toward the working class and people of Japan.

During the visit of the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party to Vietnam, the delegation of the Vietnam Workers' Party held talks with it in a cordial atmosphere. The two delegations informed each other of the respective situation in Vietnam and Japan, the revolutionary struggle of the two peoples and exchanged views on problems of common concern.

On the Japanese side were:

Kenji Miyamoto, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party,

Masayoshi Oka, Standing Member of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee, Member of the Secretariat of the JCP Central Committee, Editor-in-Chief of "Akahata",

Korehito Kurahara, Member of the Presidium of the JCP CC and Head of the Cultural Department of the JCP CC,

Itaru Yonehara, Member of the Presidium of the JCP CC and Editor-in-Chief of "Zen-ei" (Vanguard),

Ichiro Sunama, Member of the Secretariat of the JCP CC,

Koichiro Ueda, Alternate Member of the JCP CC,

Tetsuzo Fuwa, Alternate Member of the JCP CC,

Akira Kudo, Alternate Member of the JCP CC, Editor-in-Chief of "Gikai to Jichitai" ("National and Local Assemblies and Self-Governing Bodies") monthly magazine.

Attending the talks on the Vietnamese side were:

Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party Central Committee (VWP CC),

Truong Chinh, Political Bureau Member of the VWPCC,

Le Duc Tho, Political Bureau Member and Member of the Secretariat of the VWP CC,

Nguyen Duy Trinh, Political Bureau Member of the VWP CC,

Nguen Van Tran, Member of the Secretariat of the VWP CC,

Tran Quang Huy, Candidate Member of the VWPCC and Deputy-Head of the Propaganda and Educational Board of the VWP CC,

Hoang Tung, Candidate Member of the VWP CC, Editor-in-Chief of "Nhan Dan", central organ of the VWP,

Tran Chi Hien, Deputy-Head of the Commission for External Relations of the VWP CC.

The two parties severely condemn the U.S. imperialists for blatantly violating the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, and for waging a war of aggression in South Vietnam and carrying out unjust and illegal air raids on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Defying the protest of the world's peoples and the American people, the U.S. imperialists have dispatched more than 200,000 strong troops of the United States and its satellites and are using on a large scale the most barbarous war means, poison gas and toxic chemicals of various types, carrying out the policy of "kill all, burn all and destroy all", killing en masse civilians in South Vietnam along with fierce bombing and strafing of schools, hospitals, pagodas, churches, dams and densely populated areas in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The U.S. imperialists' aggression in Vietnam constitutes a big crime against the national-liberation movement, an unpardonable encroachment upon the socialist countries, and a most arrogant provocation against the peace-and-justice-loving people all over the world. It seriously jeopardizes peace and security of all the peoples.

The two parties energetically denounce the duplicity of the so-called "unconditional negotiations" proposed by U.S. President L.B. Johnson aimed at covering up the scheme of the U.S. imperialists to step up and escalate their aggressive war in Vietnam.

The two parties resolutely expose the policy of the Sato Government which tails after and cooperates with the United States in her war of aggression in Vietnam. The two parties sternly condemn the U.S. imperialists for colluding with the Japanese monopoly capitalists in restoring Japanese militarism and turning Japan into an important base for the U.S. imperialists to carry out their aggression and war plots in Asia, and for the time being to serve the U.S. aggressive war in Vietnam. The two parties unanimously point out that the Japan-South Korea Treaty is practically a step toward the setting up of a N.E.A.T.O. military alliance with the United States as the core. The two parties severely condemn the U.S. imperialists for having sent nuclear submarines to Japan. The two parties affirm that the struggle of the Japanese people to demand the abolition of all military bases of U.S. imperialism in Japan and the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara to Japan is an important contribution to peace in Asia and independence of

Japan.

The two parties unanimously hold that at present the formation and expansion of a united front of the world's peoples against U.S. imperialism, for world peace and national independence is an extremely important and urgent task. The Vietnam Workers' Party and the Japanese Communist Party will do all in their power to make active contributions to carrying out this task.

The delegation of the Japanese Communist Party is aware that the Vietnamese people are waging a struggle against the U.S. aggression for national salvation not only for their own interests, but also for the common interests of the entire socialist camp and the peace- and freedom-loving peoples in the world. It declares unreserved support for the just struggle of the Vietnamese people, and full support for the 4-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-part statement of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation on March 22, 1965. It fully supports President Ho Chi Minh's letter of January 24, 1966 addressed to the heads of states of various countries.

The delegation of the Vietnam Workers' Party asserts unreserved support of the Vietnamese people to the persistent and valiant struggle of the Japanese people against domination, oppression and exploitation by the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese monopolists and for independence, democracy, peace, neutrality and a better life. The delegation warmly welcomes the great successes which the Japanese people have won in their present revolutionary struggle under the leadership of their staunch and clear-sighted vanguard--the Japanese Communist Party. These successes are also successes of the Vietnamese people.

The delegation of the Vietnam Workers' Party sincerely thanks the Japanese Communist Party, the working people and all the democratic and progressive forces in Japan for their vigorous and whole-hearted support to the struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

The delegation of the Japanese Communist Party sincerely thanks the Vietnam Workers' Party and the Vietnamese people for having lent constant and warm support to the Japanese people's struggle for independence, democracy and peace.

The two delegations are firmly confident that the warm friendship and militant solidarity between the Vietnam Workers' Party and the working class and people of Vietnam and the Japanese Communist Party, working class and people will strengthen and develop with every passing day so as to step up the common struggle against the U.S. imperialists, to defend purity of Marxism-Leninism and to contribute to winning victory for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism in the world.

February 27, 1966

APPENDIX II

JOINT STATEMENT
OF
THE DELEGATIONS OF
THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
AND
THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA

MARCH 21, 1966

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party led by Comrade Kenji Miyamoto, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, paid a friendship visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from March 11 to 21, 1966.

During its stay the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party had talks with the leaders of the Workers' Party of Korea.

Present on behalf of the Japanese Communist Party were Comrade Kenji Miyamoto, Member of the Presidium and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party; Comrade Masayoshi Oka, Member of the Presidium and Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the JCP; Comrades Korehito Kurahara and Itaru Yonehara, Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the JCP; Comrade Ichiro Sunama, Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the JCP and Comrades Koichiro Ueda, Tetsuzo Fuwa and Akira Kudo, Alternate Members of the Central Committee of the JCP.

Present at the talks on behalf of the Workers' Party of Korea were Comrade Kim Il Sung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea; Comrades Cho Yong Kun, Pak Keum Chul, Li Hyo Sun and Kim Kwang Hyup, Members of the Political Committee and Vice-Chairmen of the Central Committee of the WPK; Comrade Pak Yong Kook, Member and Department-Director of the Central Committee of the WPK; and Comrades Kim Kwang Jung and Kim Hi Joon, Vice-Department-Directors of the Central Committee of the WPK.

The talks proceeded in an atmosphere overflowing with friendship and amity.

At the talks views were exchanged on questions concerning the present situation, the international communist movement and the strengthening of unity between the two Parties and other questions of common concern.

The delegations of the two Parties expressed satisfaction with the fact that the traditional friendship and solidarity formed between the two Parties in the long-drawn arduous struggle against the common enemies are daily being strengthened and developing on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The Korean and Japanese peoples have fought and are fighting against the common enemies.

In the past, the Communists of the two countries waged a protracted difficult struggle against Japanese imperialism and fought against its despotic rule and policies of aggression and colonial enslavement against other countries.

Today they are waging a joint struggle against U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism which is coming back to life.

In this struggle the Communists of Korea and Japan have been closely cooperating with and supporting each other.

The cooperation and support of the Communists of the two countries constitute great strength for each other in the struggle against the common enemy.

The strengthening of cooperation and unity between the Workers' Party of Korea and the Japanese Communist Party is of weighty significance under the present condition in which the aggressive machinations against Asia by U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism tailing behind it are coming into the open.

The Japanese Communist Party highly appraises the achievements made by the Korean people in the socialist revolution and socialist construction under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The Korean people have done away with the backward colonial economy of the past and built a self-reliant national economy, and turned their country into a developed socialist industrial and agricultural state, overcoming through their heroic struggle the difficult conditions caused by the aggressive war of U.S. imperialism.

In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a big upsurge is being effected today in all domains of the political, economic and cultural life, the entire people are closely rallied around the Workers' Party of Korea and the political and moral unity of the people has been fortified.

However, the situation in South Korea today stands out in diametrical contrast to this: economy has gone bankrupt, national culture is being trampled underfoot, the people are groaning from total political non-rights and poverty. The hardships and misfortunes of the South Korean people are the outcome of the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and the country-selling, treacherous policy of the Pak Jung Hi puppet clique. The resistance struggle of the South Korean people for driving out the U.S. imperialist occupationists, overthrowing the military terror rule of the Pak Jung Hi clique and frustrating the reinvasion of

Japanese militarism, is gaining momentum. The struggle of the workers, peasants, students, intellectuals and all other sections of the people for the right of existence, for democracy, national dignity and self-reliant unification is growing in scope.

The Japanese Communist Party expresses fervent support for and encouragement to and militant solidarity with the South Korean people in their anti-U.S., national salvation struggle.

The unification of Korea is the supreme national task of the Korean people. The entire Korean people are waging a nationwide struggle to achieve the unification of the country by themselves against the U.S. imperialists' colonial policy and nation-splitting policy. The U.S. imperialist aggressors must pull out of South Korea without delay. The Korean question must and can be settled only by the Korean people themselves free from any outside interference.

The Japanese Communist Party resolutely denounces the hostile policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursued by U.S. imperialism and the Sato Government, which is trailing behind it, and expresses all-out support to the policy of the Workers' Party of Korea and the struggle of the Korean people for the self-reliant unification of the country.

The Japanese Communist Party considers that the struggle of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Korean people who are expediting the socialist construction of the country and reinforcing national defense in high spirits at the eastern outpost facing U.S. imperialism is a great contribution to the cause of peace and socialism.

Advancing in Japan is the massive struggle of the Japanese people for the removal of the U.S. military bases, the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara and the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. "Security

Treaty" and against the revival of Japanese militarism and the call of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear-powered aircraft-carriers at Japanese ports.

The democratic forces of Japan are resolutely opposed to the U.S. imperialists' criminal war of aggression against the Vietnamese people and strongly demand the abrogation of the Japan-"ROK Treaty" concluded under the manipulation of U.S. imperialism.

They are also exerting much efforts for the frustration of the anti-popular policy of the Sato Government which is scheming to mal-revise the Constitution and introduce a small-constituency system, suppressing the democratic rights of the Japanese people and ruining the people's living.

The Japanese Communist Party stands in the van of the struggle of the Japanese people for the formation of a National Democratic United Front against the rule of U.S. imperialism and its junior partner, Japanese monopoly capital, and for Japan's independence, democracy, peace and neutrality and for the improvement of living.

The Workers' Party of Korea considers that the struggle of the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese people is a heavy blow to the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression in Asia and Japanese monopoly capitals' policy of reviving and reinforcing militarism and greatly contributes to the cause of world peace.

The Japanese Communist Party has consolidated its unity by smashing the anti-Party revisionist group of Shiga and Kamiyama and is making active efforts to build a powerful Party.

By its unflinching struggle the Japanese Communist Party has won the firm support and trust of the working class and awakened toiling people of Japan.

The Workers' Party of Korea fully supports the line and policy of the Japanese Communist Party which is defending the interests of the Japanese people placed under the rule and oppression of U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital and expresses militant solidarity with the Japanese people in their struggle for the independence and peaceful, democratic development of Japan.

The U.S. imperialists are engrossed in outrageous intervention and aggression in all parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America and are directing the spearhead of their aggression, above all, against Asia.

U.S. imperialism has invested roughly seventy percent of its economic and military "aid" in the Asian areas and deployed nearly a half of its overseas troops in the Asian and Pacific areas; it has framed up various military alliances and is using them in the anti-communist encirclement in Asia and in the implementation of its aggressive plan.

The delegations of the two Parties unanimously pointed out with emphasis that the U.S. imperialists' aggression against Vietnam and the struggle of the Vietnamese people against it have become the focus of the struggle between the imperialist forces and the anti-imperialist forces.

The Japanese Communist Party and the Workers' Party of Korea vehemently condemn the U.S. imperialists for persisting in the barbarous war of aggression in South Vietnam and illegally bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam flagrantly trampling underfoot the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

The U.S. imperialists are conducting "scorched-earth operations" of killing all, burning all and destroying all in South Vietnam and are bombing and strafing haphazardly schools, hospitals and populated areas of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Not content with having hurled troops over two hundred thousand strong into South Vietnam, U.S. imperialism is continuously sending reinforcements, bringing in South Korean puppet troops and troops of other satellite countries in quantities and is trying to escalate the war of aggression to Laos, Cambodia and, furthermore, to China and Korea.

The U.S. imperialists' aggression in Vietnam is not only an act against the Vietnamese people but an open aggression against the socialist camp and a challenge to the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America who are striving for national liberation and a grave menace to world peace and the security of all nations.

The delegations of the two Parties roundly denounce the Pak Jung Hi puppet cliques' criminal act of driving out the South Korean youth under the direction of the U.S. imperialists to the aggressive war against the Vietnamese people and the Sato Governments' active cooperation with the aggression in Vietnam.

The delegations of the two Parties resolutely condemn the so-called proposal for "peace talks" loudly advertised by U.S. imperialism in an attempt to hoodwink the world public opinion. The delegations of the two Parties consider that the Vietnamese question must be settled only on the basis of the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-part statement of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation.

The U.S. imperialists must at once stop the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the war of aggression in South Vietnam and withdraw the troops of the United States and her satellite countries.

The delegations of the two Parties warmly hail the heroic Vietnamese people who are dealing telling blows to the U.S. imperialist aggressors and extend utmost support and encouragement to them.

The two Parties regard it as sacred duty of the countries of the socialist camp, the Communist and Workers' Parties and the peace-loving countries and peoples of the whole world to oppose the U.S. imperialists' criminal war of aggression and to render active assistance to the Vietnamese people in their just struggle.

The Japanese Communist Party and the Workers' Party of Korea will actively assist the Vietnamese people in their just struggle against the U.S. aggression and for national salvation and fight on to the end together with the Vietnamese people until the U.S. imperialist aggressors are driven out of entire Vietnam and the Vietnamese people win independence and peace. The two Parties are convinced that the final victory belongs to the Vietnamese people and the defeat of the aggressors is inevitable.

The U.S. imperialists clearly understand what grave consequences the escalation of the Vietnam war will bring about. If they, disregarding the consequences, continue to play with fire recklessly, they will be dealt a ruinous blow in the war flames they themselves kindled.

The delegations of the two Parties directed deep attention to the U.S.-toeing, reactionary policy of the Sato Government which is faithfully serving U.S. imperialism and its junior partner, Japanese monopoly capital.

The delegations of the two Parties strongly hold that the "Japan-ROK Treaty" concluded some time ago between the Sato Government and the Pak Jung Hi clique of South Korea is illegal and invalid and must be scrapped.

The "Japan-ROK Treaty" runs counter to the interests of both the Japanese and Korean peoples and threatens peace in Asia and the world. The integration of this Treaty with the Japan-U.S. "Security Treaty" and the "ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty" virtually means the formation of a "Northeast Asia Military Alliance" by U.S. imperialism, the Sato Government and the puppet cliques of South Korea and Taiwan.

This Treaty paves the way for the Japanese militarists to reinvade South Korea and creates a new obstacle to the solution of the question of unification of Korea. And it is fraught with the grave danger of involving the Japanese territory and people deeper in the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism against Asia.

Japan has again become a dangerous hotbed of aggression and war in Asia. U.S. imperialism is openly trying to inveigle Japan into its Asian nuclear strategic system while the Japanese ruling circles are scheming to realize their old dream of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" by participating in the U.S. imperialist war of aggression in Asia.

The Sato Government has worked out aggressive plans against Korea and other Asian countries. The "three arrow operation plan" and the "flying dragon operation plan" both of which have been mapped out under the command of U.S. imperialism, are designed for preparing a war of aggression against Korea and other socialist countries. The Sato Government is pushing forward the nuclearization of the Self-Defense Forces and contemplating to dispatch them overseas under the pretext of "cooperation with the United Nations".

Japan has become an operational base as well as a supply base for U.S. imperialism in its war of aggression in Vietnam. The Sato Government openly supports the U.S. imperialists' aggression in Vietnam, helps the U.S. forces through the supply of large quantities of war materials and takes an active part in the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression in Vietnam. At home the Sato Government is pursuing a policy of reviving militarism and strengthening political reaction. To this end, it attempts to mal-revise the Constitution and to lay down serious restrictions on the people's rights. The delegations of the two Parties sternly denounce the criminal moves of the U.S. imperialists to put up Japanese militarism as a shock-brigade in their aggression in Asia by reviving and strengthening it and the schemes of the Sato Government which is again taking the road of overseas aggression, trailing behind them.

To struggle against the revival of Japanese militarism while fighting against U.S. imperialism is an urgent task not only of the Japanese people but also of all the socialist countries and the peace-loving people. We should attach importance to the struggle against the revival and reinforcement of Japanese militarism, regarding it as an inseparable part of the struggle against U.S. imperialism and must frustrate its aggressive design through united actions. It is of particular importance to unmask the Sato Government which is disguising itself as a "friend" of the Asian and African peoples and thwart its diplomatic maneuvers for dividing the anti-imperialist forces.

Failure to wage a struggle against the revival of Japanewe militarism means to strengthen the position of U.S. imperialism.

The delegations of the two Parties express their unanimous determination to cooperate closer with each other in the struggle against the common enemies, U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism which is in league with the former, and for the security of the Korean and Japanese peoples and maintenance of peace in Asia.

The delegations of the two Parties protest against and impeach the Japanese authorities, policy of persecution and discrimination of the Korean citizens in Japan, which has become all the more unscrupulous since the conclusion of the "Japan-ROK Treaty". Both parties hold that the Korean citizens in Japan should be fully guaranteed the freedom of travel to and from the homeland, freedom of acquiring the nationality of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, freedom of national education and all democratic national rights. The Japanese Government must treat and protect the Korean citizens in Japan as foreigners, and immediately put an end to such criminal acts as murder and violence against them.

The delegations of the two Parties strongly protest against the barbarous suppression and massacre, of the Communist Party of Indonesia and the Indonesian democratic forces perpetrated by the Indonesian rightist reactionary forces at the instigations of U.S. imperialism. The unwarranted step of outlawing the Indonesian Communist Party and progressive democratic organizations must be withdrawn. The anti-communist racket kept up by the Indonesian reactionary forces must be stopped at once and the illegal arrests and trial of progressive people and unjust sentences passed upon them be canceled.

The delegations of the two Parties express unshakable solidarity with and support to the progressive forces in Indonesia who are defending national independence and democratic development of the country, rejecting the scheme of foreign imperialism and the reactionary forces at home to turn Indonesia to the right.

The Japanese Communist Party and the Workers' Party of Korea express firm solidarity with the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who are struggling against imperialism and colonialism, old and new, and for national liberation and consolidation of independence.

Both parties express firm solidarity with the working class and the working people at large in the capitalist countries who are fighting against exploitation and oppression by monopoly capital at home and abroad and against the reactionary policies of the ruling quarters.

All the international events in the last several years attest to the absolute correctness of the standpoint of the Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties which defines that U.S. imperialism is the biggest international exploiter, ringleader of aggression and war, bulwark of modern colonialism, chieftain of world reaction and international gendarme. The United States of America is the most aggressive and reactionary imperialist state and the ringleader of world imperialism. U.S. imperialism is perpetrating aggression and subversive machinations against the socialist states and peace-loving countries, suppressing the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress and harassing peace everywhere in the world. U.S. imperialism is common enemy No. 1 of the world people.

Modern revisionism has obscured this fact by beautifying U.S. imperialism. The delegations of the two Parties unanimously considered that the struggle against U.S. imperialism is closely linked with the struggle against opportunism which avoids the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

The delegations of the two Parties have confirmed that under the present situation in which U.S. imperialism is running wild in the aggressive war, the struggle against it is the main international task for all the progressive people of the world. They are convinced that it is the primary task of the socialist countries and Communist and Workers' Parties to rally the broad anti-imperialist forces and concentrate all strength on the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

Taking advantage of certain difficulties created within the international communist movement, U.S. imperialism is scheming to escalate the aggressive war in Vietnam, to strangulate the national liberation movement and to invade and destroy the socialist countries one by one. Failure to counteract this with the united might of the anti-imperialist forces hampers the efforts to crush the U.S. imperialists' policies of aggression and war in more effective way.

The delegations of the two Parties unanimously emphasized that under such a situation it is urgent above all to strengthen the international joint action and united front of the anti-imperialist forces in checking the U.S. imperialists' aggression in Vietnam and assisting the Vietnamese people.

The anti-imperialist united front can display its decisive might only if all the anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces of the world unite themselves against the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war, centering around the socialist camp, the international communist movement, the working class movements and the national-liberation movement.

Even under conditions in which many difficulties exist in realizing this, it is important to make every positive effort for the successful development of the international united action and united front of these anti-imperialist forces in order to implement the pressing task of aiding the Vietnamese people against the U.S. imperialists' aggression in Vietnam.

The delegations of the two Parties confirmed that the international democratic movements play an important role in strengthening an international joint struggle and united front against U.S. imperialism.

It is to be welcomed for stepping up anti-U.S. joint action that recently a number of meetings of international democratic organizations impeached the aggressive machinations of U.S. imperialism and adopted measures to assist the struggle of the Vietnamese people. Particularly, the Asian, African and Latin American Peoples Solidarity Conference held in Havana in January this year made important success in forming the anti-imperialist united front of the peoples of the three continents.

The delegations of the two Parties deem it necessary to invigorate the activities of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples' solidarity organizations and wage a joint, anti-imperialist struggle, rallying the broad democratic forces of the international democratic movements in all fields.

They consider it essential to fight to achieve genuine unity of the socialist camp and genuine solidarity of the international communist movement.

Unity is a powerful weapon of the working class. The unity of the ranks of the international communist movement multiplies its strength several fold.

Hence, struggle should be waged in defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism, in opposition to modern revisionism and, at the same time, guarding against dogmatism and sectarianism in the international communist movement.

The delegations of the two Parties stress that all the Communist and Workers' Parties without a single exception should strictly abide by the norms governing relations among fraternal parties in order to really consolidate unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of the international communist movement.

There can be no party with privileged position within the international communist movement. All parties, big or small and whether of a socialist country or not, are equal and independent.

Unilateral will should not be forced upon fraternal parties and any acts of intervening in their internal affairs and bringing pressure to bear upon them are absolutely impermissible.

As was emphasized in the Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of 81 Countries, all Parties are independent, and shape their lines and policies in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles and according to the specific conditions in their respective countries. Only by so doing can they correctly lead revolution in their countries and fulfill their entire responsibility for that revolution and, at the same time, be faithful to the international obligations. Thus each Party jointly contributes to the theories of Marxism-Leninism and to the development of the international communist movement.

Unity of the socialist camp and solidarity of the international communist movement should be realized on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and on the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and 1960 Statement of the conferences of the representatives of the fraternal parties.

The Japanese Communist Party and the Workers' Party of Korea will strive to overcome differences in the international communist movement in keeping with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and to achieve its genuine solidarity.

The delegations of the two Parties are convinced that freiendship and solidarity between the Japanese Communist Party and the Workers' Party of Korea will contribute to defending the purity of Marxism-Leninism and strengthening the ranks of the international communist movement.

The delegations of the two Parties note with satisfaction that their talks will greatly contribute to further cementing the unity between the two Parties based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and to developing the friendly relations between the working class and peoples of the two countries.

March 21, 1966, Pyongyang

APPENDIX III

SPEECH BY
GENERAL SECRETARY KENJI MIYAMOTO AT THE GRAND WELCOME RALLY IN BEIJING

MARCH 26, 1966

Dear Comrade Zhou Enlai,
Dear Comrade Zhu De,
Dear Comrade Peng Zhen,
Dear comrades and friends of all fields in China,

First I want to express our wholehearted thanks for the cordial welcome you have given our JCP delegation.

May I take this opportunity to convey greetings of firm solidarity to the Communist Party of China and the whole Chinese people, now resolutely engaged in the struggle against the "China-containment" policy of U.S. imperialism, and striving for the socialist construction of your country.

There is a strong traditional friendship between the Communist Party of China and the Japanese Communist Party, forged in the fires of the protracted struggle.

Back in the prewar years, when Japanese imperialism invaded pre-liberation China and waged a war of aggression against your people, the members of both Parties, yours and ours, carried on a tenacious struggle aganinst Japanese imperialism.

From the time of the very founding of our Party in 1922, we have supported the complete independence of China, combining this with the demand for the overthrow of the Tenno-system rule in Japan. When

Japanese imperialism was engaged in the barbarous war of aggression against China, the Japanese Communists were engaged in a struggle for a democratic revolution, linked with the struggle against the war of aggression. In this struggle, some tens of thousands of Party members and Party supporters were arrested and imprisoned by the Japanese Tenno regime, and no small number of our comrades gave their lives. Our Comrade Sukeo Ida lost his life in delivering 100,000 rounds of ammunition to Chinese guerrilla units in 1933, and our Comrade Sanzo Nosaka, with other Party members, fought by your side in this land of China against the Japanese imperialist aggression. When you were victorious in the Revolution and hoisted the flag of the People's Republic of China, the Japanese Communist Party, which had always seen the anti-Japanese war waged by the Chinese people under the guidance of the Communist Party of China as a war for justice, hailed the victory with great pleasure as a major world-historic event.

The Japanese Communist Party and the advanced Japanese democratic forces strongly oppose the "China-containment" policy of U.S. imperialism, now waging a brutal war of aggression against Vietnam. U.S. policy aims at isolating China, as part of U.S. imperialism's vicious plan to invade the China mainland, a criminal plot against the peoples of Asia and the whole world. We also stand firmly opposed to the "two Chinas" scheme, and firmly support the Chinese people's just demand for the liberation of Taiwan; we strongly condemn the ruling circles of Japan for supporting U.S. imperialism's "China-containment" policy. One of the most shameful acts of this century, in our judgment, is that the Japanese ruling circles, who were guilty of waging a long and impermissible war of aggression against China and forcing enormous sacrifices upon the Chinese people, still refuse diplomatic relations with China, and persist in their policy of hostility of China today, even after these twenty years since they were defeated in the war of aggression.

Comrades and friends,

I want also to express deep respect and appreciation to the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people for having given warm solidarity and support in our struggle for independence, democracy, peace and neutrality, as well as for a better life for the Japanese people, while our country is under semi-occupation by U.S. imperialism.

The Communist Party of China and the Chinese people have fought for a long time against the invasion of their own country by foreign imperialism, and are firm supporters of the national-liberation struggles in other parts of the world. Back in 1960, when the Japanese people were waging a stormy struggle against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Chinese people held a great rally of one million people in Beijing in solidarity and support for the Japanese people, as well as other great demonstrations of ten and more millions of people in other parts. In the recent struggle of the Japanese and Korean peoples against the "Japan-ROK Treaty", people of all fields in China expressed strong and active solidarity and support. Every year in August in Japan at the World Conference against A and H Bombs, delegates of the Chinese people have stood with the Japanese advanced democratic forces in upholding the correct line.

The militant friendship displayed by the Chinese people through all these events will always be remembered and highly appreciated by the politically-aware Japanese democratic forces.

By contrast with this, the modern revisionists under Nikita S. Khrushchev came out with praise of U.S. imperialists, and then forced a split on the Japanese movement against A and H bombs by demanding support of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; since last year, their role has been extremely harmful to the Japanese people's struggle against its two enemies--U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital--by glamorizing even the LDP Government of Japan.

Comrades and friends,

When we visited the Jiangnan Shipbuilding Works in Shanghai, the big machine tool factory, and the Yangshupu Power Plant and the Yongxin Seamless Steel Factory, we were impressed with the keen enthusiasm of the workers in their battle for production under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

I could not withhold some strong feelings as my respect grew for the Chinese people in their struggle for socialist construction; it kindled my anger against the intrigues of the U.S. imperialists, who are looking for an opportunity to attack China, Korea and other socialist states, even while escalating their war of aggression in Vietnam, and are trying to hinder and destroy the socialist construction to which the Chinese workers are devoting themselves. This must never be allowed.

During our visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, we saw the "March 8 Spinning Factory" in Hanoi, built with aid from the Chinese Government. Here, the Vietnamese workers were literally combining production with national defense. In our friendly talks with the workers as they strove to maintain production even under U.S. air raids, I realized how urgent it was to increase our efforts to repulse the U.S. aggressors.

The Vietnamese people are fighting a heroic struggle against U.S. imperialism's barbaric aggression, and the progressive people of the world give wholehearted support and praise to them for their courage and achievements. Here in Beijing also, only the other day, when the Sixteenth Anniversary Meeting of the Anti-American Vietnam

Struggle was held on March 18, this was strongly emphasized. From March 12, in many places, in Tokyo also, international solidarity week for support of the Vietnamese people was held, as decided by the Asia-Africa-Latin America Tricontinental Solidarity Conference; what a vast number of people stood together on this!

The great results won by the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam, with four-fifths of the territory and more than ten million people freed in the struggle against brutal attacks by U.S. imperialism and its agents, and the shooting down of more than 900 intruding U.S. planes by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, greatly encourage the forces of anti-imperialism, for national liberation and world peace. The struggle of the Vietnamese people fighting so heroically against the brutal invasion of U.S. imperialism, with its armory of latest weapons and assisted by its junior allied forces, illuminates the pages of history as a great revolutionary struggle of this century.

The Japanese Communist Party firmly supports the four-point demands of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the five-part statement of the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam. This is for the future, as it was in the past.

The greatest rally and demonstration was held in Tokyo on March 20 by our Party and the politically-aware democratic forces of all fields, as part of the "Nationwide Grand United Action for Realization of Demands", fought with great enthusiasm all over the country, the biggest since the 1960 struggle against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The rally adopted a special message of support for the Vietnamese people, along with many demands expressed in the struggle.

The Vietnamese people's struggle is a triple struggle: it is for the sovereignty and independence of Vietnam; it is a struggle to defend the most important part of the world's anti-imperialist front; it is a struggle to defend the world socialist system.

We therefore have great respect for the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people, who always ardently support and help the people of Vietnam.

The Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression is a life-and-death struggle for them; but it is also an urgent task for the revolutionary forces, the anti-imperialist forces of national liberation, and for world peace to support and assist their struggle.

This becomes clear if one pays attention to the following issues:

First; the U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam is the main focal point in the U.S. strategy for world domination, part of the aggression and war policy implemented by U.S. imperialism all over the world, but in Asia, Africa and Latin America especially. Using various pretexts they blatantly express their intention to bring South Vietnam under the domination of the United States.

The U.S. Special Envoy, W.A. Harriman, who came to Tokyo recently, in round-table talks with the leaders of various Japanese political parties, (excluding the Japanese Communist Party, of course) claimed that the United States would never withdraw from Vietnam; and if they did, they would suffer a series of counterattacks in Latin-America and other parts of the world.

Second; the United States is bogged down in Vietnam. As imperialist aggressors, in order to drag their feet out of the bog, they are escalating their aggression to new levels. We are reminded that Japanese imperialism, when driven into a corner in its aggression against China, escalated its aggression all over the Pacific areas, and went on until totally defeated. The plan to blockade Haiphong Harbor and their propaganda about there being no "sanctuary area" in Vietnam safe from air raids, are linked with their war-escalation plans. They are continuing the unlawful bombing of the liberated area of Laos, using burglar's logic; they are even expanding their plan of aggression against not only South-East Asian areas, but also against the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other socialist Asian countries. Their aim is to prevent the national defense strength of socialist China to expand, especially in the field of nuclear development.

Third; when U.S. imperialist aggression is escalated, it is after taking account of the international effect of the opportunism, and the divisions caused by modern revisionism, and the complications that have arisen in the international communist movement. When the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam began, the outpost of the socialist camp in South-East Asia, all this was especially taken in their calculations in launching and prolonging the bombing.

We all know that U.S. imperialist aggression derives from its own aggressive character. But it is also perfectly clear that careful calculations were made in planning the aggression, measuring the reactions to their aggression.

All this makes it clear that the urgent task for the world's people is to strengthen the struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam.

Comrades and friends,

As world history shows us, U.S. imperialism, acting as an international gendarme, is the leader of world reaction, the main force of aggression and war and the common No. 1 enemy of the world's peoples. Against U.S. imperialism, the international united front is the powerful weapon of the world's peoples in fighting this worst enemy.

The struggle of the Japanese Communist Party is being waged under "four banners", as laid down in the Party Program, one of which is the "banner of the international united front against imperialism, headed by the United States, and for national liberation and peace".

Communists all over the world once aroused themselves against the fascism and militarism of Japanese, German and Italian imperialists, on the appeal for an international anti-fascist united front. The ideological and political line of this movement played a significant role in defeating fascism and militarism of Japan, Germany and Italy. The brilliant victory of the Chinese Revolution was won under the wise leadership of the Communist Party of China and by the heroic struggle of the Chinese people, but clearly the international anti-fascist united front helped this victory to be won.

As the enemy of the world's peoples, U.S. imperialism is now as dangerous as the fascist forces of Hitler, Mussolini and Japanese militarism were.

Under such new circumstances, we must have an effective weapon in the hands of the world's peoples in the fight against U.S. imperialism.

We all know that Comrade Mao Zedong has been calling for several years for a united front of the world's peoples against U.S. imperialism, to cope with important international questions. These appeals by Comrade Mao Zedong are seen as important contributions to the world anti-imperialist struggle; they include the statement made in August 1963 against the United States and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique of South Vietnam, through to the statement made in May 1965 for support of the people of the Dominican Republic.

I am convinced therefore that the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China, and the Japanese and Chinese peoples, now have the conditions for marching on together, under the banner of the international united front against U.S. imperialism.

We of the Japanese Communist Party are determined to keep that banner of the international united front against U.S. imperialism flying high, and to seek the way for its effective realization.

Comrades and friends,

If we are to win the battle against U.S. imperialism's policy of aggression and war, it is necessary to oppose modern revisionism, the main danger in the present-day international communist movement, and at the same time to guard against dogmatism and sectarianism.

On this issue, the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China both have had a lot of experience. Since we ourselves suffered open attacks and intervention by the CPSU leadership under Khrushchev, and had to wage severe counterattacks against them, we have been engaged in many theoretical and ideological struggles.

The basic error of modern revisionism in attempting to beautify U.S. imperialism has been exposed before the whole world's peoples, in the course of the U.S. war of aggression against Vietnam. The people of the world are ever more determinedly joining the ranks of the struggle against U.S. imperialism. If we keep that banner of the international united front flying high against U.S. imperialism, and march together by linking it with the struggle against modern revisionism--all forms of opportunism--we can further isolate U.S. imperialism and strengthen the isolation and bankruptcy of modern revisionism. This is the effective way to defeat U.S. imperialism's aggression in Vietnam, and to more effectively speed up the Vietnamese people's victory.

The Japanese Communist Party will firmly carry out this task.

Comrades and friends,

There is a fierce struggle going on now between two courses for Japan's future.

One is the Japanese people's way to independence, democracy, peace, neutrality and a better life. In this, the Japanese Communist Party is leading the way, together with the politically-aware democratic forces of Japan.

The other course is subordination to the United States and the revival of militarism; those choosing this course are U.S. imperialism and its junior ally, Japanese monopoly capital.

As a result of the persistent struggle of the Japanese democratic forces, the people's support is shifting to the former course, by which Japan's true independence, democracy, peace and a better life can be achieved. This move is seen in several nationwide elections, and in other ways.

In the elections to the House of Councilors held last July, the Liberal-Democratic Party's percentage of votes fell from the previous 47 percent to 44 percent. In the election to the Metropolitan Assembly of Tokyo, its percentage of votes fell from 48 percent to 30 percent, and from being the party with an absolute majority it became a minority party.

Economic exploitation and plunder by the U.S. and Japanese ruling circles, which means for the working masses insecurity of living because of high prices, high taxes, low wages, capitalist rationalization, housing shortage, etc., is increasing. And the Japanese working masses, through their experiences and struggle to defend their living, are becoming aware that the root cause of this insecurity is having to live in subordination to the United States, with militarism being revived under U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital.

In the attempt to recover from the setbacks they have suffered, the U.S. and Japanese ruling circles have launched new attacks on the people.

One is a plan to introduce a small-constituency-system, by revising the present electoral system, with the aim of establishing a permanent dictatorship with a majority Liberal-Democratic Party. By getting an increase in the number of Diet seats held by the reactionary forces, it would open the way for mal-revision of the Constitution, and such a mal-revision of the Constitution would open the way to the full revival of Japanese militarism, the re-introduction of conscription, and the sending of Japanese troops overseas. But in order to stop this intrigue, on March 11 the Communist Party, the Socialist Party and the Komeito together formed a "Liaison Council to Defend the Constitution and to Crush a Small-Constituency-System"; a joint counter-attack of the broad forces of Japan that has already been launched.

To win this first course for Japan's future means opening the way to even better possibilities. It is the way to rally Japanese workers, peasants and other people's masses to a National Democratic United Front against the two enemies, U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, directed toward establishing a democratic coalition government by the unity of broad democratic forces. If we succeed in this, it will be a serious blow to U.S. imperialism's intrigue to involve Japan in its war of aggression, by turning Japan into the largest base for aggression in Asia, forcing the Asian people to fight against other Asian people. Our way is to convert the stronghold for U.S. imperialism's aggression into a stronghold for friendship and solidarity with the Chinese people and other Asian nations. It is the road leading to a Japan of independence, democracy, peace and a better life, a triumphal path in the new people's democratic revolution against imperialism and monopoly capitalism.

The Program adopted by the Japanese Communist Party at the 8th Party Congress sheds light on this path.

Contrary to the Japanese people's wishes, the U.S. and Japanese ruling circles are attempting to involve Japan more deeply in U.S. imperialism's war of aggression in Vietnam, and in other new war adventures. But if the Japanese people broadly and strongly rally to the first path, the U.S. and Japanese ruling circles can never succeed with their plan. And if they try forcibly to drive Japan into their planned escalation of adventurist wars of aggression against the real interests of the Japanese people, they will certainly meet great resistance of the Japanese people and the peoples of Asia, leading to a quicker failure of U.S. imperialism's rule over Japan, allied to Japanese monopoly capital.

In the struggle between the two courses for Japan's future, we firmly believe in the final victory of the Japanese people. We will continue to hold aloft the banner of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, strengthening the ranks of our Party, and resolutely fight on to victory.

In conclusion, may I express the hope, with my whole heart, that the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people will safeguard and develop the great cause of the Chinese Revolution, and achieve great successes in socialist construction.

Long live the militant unity of the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China!

Long live friendship and solidarity between the Japanese people and the Chinese people!

Long live the international united front against U.S. imperialism!

Long live Marxist-Leninist consolidation of the ranks of the international communist movement!

Long live immortal Marxism-Leninism!

APPENDIX IV

SPEECH BY POLITICAL BUREAU MEMBER PENG ZHEN AT THE GRAND WELCOME RALLY IN BEIJING

MARCH 26, 1966

Dear Comrade Kenji Miyamoto,
Dear Comrades of the Japanese Delegation,
Dear comrades,

The people of our Capital have met here today with great joy to welcome the Japanese Communist Party Delegation led by Comrade Kenji Miyamoto. In the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the people of Beijing and all of China, I express deep respect to the Japanese Communist Party, the Japanese working class and the Japanese people.

The Japanese Communist Party is a glorious Marxist-Leninist Party, defender of the interests of the Japanese working class, the Japanese people and the Japanese nation. In the midst of frenzied oppression by imperialism and the reactionaries of Japan, the Japanese Communist Party has carried on protracted and extremely difficult struggles against the Japanese militarist war of aggression, against the reactionary domination by U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, and for the liberation of the Japanese people, in the face of many ordeals. Growing and expanding in the fires of revolutionary struggle, the Japanese Communist Party enjoys high prestige among the broad masses of the people, and is worthy of being acclaimed as the firm and highly militant vanguard of the proletariat, a battalion of

proletarian internationalists and revolutionary patriots.

Since the end of the War, the Japanese Communist Party has held aloft the banner of opposition to U.S. imperialism, and striven for national independence under the banner of revolution; this great and heroic Japanese Communist Party stands in the forefront of the struggle against U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital. Bringing together all the democratic forces of Japan opposed to U.S. imperialism and monopoly capital, it has unswervingly fought to fulfill its great historic mission of building an independent, democratic, peaceful and prosperous new Japan.

In leading the Japanese people, the Japanese Communist Party wonderfully carried out repeated mass struggles against the Japan-U.S. "Security" Treaty, for the removal of U.S. military bases, and the restoration of Okinawa and Ogasawara, and against the stationing in Japan of nuclearized U.S. submarines and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

The Japanese Communist Party has led the people in a heroic struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, and against the Japanese reactionary accomplices in that aggression, and against the "Japan-ROK Treaty".

The Japanese Communist Party has led the people in the heroic struggle against the revival of Japanese militarism by the Japanese forces of reaction, against the Sato Cabinet's intrigues to mal-revise the Constitution, and for defense of the democratic rights of the Japanese people and the living and rights of the working people.

For the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and the strengthening of friendly relations between our two peoples, the Japanese Communist Party has led the people, and in opposing the reactionaries in their backing of the U.S. imperialist policy of the "containment of

China".

Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the Japanese Communist Party has carried on a protracted struggle against Khrushchev revisionism, the present main danger in the international communist movement. It has exposed and condemned the Khrushchev revisionist criminal attempts to subvert the Japanese Communist Party, and sabotage and split the Japanese democratic movement. It has firmly expelled the traitors Shojiro Kasuga, Tomochika Naito, Yoshio Shiga and Shigeo Kamiyama, agents of the Khrushchev revisionists in Japan.

The Japanese Communist Party has expanded enormously in the struggles against U.S. imperialism, the Japanese reactionaries and modern revisionism. It has consolidated and enlarged its ranks and strengthened its unity, and the prestige and influence of the Party are growing with each passing day both at home and internationally.

The course of the Japanese Revolution has proved that the Program of the Japanese Communist Party adopted at its 8th Congress is a brilliant crystallization of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, put into practice in the Japanese revolution. The Program sheds a brilliant light on the Japanese people's road towards liberation, enriching and developing Marxism-Leninism. We are convinced that under the correct leadership of the heroic Japanese Communist Party, the revolutionary cause of the Japanese people as they march along the Marxist-Leninist path will certainly overcome all difficulties and achieve new and repeated successes.

The great successes of the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese people in their revolutionary struggles are a great inspiration and a valuable support for the Chinese people, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as to all the revolutionary people of the world; we reaffirm our gratitude and respect for the glorious Japanese Communist Party, and wish the Party and the Japanese people even greater successes in their future struggles.

The Japanese nation is a great nation, which will by no means allow the U.S. imperialists to ride on its back for long. We are convinced that the Japanese people will succeed in driving U.S. imperialism out of their country. An independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral and prosperous new Japan will certainly arise.

At present, dear comrades, the peoples of the whole world are in a severe struggle against U.S. imperialism, their main enemy, and its agents; a revolutionary struggle of the peoples of the world that is deepening still further. U.S. imperialism is surrounded by the peoples of the whole world. In the international class struggle, the revolutionary situation, in which the east wind prevails over the west wind, continues to develop. The days of U.S. imperialism and its agents are numbered.

The heroic Vietnamese people have dealt a heavy blow on the U.S. imperialists in their war of aggression. The brilliant victories of the Vietnamese people in their struggle of resistance against U.S. aggression to save their country, again provide eloquent proof that the chieftain of imperialism, U.S. imperialism, with all its latest weapons, can be defeated, and that the revolutionary peoples who persist in waging a people's war against imperialist aggression can never be conquered. Together with the Japanese people and the revolutionary peoples of the whole world, the Chinese people resolutely support the Vietnamese people in their struggle to resist U.S. aggression and save the country, backing the four-point demand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-part statement of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation. There is no representative of South Vietnam other than the

National Front for Liberation. The Vietnam problem must be resolved by the Vietnamese people themselves. U.S. imperialism must get out of South Vietnam. If the U.S. imperialists persist in carrying on their war of aggression in Vietnam, if they persist in "escalating" the war, and even imposing war on the Chinese people, well, let them just come and try. It can be stated with certainty that this will only speed up the end of U.S. imperialism.

The forces of Japanese reaction are hastening to fall in with the counter-revolutionary world strategy of U.S. imperialism. The recently signed "Japan-ROK Treaty" is nothing but a supplement to the Japan-U.S. "Security" Treaty. It is an important step in the U.S. imperialist attempt to expand the war of aggression in Asia, and for the Japanese reactionaries to work to revive militarism, and openly join with the United States in its war of aggression. The spearhead of the "Japan-ROK Treaty" is directed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, as well as against the Japanese people and other peoples of Asia. But Asia today is no longer the Asia of thirty years ago. If the Japanese reactionaries should again try to achieve their dream of a "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", they will certainly be destroyed by the revolutionary peoples of Asia, who will continue their anti-imperialist struggle.

After the signing of the "Japan-ROK Treaty", the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union hastened to fall in with the U.S. strategic plans, and collude with the Japanese reactionaries. Their so-called "Soviet-Japanese friendship" in fact is nothing but an extension of cooperation between Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism. In cooperation with U.S. imperialism, and drawing in the Japanese militarist forces, the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union is attempting to build a "cordon sanitaire" around socialist China. These criminal activities, which are directed against communism, against China, against the people, against the revolution and against Marxism-Leninism, will certainly go completely bankrupt.

Dear comrades, the unity of the Chinese and Japanese Communist Parties is built on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Our two Parties resolutely oppose modern revisionism, the main danger in the international communist movement. At the same time we also oppose modern dogmatism. Our two Parties and the peoples of our two countries always support and encourage each other. The Chinese and Japanese people have built up a profound and militant friendship, through prolonged struggle against their common enemies. In the years to come, the Chinese people will continue unswervingly to support the great revolutionary struggle of the Japanese people.

In the course of the protracted struggle against our common enemies, the Chinese and Japanese peoples have formed a deep, militant friendship. In the years to come, the Chinese people will continue to resolutely and unswervingly support the great revolutionary struggle. Comrade Mao Zedong said:

> "The Chinese and Japanese peoples should unite, the people of various Asian countries should unite, all oppressed people and nations of the world should unite, all peace-loving countries should unite, all countries and individuals subject to U.S. imperialist aggression, control, interference and bullying should unite and form a broad united front against U.S. imperialism to frustrate its plans for aggression and war and to safeguard world peace."

Let us strive together towards new successes for the cause of world peace, national liberation, people's democracy and socialism.

Long live the friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples!

Long live the militant friendship between the Communist Party of China and the Japanese Communist Party!

Long live ever-victorious Marxism-Leninism!

0082-280012-5805